The Law of One Price: further empirical evidence concerning Italy and the United Kingdom

The main purpose of this paper is to perform a disaggregated test on the empirical validity of the Law-of-one-price Hypothesis in the sector of manufacturing for two industrial countries, Italy and the United Kingdom, during the period 1973–80. The findings show that Italian export prices are much less related to British export prices than is usually suggested by contemporary balance-of-payments and exchange rate theoretical literature assuming the Law of One Price.     

A Poverty Trap of Crime and Unemployment

We present an overlapping generation growth model with an imperfect labor market where the links among crime, growth and unemployment are jointly considered, both in an endogenous and exogenous set‐up. We test the major implications of our theory and verify the two model specifications through the Italian regional data, using the Pooled Mean Group estimator proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999 ). The empirical results are in favor of the exogenous version of the model and suggest that crime and unemployment have long‐run income level effects.     

A Note on Managerial Delegation with Asymmetric and Convex Costs

In this note, we investigate if the standard result by the managerial delegation literature, i.e., the sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto‐optimal from the firms' viewpoint, still applies when asymmetric and convex costs are introduced into the analysis. In such a framework, the managerial delegation choice still represents a sub‐game Nash perfect equilibrium, but the more efficient firm may obtain higher profits provided that the degree of cost asymmetry between firms is sufficiently large. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial delegation games and corporate social responsibility

In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes.     

Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition

This paper studies the dynamic interaction between product market competition and incentives against shirking. In contrast with standard results, efficiency wages paid by each firm can decrease when competition (i.e. the number of firms in the product market) increases. Discretionary bonuses, on the other hand, do not vary with competition. There is an upper threshold for the number of competing firms, however, above which such schemes are no longer sustainable as an equilibrium. Industry profits with bonuses are generally higher than with efficiency wages but, when information regarding firms’ misbehaviour flows at a low rate, a competition range exists for which firms can make a positive profit by only paying efficiency wages.     

NON‐RIGID WAGES AND MERGER PROFITABILITY REVERSAL UNDER CONVEX COSTS AND CENTRALIZED UNIONIZATION

Can a merger from duopoly to monopoly be detrimental for profits? This paper deals with this issue by focusing on the interaction between decreasing returns to labour (which imply firms’ convex costs) and centralized unionization. First, it is highlighted that a wage ‘non‐rigidity’ result applies: the post‐merger wage is higher than in the pre‐merger equilibrium. Second, it is shown that a ‘reversal result’ in relation to merger profitability actually realizes when the union is sufficiently oriented towards wages. Moreover, the higher the reservation wage, the degree of product differentiation, and the union's relative bargaining power, the higher the probability that a merger reduces profits.     

ON INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE. A REPLY TO PROFESSOR RYZHENKOV

A recent paper by Ryzhenkov considers also a paper of mine, where increasing returns to scale are a crucial ingredient. According to Ryzhenkov, my specification of increasing returns is not correct. In this paper I shall show that on the contrary, it is his specification that is not correct while mine is well grounded in the main contributions to this field of literature. Further criticisms addressed to my paper will also receive a reply.     

Change of numeraire in the two-marginals martingale transport problem

In this paper, we apply change of numeraire techniques to the optimal transport approach for computing model-free prices of derivatives in a two-period setting. In particular, we consider the optimal transport plan constructed in Hobson and Klimmek (Finance Stoch. 19:189–214, 2015) as well as the one introduced in Beiglböck and Juillet (Ann. Probab. 44:42–106, 2016) and further studied in Henry-Labordère and Touzi (Finance Stoch. 20:635–668, 2016). We show that in the case of positive martingales, a suitable change of numeraire applied to Hobson and Klimmek (Finance Stoch. 19:189–214, 2015) exchanges forward start straddles of type I and type II, so that the optimal transport plan in the subhedging problems is the same for both types of options. Moreover, for Henry-Labordère and Touzi’s (Finance Stoch. 20:635–668, 2016) construction, the right-monotone transference plan can be viewed as a mirror coupling of its left counterpart under the change of numeraire.