Tax Incentives and Household Investment in Complementary Pension Insurance: Some Recent Evidence From the Italian Experience

We show by a simple difference‐in‐difference methodology that, contrary to prior research, robustly raising the deductibility limit associated to pension fund holdings in Italy did not succeed in boosting households’ contributions to this form of savings. Some other empirical findings also suggest that this policy measure may have not even increased the average amount of first‐time contributors to such funds. In view of the specific features of the Italian market for complementary insurance (relatively young and less developed), these empirical results might be of interest to policymakers acting in countries with similar features (for instance, some of the more recent EU members).     

Lombard Enlightenment and Classical Political Economy

Abstract

This paper discusses the formative steps of ‘Classical’ Political Economy under the joint influence of the Italian and Scottish Enlightenment. Pietro Verri is a leading figure of the Italian Enlightenment and he belongs to the Lombard branch of the Italian School of Political Economy (sometimes named ‘School of Milan’) during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Schumpeter's treatment of the ‘School of Milan’ describes Pietro Verri as ‘the most important pre-Smithian authority on Cheapness-and-Plenty’. A careful canvass of the texts substantiates Schumpeter's suggestion. Verri stands out as a key figure in the transition from Physiocracy to the Smithian system.     

The impact of faking on Cronbach’s alpha for dichotomous and ordered rating scores

In many psychological inventories (i.e., personnel selection surveys and diagnostic tests) the collected samples often include fraudulent records. This confronts the researcher with the crucial problem of biases yielded by the usage of standard statistical models. In this paper we applied a recent probabilistic perturbation procedure, called sample generation by replacement (SGR)—(Lombardi and Pastore, Multivar. Behav. Res 47:519–546, 2012), to study the sensitivity of Cronbach’s alpha index to fake perturbations in dichotomous and ordered data, respectively. We used SGR to perform two distinct SGR simulation studies involving two sample size conditions, three item set sizes, and twenty levels of faking perturbations. Moreover, in the second SGR simulation study we also evaluated an additional factor, type of faking model, to study sample reliability under different modulations of graded faking (uniform faking, average faking, slight faking, and extreme faking). To simulate these more complex faking models we proposed a novel extension of the SGR perturbation procedure based on a discrete version of the generalized beta density distribution. We also applied the new procedure to real behavioral data on emotional instability.     

Cooperation under alternative punishment institutions: An experiment

While peer punishment has been shown to increase group cooperation, there is open debate on how cooperative norms can emerge and on what motives drive individuals to punish. In a public good experiment we compared alternative punishment institutions and found (1) higher cooperation levels under a consensual punishment institution than under autonomous individual punishment; (2) similar cooperation levels under sequential and simultaneous punishment institutions.     

Selection by committee: Anonymity and gratitude

What kind of candidate is selected into a job when the principal has to appoint a committee to measure the candidates’ ability and select a winner? We find that if the committee takes into account the candidate’s gratitude towards them, a candidate with less than first best ability will be selected. A relevant exception may occur if the first best is the overall best candidate. First best selection is always achieved if the committee is anonymous to the candidates. If the committee is not detached enough from the candidates then delegation fares even worse than random selection.     

Horizontal mergers and product quality

We study the effects of a horizontal merger when firms compete on price and quality. In a Salop framework with three symmetric firms, several striking results appear. First, the merging firms reduce quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside firm increases both price and quality. As a result, the average price in the market increases, but also the average quality. Second, the outside firm benefits more than the merging firms from the merger, and the merger can be unprofitable for the merger partners, i.e., the “merger paradox” may appear. Third, the merger always reduces total consumer utility (though some consumers may benefit), but total welfare can increase due to endogenous quality cost savings. In a generalized framework with n firms, we identify two key factors for the merger effects: (i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction and (ii) the cross‐quality and cross‐price demand effects, which determines the intensity of price relative to quality competition. These findings have implications for antitrust policy in industries where quality is a key strategic variable for the firms.     

SCALE ECONOMIES AND HETEROGENEITY IN BUSINESS MONEY DEMAND: THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE

This paper investigates the demand for money by firms and the existence of economies of scale in the Italian manufacturing industry. We estimate a model for cash elaborated by Fujiki and Mulligan using a different estimation procedure from the previous literature. We then introduce an iterative procedure based on backward exclusion of firms from model estimation which points out the high heterogeneity of Italian companies in money demand. Our estimates show that the Italian manufacturing industry, considered as a whole, does not enjoy scale economies in money demand. However, our iterative procedure points out that the cause of this result has to be ascribed to small firms which are characterized by thin cash money holdings and a consequent very modest opportunity cost.     

Competition for Power and Altruism

The paper analyzes the trade-off between power and altruism by using an experimental framework which involved a group of experimental agents, undergraduate students of the University of Siena. The results show that the introduction into the experimental structure of a tournament for the power appreciably altered the behaviour of agents. More specifically the degree of altruism, measured by the dictator offers, significantly decreased when the agents were able to trade altruism for power. The results were more clear-cut and robust in the case of the dictator game, but also in the case of the ultimatum game the introduction of the tournament for power altered the behavior of subjects. A significant gender effect emerged.