A Comment on Müller's “Unveiling of the Veil of Uncertainty”

This comment replies to the assertion by Müller (1998) that a rational and self-interested individual faced with a thick veil of uncertainty may not, as a result, vote for a fair rule. It is argued that if such an individual is reasonably assumed to behave as if he/she were risk-averse then he/she is more likely to vote for such a rule.     

European Union and Africa: Two decades of Lomé

In light of the fact that the most recent Lomé Convention is currently being renegotiated, this study attempts to assess the overall impact of the first three Lomé Conventions on the trade flows of a selected group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP) to the European Union (EU). A brief summary of the major findings is that the Lomé Conventions had no detectable impact on ACP countries' trade with the EU, except in the case of agricultural products during the Lomé I period and that ACP countries did better than non-ACP countries in their traditional markets only, i.e., Yaoundé ACP with the original six members of the EU and the Commonwealth ACP with the United Kingdom.     

Rational Irrationality and Group Size: The Effect of Biased Beliefs on Individual Contributions Towards Collective Goods

The price of irrationality or belief manipulation varies as we move from small to large group settings. Individual members of large groups can more cheaply bias downwards their beliefs as to the immorality of their free‐riding thereby circumventing internal moral constraints. The relative anonymity inherent to large number settings moreover reduces social pressures against free‐riding stemming from some common ethical or moral norms. Both selfish individuals facing an internal moral constraint to behave altruistically and those with altruistic preferences have an incentive to bias upward their belief of the decisiveness of their contribution in large number settings. In addition, the impact of symmetry and the illusion of control can introduce biases regarding the expected reactions of others to one's own decisions. The loosening of moral constraints will tend to increase free‐rider behavior while biased beliefs about the decisiveness of one's contribution or the reaction of others to one's actions will tend to decrease such behavior.