R&D Investments,Information and Strategy

This paper argues that firms can best realize the value of their investments in R&D by exploiting the associated information asymmetries. Attention is directed away from the physical results of R&D and towards the firm's ability, more generally, to earn rents from the private information emanating from its R&D. Four strategies may be used to exploit the information asymmetries from R&D: (1) publish the details of the innovation in return for legal protection; (2) keep the information inside the firm; (3) make the information selectively, informally available to others; and (4) disseminate the information as widely and rapidly as possible. To implement these strategies, resources may be allocated both to the commercial development of new technologies, and/or to related market opportunities (investing in other companies, assets and technologies). Of critical importance are the innovator's own skills and resources in effectively gathering, understanding, and commercially exploiting R&D-generated information asymmetries, both internally and in relation to other firms. This study should yield new insights to managers in designing strategies (and counter-strategies) to position themselves not only at the technological edge, but more fundamentally, at the 'information edge'.     

ARBITRAGE BOUNDS FOR PRICES OF WEIGHTED VARIANCE SWAPS

We develop a theory of robust pricing and hedging of a weighted variance swap given market prices for a finite number of co‐maturing put options. We assume the put option prices do not admit arbitrage and deduce no‐arbitrage bounds on the weighted variance swap along with super‐ and sub‐replicating strategies that enforce them. We find that market quotes for variance swaps are surprisingly close to the model‐free lower bounds we determine. We solve the problem by transforming it into an analogous question for a European option with a convex payoff. The lower bound becomes a problem in semi‐infinite linear programming which we solve in detail. The upper bound is explicit. We work in a model‐independent and probability‐free setup. In particular, we use and extend Föllmer's pathwise stochastic calculus. Appropriate notions of arbitrage and admissibility are introduced. This allows us to establish the usual hedging relation between the variance swap and the “log contract” and similar connections for weighted variance swaps. Our results take the form of a FTAP: we show that the absence of (weak) arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a classical model which reproduces the observed prices via risk‐neutral expectations of discounted payoffs.     

FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION, CONSUMPTION AND WEALTH EFFECTS IN SEVEN OECD COUNTRIES

We estimate the impact of financial liberalisation on consumption in seven major industrial countries, and find a marked shift in behaviour, notably a decline in short‐run income elasticities and a rise in short‐run wealth and interest rate elasticities. A corollary is that consumption equations estimated over both pre‐ and post‐liberalisation regimes may be misleading, and either a form of testing as presented here or a shortening of the sample period may be appropriate for accurate forecasting and simulation.     

The Substitution Problem in the Theory of Effective Protection

Input substitution theoretically invalidates the resource flow predictions of effective rates of protection calculated in a partial equilibrium framework. Partial equilibrium effective protection analysis, despite this "substitution problem," has nevertheless quietly settled into the trade economistÕs toolbox. This paper presents a new, transparent review of the substitution problem in effective protection. It finds that partial equilibrium effective protection analysis, although theoretically susceptible to misleading results, is in practice a reasonable estimator of certain short-run general equilibrium effects of protection.     

Capital management in mutual financial institutions

Capital management by mutual financial institutions (such as credit unions) provides a valuable testing ground for assessing the impact of capital regulation and theories of managerial behaviour in financial institutions. Limited access to external equity capital means that capital accumulation must be met primarily by reliance on retained earnings. To deal with shocks to the capital position and avoid breaching regulatory requirements, managers will aim to have a buffer of capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. Moreover, mutual governance arrangements and an absence of capital market discipline mean that managers have discretion to set target capital ratios which differ significantly from industry averages. This paper develops a formal model of capital management and risk management in mutual financial institutions such as credit unions which reflects these industry characteristics. The model is tested using data from larger credit unions in Australia, which have been subject to the Basel Accord Risk Weighted Capital Requirements since 1993. The data supports the hypothesis that credit unions manage their capital position by setting a short term target profit rate (return on assets) which is positively related to asset growth and which is aimed at gradually removing discrepancies between the actual and desired capital ratio. Desired capital ratios vary significantly across credit unions. There is little evidence of short run adjustments to the risk of the asset portfolio to achieve a desired capital position.     

Challenges to employment at will: A survey of the natural gas transmission industry

The natural gas transmission industry, once paternalistic towards its employees, is feeling the effects of challenges to the doctrine of employment at will, and is responding with policies that will increase managerial prerogatives. This article approaches the issue from the points of view both of law and of economics, and includes a survey of pipeline managers who must develop viable work rules in an environment of increasing expectations of employee rights and tightening market competition.     

Ethical beliefs of MIS professionals: The frequency and opportunity for unethical behavior

The frequency and opportunity for unethical behavior by MIS professionals is examined empirically. In addition, the importance of top management's ethical stance, one's sense of social responsibility and the existence of codes of ethics in determining perceptions of the frequency and opportunity for unethical behavior are tested.Results indicate that MIS professionals are perceived as having the opportunity to engage in unethical practices, but that they seldom do so. Additionally, successful MIS professionals are perceived as ethical. Finally, while company codes of ethics were uncommon, top management was seen as supporting high ethical standards. Scott J. Vitell is an Assistant Professor of Marketing at the University of Mississippi. His publications have appeared in the Journal of Macromarketing, the Journal of Business Ethics, Research in Marketing, various national and regional proceedings, and elsewhere. Donald L. Davis is Associate Professor and Director of Management Information Systems Programs in the School of Business at The University of Mississippi. He has published in OMEGA, Journal of Operations Management, Human Systems Management and other journals. His current research interests are in user-system interfaces in DSS, expert systems, and nueral nets.     

Perceptions of Dishonesty among Two-year College Students: Academic versus Business Situations

This study statistically analyzes two-year college students' attitudes toward cheating via a survey containing academic and business situations that the students evaluated on a seven point scale from unethical to ethical. When both the general questions concerning attitudes about cheating and the opinions on the ethical statements are considered, the business students were generally more unethical in their behavior and attitudes than non-business majors. These results indicate a need for more ethical exposure in business courses to help students distinguish ethical from unethical decisions.