Drucker as Business Moralist

In his 1981 article "What is 'business ethics'"? Peter Drucker maintains that the then current business ethics literature is a form of casuistry, and it provides an illegitimate argument for business apologists, while it also unjustly bashes business. I agree with W. Michael Hoffman's and Jennifer Mills Moore's criticisms of Drucker's article. However, by limiting themselves to this article, rather than considering Drucker's management works, they have missed an opportunity to benefit from his acknowledged practical wisdom. In this paper, I seize the opportunity to show that Drucker takes business ethics seriously, and I develop his position on business morality. His view of business management responsibility and the related notion of a just organization is seen to be essentially Platonic.     

Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy

We study empirically the macroeconomic effects of an explicit de jure quantitative goal for monetary policy. Quantitative goals take three forms: exchange rates, money growth rates, and inflation targets. We analyze the effects on inflation of both having a quantitative target and hitting a declared target. Our empirical work uses an annual data set covering 42 countries between 1960 and 2000, and takes account of other determinants of inflation (such as fiscal policy, the business cycle, and openness to international trade) and the endogeneity of the monetary policy regime. We find that both having and hitting quantitative targets for monetary policy is systematically and robustly associated with lower inflation. The exact form of the monetary target matters somewhat (especially for the sustainability of the monetary regime) but is less important than having some quantitative target. Successfully achieving a quantitative monetary goal is also associated with less volatile output.     

Homeownership as a Constraint on Asset Allocation

Personal preferences and financial incentives make homeownership desirable for most families. Once a family purchases a home they find it impractical (costly) to frequently change their ownership of residential real estate. Thus, by deciding how much home to buy, a family constrains their ability to adjust their asset allocation between residential real estate and other assets. To analyze the impact of this constraint on consumption, welfare, and post-retirement wealth, we first investigate an individual’s optimal asset allocation decisions when they are subject to a “homeownership constraint.” Next, we perform a “thought experiment” where we assume the existence of a market where a homeowner can sell, without cost, a fractional interest in their home. Now the housing choice decision does not constrain the individual’s asset allocations. By comparing these two cases, we estimate the differences in post-retirement wealth and the welfare gains potentially realizable if asset allocations were not subject to a homeownership constraint. For realistic parameter values, we find that the homeowner would require a substantial increase in total net worth to achieve the same level of utility as would be achievable if the choice of a home could be separated from the asset allocation decision. The robustness of the analysis is evaluated with respect to the model’s parameters and initial state variables. We find that changes in the values of the constraint (i.e., the value of the home) and the expected real rate of home value appreciation are the only state variables or parameter that is associated with a large change in asset allocation and/or the burden imposed by the housing constraint. This finding suggests the importance of a detailed examination of the impact of inter-regional differences in home prices and expected rates of appreciation on asset allocation and post-retirement wealth.     

Hedging emerging market bonds and the rise of the credit default swap

On October 5, 2001, when credit spreads were widening, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange CME de-listed the full menu of emerging market Brady bond futures contracts. This is intriguing because at a time when interest in hedging and speculating in emerging market sovereign credit risk should be at its peak, the CME de-listed precisely the sort of contract designed to hedge and speculate in sovereign credit risk. This paper finds statistical evidence suggesting that the developing over the counter CDS contract acted as a substitute product for the Brady bond futures contract thereby undermining the Brady bond futures contract and contributing to its demise.