Strategic Certification and Provision of Quality

We study the effect of the presence of a certification intermediary in an environment where information asymmetries are particularly severe. The intermediary improves the information that buyers have about quality. This in turn increases the incentives that the seller has to provide high-quality goods. Efficiency is increased by the presence of the intermediary, but quality is underprovided in equilibrium relative to full information. The intermediary can implement the optimal policy in many ways. The amount of information revealed ranges from full disclosure to partial, noisy disclosure.     

The role of trust in the 2008 financial crisis

Financial transactions require trust. This paper analyzes the role of trust in the context of the 2008 financial crisis. In order to find a role for trust, we need to find a role for trust in a standard economic model which differs from the rational expectation of the equilibrium outcome. It is argued that trust dropped dramatically in the Fall of 2008. The consequences and effects of this drop in trust are discussed.     

Peer punishment in teams: expressive or instrumental choice?

A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who violate norms are often targeted by their peers for punishment. In an experiment with small teams we examine whether subjects treat punishment itself as a second-order public good. Results do not support this view and rather suggest a hard-wired taste for punishment; subjects are engaged in a cooperative task but ignore the public good characteristics of punishment.     

Does player specialization predict player actions? Evidence from penalty kicks at FIFA World Cup and UEFA Euro Cup

Penalty kicks are analysed in the literature as ‘real life experiments’ for assessing the use of rational mixed strategies by professional players. However, each penalty kick cannot be considered a repetition of the same event because of the varying background conditions, in particular the heterogeneous ability of different players. Consequently, aggregate statistics over data sets composed of a large number of penalty kicks mediate the behaviour of the players in different games, and the properties of optimal mixed strategies cannot be tested directly because of aggregation bias. In this article, we model the heterogeneous ability of players. We then test the hypothesis that differently talented players randomize over different actions. To achieve this aim, we study a data set that collects penalties kicked during shoot-out series in the last editions of FIFA World Cup and UEFA Euro Cup (1994–2012) where kickers are categorized as specialists and non-specialists. The results support our theoretical predictions.     

Does the nano-patent ‘Gold rush’ lead to entrepreneurial-driven growth? Some policy lessons from China and Japan

In this study we compare the nano-patent landscapes of China and Japan in order to assess how their structures (type, fragmentation and concentration of patent ownership) affect the organization of the nanotechnology industry. We also analyze technology policy in order to assess how these interventions support technology transfer and nano-exploitation through university–industry collaboration and technology entrepreneurship. Drawing upon 20,365 patent families related to carbon nanotubes from 1994 to present, we found that two dissimilar technology policies boosting national innovation system emerged: China is more focused on forging an anchor-tenant model, while Japan exhibits a more industry-oriented model through demand-side policy intervention. Implications for firms? strategies and policy makers are discussed.     

Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense

We analyze optimal patent design when innovators can rely on secrecy to protect their innovations. Secrecy has no fixed term but does not preclude accidental disclosure nor independent creation by other inventors. We derive the optimal scope of the rights conferred to such second inventors, showing that if the patent life is set optimally, second inventors should be allowed to patent and to exclude first inventors who have relied on secrecy. We then identify conditions under which it is socially desirable to increase patent life as much as is necessary to induce first inventors to patent. The circumstances in which it is preferable that they rely on secrecy seem rather limited .     

Modelling user perception of bus transit quality

This article evaluates how bus users perceive the quality of their public transport service. In particular it looks at how perception of quality varies according to the available information. The experiment compares an overall evaluation of service quality before and after making passengers reflect on the importance of certain fundamental system variables which they may not have previously considered.Focus groups were used to individualise the most relevant variables. A quality survey was carried out both on-board buses and at bus stops and the overall service quality was related to the aforementioned variables using ordered probit models. The perception of quality is shown to change with the category of user and that there tends to be more criticism towards variations in overall quality until the users are stimulated into thinking more deeply about other influential variables. The application of this methodology may provide operating companies with valuable information for planning marketing policies aimed at different categories of user, in order to improve the service quality and attract more passengers to using public transport.     

Optimality conditions¶and bubbles in sequential economies¶and bounded relative risk-aversion

We provide specific qualifications in order that Kuhn–Tucker type Euler equations and transversality conditions at infinity hold in stochastic equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and where assets are traded in sequential markets. It is not assumed that uncertainty is modeled as an event-tree structure or that preferences are necessarily bounded. We also describe an important class of preferences based on bounded relative risk aversion which yields relevant simplifications. Our results are used to establish conditions that rule out asset pricing bubbles. Specific examples of economies with bubbles are also discussed. Received: 28 January 2002 / Accepted: 19 July 2002 We are grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments. This research was partially supported by MURST (Italy), National Group on “Nonlinear Dynamics and Stochastic Models in Economics and Finance”.