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Review of Accounting Studies - We document that the initiation of audit committee interlocks is associated with contagion in reported special items. We argue that this is, in part, attributable to... 相似文献
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潘琳娜 《商业经济(哈尔滨)》2011,(7):17-19
随着我国社会保障基金规模的扩大,在其运行中存在着的道德风险问题也日益凸显,主要表现为政府挤占挪用,保障机构违规操作,冒领、骗领社会保障基金等行为增多。为有效防范社保基金运行中的道德风险,应加速构建以自治为核心,监治为约束,法制为保障的高效风险的抗衡体系,以此遏止社会保障基金运行中道德风险的滋生与蔓延。 相似文献
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将市场营销中客户关系管理理念引入开放教育学员管理,在开放教育办学中表现为学员关系管理,是一次管理理念与实际业务有机结合的尝试。通过学员关系管理的实施,来完善对学员需求的快速互动的组织形式,规范以学员服务为核心的工作流程,建立学员驱动的服务设计,进而培养学员的信任度、忠诚度和满意度。 相似文献
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浅谈高职院校实践教学改革 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
教学改革是提高学校教学质量和培养人才的重要因素之一,所以我们必须加强和落实教学改革这一重要环节。本文指出了教学改革的指导思想和目标,明确了加强实践教学是当前教学改革的重大问题,分析了实践教学中存在问题并提出了解决问题对策。 相似文献
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Ping Wang Masako Darrough Linna Shi 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2016,43(9-10):1197-1243
Some CEOs decide voluntarily to issue a warning when they expect a negative earnings surprise. Prior research suggests that warnings contain incremental information beyond actual earnings; warning firms tend to experience permanent earnings decreases. This paper investigates whether compensation committees take warnings into account in setting CEO compensation. We find that warnings are significantly negatively (positively) associated with CEO bonus (option grants), suggesting that compensation committees adjust CEO compensation towards a more high‐powered structure after warnings. However, the sensitivity of bonus or option grants to earnings and stock returns is not affected except for bonus sensitivity to stock returns. We also find weak evidence of an increase in forced CEO turnover after warnings, accompanied by a significant increase in its sensitivity to stock returns. This benefits CEOs with higher ability but imposes more risk on other CEOs. These findings provide a partial explanation of why not every CEO facing a negative surprise decides to issue a warning. Our results are robust to various specifications. In particular, the impact of warnings on compensation appears invariant to the timing or the number of warnings. Overall, these findings suggest that the signal from warnings is used in determining CEO compensation and retention. 相似文献
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This paper provides empirical evidence on whether the earnings fixation hypothesis can explain the accrual anomaly originally documented in Sloan (1996). Our analytical model yields the prediction that, if investors fixate on reported earnings, the effectiveness of the accrual strategy will increase in the responsiveness of the stock price to earnings and the differential persistence of cash flows relative to accruals. Our empirical evidence confirms our prediction and lends support to the earnings fixation hypothesis. 相似文献
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