Valuing Exclusivity from Encroachment in Franchising

Conflict is created when business format franchisors penetrate existing markets with new outlets that increase system-wide sales, but negatively affect the sales and profits of existing franchisees. Territorial exclusivity contracts are used to manage channel conflict in such situations. We present a model to value territorial exclusivity from the perspective of both the franchisor and the franchisee. We show that under certain circumstances there is positive value to the franchisor by including the exclusivity clause in the contract and to the franchisee by purchasing this exclusivity. When this happens, the likelihood of franchisor-franchisee encroachment-related conflict is reduced.     

Price promotions and “freemium” app monetization

The “freemium” model for digital goods involves selling a base version of the product for free, and making premium product features available to users only on payment. The success of the model is predicated on the ability to profitably convert free users to paying ones. Price promotions (or “sales”) are often used in freemium to induce this conversion. However, the causal effect of exposing consumers to such inter-temporal price variation is unclear. While sales can generate beneficial short-run conversion, they may be harmful in the long-run if consumers inter-temporally substitute purchases to periods with low prices, or use them as signals of low product quality. These long-run concerns may be accentuated in freemium apps, where the base version is sold for free, so that sales form extreme price cuts on the overall product combination. We work with the seller of a free-to-play video game to randomize entering cohorts of users into treatment and control conditions in which promotions for in-game purchases are turned on or off. We observe complete user behavior for half a year, including purchases and consumption of in-game goods, which, in contrast to much of the extant literature, enables us to assess possible substitution over time in consumption directly. We find that conversion and revenue improve in the treatment group; and detect no evidence of harmful inter-temporal substitution or negative inferences about quality from exposure to price variation, suggesting that promotions are profitable. We conjecture that the zero price of the base product that makes its consumption virtually costless, combined with the complementarity between the base product and premium features can help explain this. To the extent that this holds across freemium contexts, the positive effects of promotions documented here may hold more generally.

     

School Choice and the Intergenerational Poverty Trap

This paper formulates a dynamic altruistic model of parental choice of school quality and intergenerational social mobility. It shows that when there are many school qualities, the earnings of children as a function of parental schooling investment is a non‐concave function, which leads to multiple steady‐state equilibria. The paper studies the intergenerational dynamics of parental schooling investment and gives conditions on the rate of return from parental schooling investment under which some families are stuck in an intergenerational poverty trap. The policy implications are also discussed.     

Real options in divestment alternatives

This paper examines the implications of real options theory for both the decision to divest a business unit and the mode of divestment. It is shown that the decision to divest a business unit and the decision to engage in staged modes of divestment are both sensitive to uncertainty, consistent with a real options logic. However, in the face of uncertainty, the results suggest that staged forms of governance create real options that are of lesser value as compared to simply not divesting a business unit and also as compared to completely divesting a business unit. Thus, this study shows that firms have real options of varied value to choose from in the context of divestments. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices

We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanismson bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impactof shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders)on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholdercontrol is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firmis exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence ofshareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differencesin takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points.Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associatedwith strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bondcovenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interestsdiverge.