财政分权与义务教育财政管理体制问题探析

我国是成功实施财政分权化的国家之一。作为公共财政框架部分之一的义务教育也实行了分权化管理,义务教育办学的责任主要地落在了县、乡两级地方政府身上。而我国庞大的义务教育事业由县、乡甚至村脆弱的财力来承担,可谓“杯水车薪”：一些农村地区和贫困山区学龄儿童无学可上,无书可读等现象屡见不鲜。可见过度分权化的义务教育财政管理体制是制约当今中国义务教育发展的症结所在。     

区域产业结构与就业结构的比较及启示——基于重庆市万州区和涪陵区的分析

产业结构和就业结构的变化反映出区域经济发展的资源分配结构及其发展进程和水平.分析发现,万州区与涪陵区在产业结构上都存在第一产业所占比重与其吸纳劳动力的比重不一致的现象,其中,涪陵区第二产业比重较大但吸纳劳动力能力较弱,而万州区第三产业吸纳劳动力能力要弱于涪陵区.两地应大力发展第三产业以改善就业结构,充分吸纳从第一产业转移出来的劳动力.     

Nonlinear IV unit root tests in panels with cross-sectional dependency

We propose a unit root test for panels with cross-sectional dependency. We allow general dependency structure among the innovations that generate data for each of the cross-sectional units. Each unit may have different sample size, and therefore unbalanced panels are also permitted in our framework. Yet, the test is asymptotically normal, and does not require any tabulation of the critical values. Our test is based on nonlinear IV estimation of the usual augmented Dickey–Fuller type regression for each cross-sectional unit, using as instruments nonlinear transformations of the lagged levels. The actual test statistic is simply defined as a standardized sum of individual IV t-ratios. We show in the paper that such a standardized sum of individual IV t-ratios has limit normal distribution as long as the panels have large individual time series observations and are asymptotically balanced in a very weak sense. We may have the number of cross-sectional units arbitrarily small or large. In particular, the usual sequential asymptotics, upon which most of the available asymptotic theories for panel unit root models heavily rely, are not required. Finite sample performance of our test is examined via a set of simulations, and compared with those of other commonly used panel unit root tests. Our test generally performs better than the existing tests in terms of both finite sample sizes and powers. We apply our nonlinear IV method to test for the purchasing power parity hypothesis in panels.     

Managing academic innovation in Taiwan: Towards a ‘scientific-economic’ framework

Since the passage of the Science and Technology Basic Law in 1999, Taiwanese universities have taken a more “scientific-economic” approach to protect and commercialize their research. This research mainly examines innovation activities such as patenting, licensing, and incubated startups in the context of Taiwanese higher education institutions (HEIs). The “scientific-economic” framework used to analyze the strategic aspects influencing these academic innovations includes (1) intellectual property managerial capabilities, (2) the strength of external industrial partnerships, (3) the university entrepreneurial orientation, and (4) government research policy. Four hypotheses were developed. Data were collected via a questionnaire with all 122 HEIs in Taiwan surveyed.The research reveals that the aspects of intellectual property managerial capability, HEI-industry partnerships, and academic entrepreneurial orientation are useful to distinguish the university's innovation performance on patent grants, licensing incomes, and firm incubation. Also, government support on research plays a moderating role in academic innovation. Managerial and policy implications for managing innovation effectively in universities were drawn.     

This is what the leading indicators lead

We propose an optimal filter to transform the Conference Board Composite Leading Index (CLI) into recession probabilities in the US economy. We also analyse the CLI's accuracy at anticipating US output growth. We compare the predictive performance of linear, VAR extensions of smooth transition regression and switching regimes, probit, non‐parametric models and conclude that a combination of the switching regimes and non‐parametric forecasts is the best strategy at predicting both the NBER business cycle schedule and GDP growth. This confirms the usefulness of CLI, even in a real‐time analysis. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

The rationality and efficacy of decisions under uncertainty and the value of an experiment

Summary A decision maker faces a known prior distribution over payoff relevant states. We compare the expected utility of this individual under two scenarios. In the first, the decision maker makes a choice without further information. In the second, the decision maker has access to an experiment before choosing an action. However, the decision maker does not know the true joint distribution over states and messages. The value of the experiment as measured by the difference in the two utility levels can be negative as well as positive. We give a condition which is necessary and sufficient for the experiment to be valuable in our sense, for any decision problem.An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title Noisy Bayes Updating and the Value of Information. We have gained from the comments of Stephen Coate, John Geanakoplos, Larry Samuelson, Timothy Van Zandt and seminar participants at Harvard Business School, Princeton, Boston University, the international conference on game theory at Stony Brook 1992 and the Winter meeting of the Econometric Society at Anaheim 1993. The first author received support for this project from NSF grant #SES-9308515 and a University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation Grant.     

An analysis of some aspects of regulatory risk and the required rate of return for public utilities

This paper uses a modification of the continuous time asset pricing model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross to analyze the effect of regulatory risk on the cost of capital. Analysis shows that random errors in setting the allowed rate of return can either increase or decrease the cost of capital depending on other regulatory parameters. However, the analysis suggests that regulatory risk is not material.     

Profit,productivity, and profit-sharing

This study is an investigation of the effect of profit-sharing on labor productivity. When monitoring labor performance is costly for management, a regular wage/salary contract is insufficient to induce profit-maximizing behavior from the worker. The authors demonstrate that when this profit-maximizing behavior can be induced only through profit-sharing, a linear profit-sharing program will increase productivity and the welfare of both management and labor. The benefit from profit-sharing is increasing up to the point where the utility of additional income is offset by the negative utility of extraordinary effort (working harder or providing higher quality work). The income effect, i.e., the change in negative utility of extraordinary effort given a change in income, can potentially either increase or decrease the point at which the income-effort tradeoff-reaches zero.     

Linking Public Investment to Private Investment. The Case of Spanish Regions

Public investment constitutes one of the main instruments of regional policies. The existence of a direct link between infrastructure and regional income per capita is usually accepted. Literature also describes a positive effect of public investment on private capital accumulation. This paper seeks to provide new empirical evidence on this latter relationship for the case of Spanish regions over the period 1965–1997 using panel data methodology. The results show a positive effect of productive and social public investment (especially in education) on private investment. The spillover effects generated by the productive infrastructures located in other regions do not seem to encourage the private investment in neighbouring regions. Public consumption and interest rate exert a negative influence on private capital accumulation. These results are robust to changes in the econometric specification.