The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders

We consider standard auction models when bidders’ identities are not-or are only partially-observed by the econometrician. We first adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility of identifying private value auction models. Second, in the asymmetric independent private value model which is nonparametrically identified, we generalize Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong’s estimation procedure [Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions, Econometrica 68 (2000) 525-574] and consider the asymptotic properties of our multi-step kernel-based estimator. Monte Carlo simulations illustrate the practical relevance of our estimation procedure in small data sets.     

Evaluation of subsidiary marketing performance: combining process and outcome performance metrics

Issues in evaluating marketing performance and devising appropriate metrics for measurement have taken center stage in marketing thought and practice in recent years. We propose an empirical model that enables a multinational enterprise (MNE) to assess the marketing performance of its subsidiaries, taking into explicit consideration the fact that tactical actions by subsidiaries contribute to the creation of assets that can be harnessed for marketing outcomes. Thus, our model captures the asset creation abilities of marketing expenditures and also takes in to account the environmental differences of the context in which each MNE subsidiary operates. We evaluate comparative, overall, and process-level (creation of market assets and market yield) marketing performance in the context of multi-country operations. This simultaneous examination of marketing process and marketing outcome performance enables a global corporation to gain strategic, operational, and diagnostic insights into the performance of its subsidiaries. Our approach is empirically illustrated with an evaluation of the marketing performance of subsidiaries of a large global corporation.     

Aggregate liquidity shortages, idiosyncratic liquidity smoothing and banking regulation

This paper develops a model of banking fragility driven by aggregate liquidity shortages. Inefficiencies arise from a failure of the interbank market to smooth the available liquidity in such a shortage. We find that a standard lender of last resort policy is ineffective in restoring efficiency as it leads to offsetting changes in the banks’ supply of liquidity. In contrast, subsidizing the purchase of assets from troubled banks increases welfare by improving the banks’ liquidity holdings. The first best, however, is achieved by redistributing existing liquidity from healthy to troubled banks in a crisis.