The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information

We consider the efficiency properties of exchange economies where privately informed traders behave strategically. Specifically, a competitive mechanism is any mapping of traders’ reports about their types to an equilibrium price vector and allocation of the reported economy. In our model, some traders may have non-vanishing impact on prices and allocations regardless of the size of the economy. Although truthful reporting by all traders cannot be achieved, we show that, given any desired level of approximation, there is such that any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of any competitive mechanism of any private information economy with or more traders leads, with high probability, to prices and allocations that are close to a competitive equilibrium of the true economy. In particular, allocations are approximately efficient. A key assumption is that there is small probability that traders behave non-strategically.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.     

The Assimilative and Contrastive Effects of Word-of-Mouth Volume: An Experimental Examination of Online Consumer Ratings

The popularity of online rate-and-review websites has increased the importance of word-of-mouth (WOM) volume (number of ratings) yet the retail literature has not paid adequate attention to understanding its impact. This paper highlights WOM volume as a high-scope, decision-making cue upon which the influence of other WOM-relevant characteristics on a WOM message's persuability depends. We begin, via a pretest, by demonstrating the intuitive expectation that high volume, relative to low volume, accentuates or assimilates perceptions of positivity or negativity of WOM targets. Then, through two experimental studies, we show that depending upon how high volume interacts with WOM consensus and consumer decision precommitment, it can contrast preference away from the valence of a target also. In our third and final experimental study, we demonstrate that consumers differ in their susceptibility to the influence of high volume. Those with a higher desire to be different from others, compared to those with a higher desire to be similar, are resistant to high volume's assimilative sway and do not show the valence-accentuating effects demonstrated in the pretest. Retail managers and researchers should find these insights about the different roles of WOM volume beneficial.     

Off‐farm work,technical efficiency,and rice production risk in Taiwan

This article investigates the differences in yield production, production efficiency, and yield risk for farmers both with and without off‐farm work. Using a nationwide survey of rice farmers in Taiwan, we estimate two stochastic production frontier models that accommodate technical inefficiency and production risk simultaneously for farmers both with and without off‐farm work. The stochastic dominance criterion is then applied to compare the differences in the distributions of the estimated technical efficiency and yield risk between groups. The empirical results indicate that these two groups of farmers use resources in different ways, and off‐farm work is not necessarily associated with lower technical efficiency. For farmers in the lower percentiles of the efficiency distribution, those with off‐farm work are more efficient than their counterparts without off‐farm work. In addition, farmers with off‐farm work face higher production risk and this result is robust for the entire distribution.     

COMPETING VIEWS OF THE MONEY SUPPLY PROCESS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper examines three competing approaches to the determination of the money supply. The first approach is labelled the pure portfolio approach, and corresponds to the orthodox approach to the money supply. The second approach is labelled the pure loan demand approach, and corresponds to the Post Keynesian accommodationist view of endogenous money. The third approach is labelled the mixed portfolio-loan demand approach, and corresponds to the Post Keynesian structuralist view of endogenous money. The critical theoretical difference between the latter two models is identified in terms of the importance of the private initiatives of banks in accommodating expansions of loan demand. The paper then provides Granger-causality evidence on the three approaches, and concludes in favor of the mixed portfolio-loan demand approach.