External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions

R esearch summary : Agency theory suggests that external governance mechanisms (e.g., activist owners, the market for corporate control, securities analysts) can deter managers from acting opportunistically. Using cognitive evaluation theory, we argue that powerful expectations imposed by external governance can impinge on top managers' feelings of autonomy and crowd out their intrinsic motivation, potentially leading to financial fraud. Our findings indicate that external pressure from activist owners, the market for corporate control, and securities analysts increases managers' likelihood of financial fraud. Our study considers external governance from a top manager's perspective and questions one of agency theory's foundational tenets: that external pressure imposed on managers reduces the potential for moral hazard. M anagerial summary : Many of us are familiar with stories about top managers “cooking the books” in one way or another. As a result, companies and regulatory bodies often implement strict controls to try to prevent financial fraud. However, cognitive evaluation theory describes how those external controls could actually have the opposite of their intended effect because they rob managers of their intrinsic motivation for behaving appropriately. We find this to be the case. When top managers face more stringent external control mechanisms, in the form of activist shareholders, the threat of a takeover, or zealous securities analysts, they are actually more likely to engage in financial misbehavior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Another Take on Real Estate's Role in Mixed‐Asset Portfolio Allocations

This article examines real estate's role in institutional mixed‐asset portfolios using both private‐ and public‐real estate indices, as a means of examining varying real estate‐related risk/return opportunities. In so doing, this article also examines the effects of: (1) increasing the investment horizon, (2) placing constraints on the maximum allocation to any one asset class, and (3) varying the risk preferences of investors. The empirical results suggest—using infinite‐horizon returns and all of the caveats that accompany such a perspective—that real estate allocations of approximately 10–15% of the mixed‐asset portfolio represent an upper bound for most investors. For those investors preferring low‐risk portfolios, (unlevered) private real estate is the vehicle serving this allocation preference; for those investors preferring high‐risk portfolios, public real estate (with its embedded leverage of 40–50%) is the vehicle serving this allocation preference—with such vehicles serving as substitutes for a variety of noncore real estate strategies. In some sense, the distinction between private and public real estate is more about the use of leverage. For those investors preferring moderate‐risk portfolios, an intermediate‐leverage approach seems optimal.     

An optimization approach to business buyer choice sets: How many suppliers should be included?

In many new or repeat purchasing situations, business buyers must decide how many suppliers to consider (a “choice set”) in determining which supplier(s) to actually buy from or contract with. This paper develops an optimization approach to determining the size of the choice set, taking into consideration buyer utility and search and evaluation costs. A theoretical model is developed for both one-time and repeat purchase situations. The model is estimated using empirical data received from bids received for procurement auctions. In these auctions, suppliers provide bids for steel pipe based on two product attributes (price and delivery time). Model sensitivity to small changes in parameters is also tested.     

Regulating B2B online reverse auctions through voluntary codes of conduct

In response to real and perceived abuse by market makers, buyers, and sellers, some industry trade groups representing suppliers have developed voluntary codes of conduct, white papers, and other forms of guidance for online reverse auction participants. The intent of these guidelines is to improve both the reverse auction process and relationships between buyers and sellers. This paper examines the rationale for creating guidelines and codes of conduct, and examines their efficacy in regulating reverse auctions to achieve improved outcomes for market makers, buyers, and sellers. Data from primary and related secondary sources indicate that industry-specific codes of conduct and guidelines have not had a favorable impact.     

The influence of the financial press on stockholder wealth: the case of corporate governance

This study examines the impact that the publication of ratings of boards of directors by the business press has on stockholder wealth. We report findings from an event study of price reactions to the publication of Business Week's 1996 and 1997 ratings of boards of directors of U.S. corporations. As hypothesized, favorable ratings resulted in significant positive abnormal returns after controlling for market effects and confounding events, with only novel information explaining statistical variance. Contrary to expectations, unfavorable ratings also resulted in positive abnormal returns. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups: response,speed of response and ex ante vs. ex post competitive interaction in the spanish bank deposit market

The objective of this study is to examine asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups in a given industry. Two research hypotheses argue for the existence of asymmetric rivalry in the sense that strategic groups of small companies have a greater degree of response but a slower speed of response to the actions of strategic groups of large companies, than vice versa. To test this, we use an ex post approach that examines the news releases published on the strategic actions and reactions of firms. A third hypothesis compares ex ante competitive expectations with ex post asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups. To test this, we compare ex post news on actions/reactions with an ex ante approach that estimates conjectural variations. The empirical application carried out on bank deposits in the Spanish market defines strategic groups in terms of size due to the historical and institutional conditions of the industry (deregulatory change). The results obtained show that rivalry patterns between strategic groups in terms of company size can be predicted as asymmetric in the sense that smaller bank strategic groups have a greater degree of response (Stackelberg ‘leader–follower’ competitive interaction), and a slower speed of response to the actions of larger bank strategic groups than is found the other way around. Moreover, ex ante expectations of aggressiveness on the part of larger strategic groups characterize greater ex post reactions from the smaller‐size strategic groups. Therefore, the size distribution of strategic groups is valuable to research on complex industries with deregulation changes. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predicting Counterproductive Performance Among Temporary Workers: A Note*

Using prehire biographic and work history data, temporary help agency workers (N= 201) were classified as marginal or satisfactory. Marginal temps had characteristics suggesting poor work histories and willingness to accept any kind of employment. In prior jobs, they were paid less and more likely to have been laid off. They had also been temps for longer periods of time, and were more willing to work weekends and nights. The classification of temps as marginal versus satisfactory was validated using posthire data, showing that marginal temps had lower performance evaluations, and exhibited more counterproductive behaviors (e.g., late, absent, unsafe, or careless).     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGERS*

Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption. When managers of a multi‐product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality, there is a trade‐off between providing adequate effort incentives and ensuring sufficient price‐coordination between the product divisions. This makes some intra‐firm price competition optimal, explaining why many multi‐product firms allow for competition between divisions. When there are effort spillovers, the optimal amount of price competition can be as great as when the products are under separate ownership. Even with some profit‐sharing, intra‐firm price competition can reduce quality‐adjusted price, which has important implications for antitrust policy.