全文获取类型
收费全文 | 19769篇 |
免费 | 81篇 |
国内免费 | 1篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 3006篇 |
工业经济 | 953篇 |
计划管理 | 3034篇 |
经济学 | 4563篇 |
综合类 | 493篇 |
运输经济 | 40篇 |
旅游经济 | 42篇 |
贸易经济 | 5069篇 |
农业经济 | 95篇 |
经济概况 | 1936篇 |
信息产业经济 | 44篇 |
邮电经济 | 576篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 26篇 |
2022年 | 17篇 |
2021年 | 36篇 |
2020年 | 70篇 |
2019年 | 95篇 |
2018年 | 2420篇 |
2017年 | 2178篇 |
2016年 | 1349篇 |
2015年 | 161篇 |
2014年 | 187篇 |
2013年 | 376篇 |
2012年 | 588篇 |
2011年 | 2091篇 |
2010年 | 1908篇 |
2009年 | 1614篇 |
2008年 | 1603篇 |
2007年 | 1939篇 |
2006年 | 144篇 |
2005年 | 505篇 |
2004年 | 571篇 |
2003年 | 626篇 |
2002年 | 297篇 |
2001年 | 106篇 |
2000年 | 82篇 |
1999年 | 45篇 |
1998年 | 47篇 |
1997年 | 28篇 |
1996年 | 43篇 |
1995年 | 28篇 |
1994年 | 27篇 |
1993年 | 21篇 |
1992年 | 20篇 |
1991年 | 21篇 |
1990年 | 22篇 |
1989年 | 20篇 |
1988年 | 20篇 |
1987年 | 21篇 |
1986年 | 31篇 |
1985年 | 18篇 |
1984年 | 18篇 |
1982年 | 19篇 |
1981年 | 17篇 |
1980年 | 22篇 |
1979年 | 9篇 |
1978年 | 12篇 |
1975年 | 10篇 |
1969年 | 11篇 |
1965年 | 9篇 |
1946年 | 8篇 |
1942年 | 10篇 |
排序方式: 共有10000条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
61.
62.
Bernhard Hirsch 《Controlling & Management》2007,51(2):88-89
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
63.
64.
Who's in charge of the central city? The conflict between efficiency and equity in the design of a metropolitan area 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A circular metropolitan area consists of a central city surrounded by a suburb. Households sort over the two jurisdictions based on public service levels and their costs of commuting to the metropolitan center. Using numerical simulations, we show that (1) there typically exist two equilibria: one in which the poor form the voting majority in the central city and the other in which the rich form the majority in the central city; (2) there is an efficiency vs. equity trade-off as to which equilibrium is preferred; and (3) if the central city contains only poor households, equity favors expanding the central city to include rich households. The third result arises not because of a fiscal subsidy from rich to poor households induced by a property tax but rather because of a change in house price capitalization. 相似文献
65.
Ines Lindner 《Economic Theory》2008,35(3):607-611
We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité
des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of
‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but
where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will
arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota
q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role.
I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 相似文献
66.
Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk. 相似文献
67.
68.
We analyze the importance of firm-specific and country-specific factors in the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries around the world. Our analysis yields two new results. First, we find that firm-specific determinants of leverage differ across countries, while prior studies implicitly assume equal impact of these determinants. Second, although we concur with the conventional direct impact of country-specific factors on the capital structure of firms, we show that there is an indirect impact because country-specific factors also influence the roles of firm-specific determinants of leverage. 相似文献
69.
70.