Volume Contents

Volume Contents

Volume Contents     

Trade union membership and dismissals

In Germany, there is no trade union membership wage premium and a membership fee of 1% of the gross wage. Therefore, prima facie, there are strong incentives to free-ride on the benefits of trade unionism. We establish empirical evidence for a private gain from trade union membership which has hitherto not been documented: in Western Germany, union members are less likely to lose their jobs than non-members. In particular, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel we are able to show that roughly 50% of the observed raw differential in individual dismissal rates can be explained by the estimated average partial effect of union membership.     

Commodity tax structure under uncertainty in a perfectly competitive market

In a partial equilibrium setting without price uncertainty, the balanced-budget substitution of an ad valorem tax on output for a specific (unit) tax can enhance welfare in imperfectly competitive markets and is without impact in a competitive world. This paper demonstrates that a substitution of this kind can also increase expected output and welfare in a competitive market characterised by uncertainty about the commodity price, if firms can respond to the revelation of demand conditions by altering output.     

Tax evasion and competition

Using a Cournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, we show that more intense competition may have the negative side effect of increasing tax evasion, thereby, lowering public revenues and welfare. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave, or convex and inelastic. The result of more competition, less evasion and higher public revenues will be obtained if (a) marginal production costs fall and demand is convex and elastic or (b) the demand elasticity increases. As a policy implication, we prove that tax enforcement should be intensified if there is a negative trade‐off between competition and evasion.     

Political Interests and the Emergence of Commercial Banking in Transition Economies*

abstract This paper examines how interactions between government agencies and banking organizations led to the emergence of commercial banking in the Czech Republic and Hungary during the 1990s. We rely on interviews with bank managers at six large banks, government officers, and experts at other organizations to learn how actions based on different political ideologies shaped the banking field. We integrate prior research on institutional change, political interest, and transition economies to describe the emergence of commercial banking. Three important problems characterized commercial banking in the two countries: the disposal of bad loans, the privatization of banks, and the establishment of banking services. We argue that the solutions to these problems based on the changing political interests of organizational actors and regulators represent the phases of institutional development in commercial banking during the 1990s. Implications of our research are discussed regarding the political perspective of organizational fields in transition economies.     

Honesty versus Cooperation:

ABSTRACT . A variety of empirical evidence suggests that economics students are less cooperative than are students in other disciplines. Anthony M. Yezer and his colleagues have recently provided a strong counter‐example claiming that economics students behave in a more honest manner than do noneconomics students. Since honesty and cooperation are not the same quality, there might be no contradiction between these two claims. Economics students seem to re‐present a special pattern of moral behavior that is characterized by respect for property rights and strong self‐interest motivation simultaneously.     

Collaborative Enterprise and Sustainability: The Case of Slow Food

The current and prevailing paradigm of intensive agricultural production is a straightforward example of the mainstream way of doing business. Mainstream enterprises are based on a negativistic view of human nature that leads to counter-productive and unsustainable behaviours producing negative impact for society and the natural environment. If we want to change the course, then different players are needed, which can flourish thanks to their capacity to serve others and creating values for all the participants in the network in which they are embedded. In the article, through the analysis of the Slow Food movement and the use of recent theoretical and empirical contributions in behavioural sciences and psychology, we support the collaborative enterprise model as an alternative to the still prevailing, mainstream business models. Evidence shows that caring and responsible efforts of economic agents are acknowledged and reciprocated even in highly competitive markets.     

Sick pay reforms and health status in a unionised labour market

We theoretically analyse the effects of sick pay and employees' health on collective bargaining, assuming that individuals determine absence optimally. If sick pay is set by the government and not paid for by firms, it induces the trade union to lower wages. This mitigates the positive impact on absence. Moreover, a union may oppose higher sick pay if it reduces labour supply sufficiently. Better employee health tends to foster wage demands. If the union determines both wages and sick pay, we identify situations in which it will substitute wages for sick pay because adverse absence effects can be mitigated.     

Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany

Abstract. In the absence of closed shops and discriminatory wage policies, union membership can be explained by the existence of social norms. We describe a model, incorporating institutional features of the German labour market, which explicitly allows for social custom effects in the determination of union membership. Using panel data for Germany, we find evidence for according effects which restrict free‐riding. The impact of social norms tends to increase with net union density. Hence, observed reductions in the demand for union membership can weaken the impact of a norm and accentuate the free‐rider problem.