Horizontal mergers and product quality

We study the effects of a horizontal merger when firms compete on price and quality. In a Salop framework with three symmetric firms, several striking results appear. First, the merging firms reduce quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside firm increases both price and quality. As a result, the average price in the market increases, but also the average quality. Second, the outside firm benefits more than the merging firms from the merger, and the merger can be unprofitable for the merger partners, i.e., the “merger paradox” may appear. Third, the merger always reduces total consumer utility (though some consumers may benefit), but total welfare can increase due to endogenous quality cost savings. In a generalized framework with n firms, we identify two key factors for the merger effects: (i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction and (ii) the cross‐quality and cross‐price demand effects, which determines the intensity of price relative to quality competition. These findings have implications for antitrust policy in industries where quality is a key strategic variable for the firms.     

Hospital Competition with Soft Budgets

We study the incentives for quality provision and cost efficiency for hospitals with soft budgets, where the payer can cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. While a higher bailout probability reduces cost efficiency, the effect on quality is ambiguous. Profit confiscation reduces both quality and cost efficiency. First‐best is achieved by a strict no‐bailout and no‐profit‐confiscation policy when the regulated price is optimally set. However, for suboptimal prices, a more lenient bailout policy can be welfare‐improving. When we allow for heterogeneity in costs and qualities, we also show that a softer budget can raise quality for high‐cost patients.     

The Demand for Intermediate Goods in an Input–Output Framework: a methodological note

This methodological note suggests the use of the maximum eigenvalues of the matrices of the direct input–output coefficients and of the coefficients of vertically integrated sectors as indicators of the aggregate intensity of the demand for intermediate goods. Such indicators have the desirable property of being independent from both relative prices and the composition of final demand and reflect therefore only the structural characteristics of the productive system.     

Global competition and EEC policy in telecommunications: An Italian perspective

Within the framework of increasing US and Japanese competition, an interpretation is given of the future development lines of European telecommunications. Europe is lagging behind in this sector; this is explained in terms of the subdivision of services at the national level and the fragmentation of industrial areas within the respective countries. The minimum basis for recovery should be the establishment of a common European base in the telecommunications sector. A European scenario is proposed with particular attention devoted to the Italian problems in restructuring and development.     

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Competition and waiting times in hospital markets

This paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type model, with hospitals that differ in (geographical) location and, potentially, waiting time, and two types of patients: high-benefit patients who choose between neighbouring hospitals (competitive segment), and low-benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand treatment from the closest hospital (monopoly segment). Compared with a benchmark case of monopoly, we find that hospital competition leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium if the competitive segment is sufficiently large. Given a policy regime of hospital competition, the effect of increased competition depends on the parameter of measurement: Lower travelling costs increase waiting times, higher hospital density reduces waiting times, while the effect of a larger competitive segment is ambiguous. We also show that, if the competitive segment is large, hospital competition is socially preferable to monopoly only if the (regulated) treatment price is sufficiently high.     

Do people respond to tax incentives? An analysis of the Italian reform of the deductibility of home mortgage interests

Before 1992 mortgage interests in Italy were fully tax deductible up to 3500 Euro (7000 for two cosigners). In 1992-1994 the government implemented a series of tax reforms whose ultimate effect was to eliminate the relation between the after-tax mortgage rate and the marginal tax rate. Using data from the 1989-2002 Survey of Household Income and Wealth we test if the elimination of incentives has affected the sensitivity of the decision to borrow and the amount borrowed with respect to the marginal tax rate. Regression analysis and difference-in-differences estimates indicate that tax considerations have not affected the demand for mortgage debt, neither at the extensive nor intensive margin. These results are consistent with lack of financial information and credit rationing during the sample period.     

The origin of money: A survey of the contemporary literature

Introducing money into a scheme of general economic equilibrium entails manifold problems, which have emerged in many contributions to the literature. Some of these problems have been adequately addressed at the level of micro-based approaches which can be traced back to the monetary theory of Carl Menger. In this survey we shall review such issues, after which we shall attempt to illustrate the contribution to solving the problem of the origin of money offered by the literature on transaction and information costs inspired by Menger's monetary theory. (JEL: E40, E42, D83) Although this paper is the fruit of a common effort, credit for Sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 goes in particular to Giuseppe Mastromatteo, and for Sections 4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 6 to Luigi Ventura. The authors would like to thank the referees for most useful comments and suggestions; the usual disclaimer applies.     

Cass transversality condition and sequential asset bubbles

Summary. The objective of this paper is to illustrate the connection existing between the asymptotic value of a certain random series and the absence of asset pricing valuation bubbles in stochastic economies with sequential markets. This series, in turn, is closely related to the one proposed by Cass to characterize efficient accumulation paths in Solow models.Received: 3 June 2003, Revised: 3 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C61, C62, D51, G12.A first draft of this paper was presented at the V Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Ischia, Italy, 2001. I am grateful to S. Spear and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments. This research was partially supported by MIUR (Ministero dellIstruzione, Universitá e Ricerca).