Market Integration,Choice of Technology,and Welfare

This paper develops an international trade model where firms in a duopoly may diversify their technologies for strategic reasons. The firms face the same set of technologies given by a tradeoff between marginal costs and fixed costs, but depending on trade costs firms may choose different technologies. Market integration may induce a technological restructuring where firms either diversify their technologies or switch to a homogeneous technology. In general, market integration improves welfare. However, a small decrease of trade costs which induces a switch from heterogeneous technologies to a homogeneous technology may locally reduce global welfare. The model also shows that productivity differences lead to intra‐industry firm heterogeneity in size and exports similar to the “new–new” trade models with monopolistic competition.     

Exploration and exploitation fit and performance in international strategic alliances

Exploration and exploitation constitute two separate, potentially conflicting strategic choices for firms engaged in international strategic alliances. Our empirical study challenges the ambidexterity argument and demonstrates that exploration and exploitation are separate (though not necessarily antithetical) strategies with different antecedents and performance consequences.Our results show that while competency similarity is conducive to upstream innovative performance, prior experience with the partner is potentially damaging for this type of performance and trust and cultural distance do not play significant roles. When the motive is efficiency and downstream market performance, prior experience with the partner instead is beneficial, as are high levels of trust and low levels of cultural distance. These findings have key implications for literature on strategic fit and alliance performance.     

Internet Based Benchmarking

We discuss the design of interactive, internet based benchmarking using parametric (statistical) as well as non-parametric (DEA) models. The user receives benchmarks and improvement potentials. The user is also given the possibility to search different efficiency frontiers and hereby to explore alternative improvement strategies. Implementations of both a parametric and a non-parametric model are presented.     

Dumping and Injury Margins in Markets with Horizontal as well as Vertical Product Differentiation

This paper examines the GATT/WTO rules for anti-dumping measures in a duopoly model with both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. The GATT/WTO rules allow for anti-dumping measures if domestic producers, exposed to price discrimination, also demonstrate injury where price-undercutting is an important indicator of the latter. The paper shows that the procedure for calculating injury is flawed due to negligence of quality differences in the calculation of the margin of price-undercutting. This gives countries with high-quality producers an option to practice protectionism. This asymmetry between countries in ability to implement anti-dumping measures predominantly favors the developed countries which are specialized in producing high-quality products. The paper suggests an overall critical look at the lenient rules for implementing anti-dumping measures—especially the rules for injury determination—in order to restrict the use of such measures to a minimum and to move the world economy closer to free trade.     

Institutional Investors and Private Equity

Entrepreneurial finance literature has highlighted that institutionalinvestors are the main contributors to private equity funds.This paper complements these findings by documenting that institutionalinvestors also invest directly in private equity. A major concernfor such investments is the higher agency costs associated withprivate equity. We show that institutions invest in privatefirms with governance mechanisms that tend to reduce the expectedagency costs and risk of minority expropriation. Good governancemechanisms further allow institutional investors to enjoy thebenefits of syndication and thereby reduce idiosyncratic risk.In addition, we show that institutional investments tend tobe followed by further improvements in corporate governanceand tend to occur in high-growth firms within research and developmentintensive industries.     

Compensating Wage Differentials for Schooling Risk in Denmark*

In this paper we analyse the association between wage differentials and risk using detailed information on length and type of education as seen in Danish administrative registers. Our contribution to the literature is that we distinguish between transitory (time‐series) and permanent (cross‐sectional) income shocks, and estimate the compensation for both sorts of risk. We find that wage risk in a given education cell is associated with higher wages, while skewness is associated with lower wages. As a robustness check, we see that ad hoc risk measures based on earnings‐mobility indicators confirm these findings.     

Public Policy for Venture Capital

This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and offer a base salary as well. In addition to providing incentive compatible equity finance, they support the venture with managerial advice to raise survival chances. We analyze several policy measures addressed at venture capital activity: government spending on entrepreneurial training, subsidies to equipment investment, and output subsidies at the production stage. While these measures stimulate entrepreneurship, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.     

Evaluation of training in African enterprises

The importance of skill-shortage in Africa, combined with the extensive use of training, necessitates appropriate evaluation of training programs. By using firm data from Sub-Saharan Africa, we evaluate the effect of on-the-job training on log wages using matching estimators. We find that training tends to improve wages, and that the effect is larger and more well-determined when we focus on long training durations and large firms.