Tests of the empirical classification of horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade

Tests of the Empirical Classification of Horizontal and Vertical IntraIndustry Trade. — Using longitudinal data this paper shows the separation of international trade in (a) inter-industry trade, (b) horizontal intra-industry trade, and (c) vertical intra-industry trade used in the empirical trade literature to be non-stable at the individual product level. The high level of vertical intra-industry trade mentioned in the empirical literature probably covers up many products shifting between e.g. vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade. The paper therefore questions the work of the last decade in the measurement of intra-industry trade.     

What can managers do about unethical management?

What can and should we do as managers and administrators when our sense of personal morality is at odds with our organization's behavior? Among the many alternatives are: (1) not think about it; (2) go along and get along; (3) protest; (4) conscientiously object; (5) leave; (6) secretly blow the whistle; (7) publicly blow the whistle; (8) secretly threaten to blow the whistle; (9) sabotage; and, (10) negotiate and build consensus for a change in the unethical behavior. This article considers the advantages and disadvantages of these ten types of strategies based on some philosophy, game theory and everyday pragmatics.     

Progressive Taxation, Moral Hazard, and Entrepreneurship

This paper considers the general equilibrium and welfare effects of a linear progressive income tax with entrepreneurship and moral hazard. A competitive intermediation sector diversifies risk associated with entrepreneurial activity, but full risk consolidation is prevented by moral hazard. Since effort is not observable, risk bearing of entrepreneurs is required for incentive reasons. The extent of risk consolidation is endogenously explained. We find that a nonredistributive tax is neutral. A progressive tax always impairs entrepreneurship while the effect on welfare can be positive or zero, depending on the specification of moral hazard. Some results may also depend on the concrete formulation of preferences.     

Non-parametric estimation of operational risk losses adjusted for under-reporting

Not all claims are reported when a database for financial operational risk is created. The probability of reporting increases with the size of the operational risk loss, and converges towards one for big losses. Losses in operational risk have different causes, and usually follow a wide variety of distributional shapes. Therefore, a method for modelling operational risk based on one or two parametric models is deemed to fail. In this paper, we introduce a semi-parametric method for modelling operational risk that is capable of taking under-reporting into account and being guided by prior knowledge of the distributional shape.     

Calculation of ruin probabilities for a dense class of heavy tailed distributions

In this paper, we propose a class of infinite-dimensional phase-type distributions with finitely many parameters as models for heavy tailed distributions. The class of finite-dimensional phase-type distributions is dense in the class of distributions on the positive reals and may hence approximate any such distribution. We prove that formulas from renewal theory, and with a particular attention to ruin probabilities, which are true for common phase-type distributions also hold true for the infinite-dimensional case. We provide algorithms for calculating functionals of interest such as the renewal density and the ruin probability. It might be of interest to approximate a given heavy tailed distribution of some other type by a distribution from the class of infinite-dimensional phase-type distributions and to this end we provide a calibration procedure which works for the approximation of distributions with a slowly varying tail. An example from risk theory, comparing ruin probabilities for a classical risk process with Pareto distributed claim sizes, is presented and exact known ruin probabilities for the Pareto case are compared to the ones obtained by approximating by an infinite-dimensional hyper-exponential distribution.     

Assessing farmers’ risk preferences and their determinants in a marginal upland area of Vietnam: a comparison of multiple elicitation techniques

We examine the consistency of risk preference measures based on eight hypothetical elicitation methods and a lottery game applied to smallholder farmers in a marginal upland environment in Vietnam. Using these measures, we identify influencing factors of risk aversion via regression analysis, whereby unlike previous studies, we include several proxies of social capital such as social networks and norms. Data were collected from household heads and spouses separately in a random sample of 300 households. Although correlations between most of the various risk preference measures are all statistically highly significant, most are weak. On average, respondents have a high degree of risk aversion and specific characteristics—gender, age, idiosyncratic shocks, education, social norms, network‐reliance with extended family, and connections to local authorities—are significant determinants of risk preferences across most elicitation methods, whereas others—the household's dependency ratio, wealth, and covariate shocks—are significant in a few methods only. The explanatory power of the models is limited, indicating that other factors are likely to be of greater importance in determining risk preferences. The results can help target safety nets, encourage investments, and lead to the development of more applicable methods for assessing risk preferences of smallholders in developing countries.     

Analysis of contagion from the dynamic conditional correlation model with Markov Regime switching

Over the last decades, the transmissions of international financial events have been the subject of many academic studies focused on multivariate volatility models. This study evaluates the financial contagion between stock market returns. The econometric model employed, regime switching dynamic correlation (RSDC). A modification was made in the original RSDC model, the introduction of the GJR-GARCH-N and also GJR-GARCH-t models, on the equation of conditional univariate variances, thus allowing us to capture the asymmetric effects in volatility and also heavy tails. A database was built using series of indices in the United States (S&P500), the United Kingdom (FTSE100), Brazil (IBOVESPA) and South Korea (KOSPI) from 1 February 2003 to 20 September 2012. Throughout this study the methodology is compared with those frequently found in literature, and the model RSDC with two regimes was defined as the most appropriate for the selected sample with t-Student distribution in the disturbances. The adapted RSDC model used in this article can be used to detect contagion – considering the definition of financial contagion from the World Bank called very restrictive – with the help of the empirical exercise.     

PLAYING THE FERTILITY GAME AT WORK: AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF PEER EFFECTS

We study workplace peer effects in fertility decisions using a game theory model of strategic interactions among coworkers that allows for multiple equilibria. Using register‐based data on fertile‐aged women working in medium‐sized establishments in Denmark, we uncover negative average peer effects. Allowing for heterogeneous effects by worker type, we find that positive effects dominate across worker types defined by age or education. Negative effects dominate within age groups and among low‐education types. Policy simulations show that these estimated effects make the distribution of where women work an important consideration, beyond simply if they work, in predicting population fertility.