Limit-order submission strategies under asymmetric information

This paper provides evidence that informed traders dominate the response of limit-order submissions to shocks in a pure limit-order market. In the market we study, informed traders are highly sensitive to spreads, volatility, momentum and depth. By contrast, uninformed traders are relatively insensitive to all these market conditions. The dominance of the informed over limit-order submissions is magnified by contrasts between them and the uninformed in the use of aggressively-priced limit orders.     

Professionals’ endorsement of behavioral finance: Does it impact their perception of markets and themselves?

This paper provides evidence on the hypothesis that many behavioral finance patterns are so deeply rooted in human behavior that they are difficult to overcome by learning. We test this on a target group which has undoubtedly very strong incentives to learn efficient behavior, i.e. fund managers. We split this group into endorsers and non-endorsers of behavioral finance. Endorsers do, indeed, view markets differently as they regard stronger influences from behavioral biases. However, when it comes to the perception of one's own behavior the endorsement of behavioral finance becomes almost meaningless, even though endorsers otherwise do adapt behavior towards their conviction.     

Are All Professional Investors Sophisticated?

Abstract. Existing empirical evidence is inconclusive as to whether professional investors show more sophisticated behavior than individual investors. Therefore, we study two important groups of professional investors and compare them with laymen by means of a survey covering about 500 investors. We find that some professionals, i.e. institutional investors, behave in a more sophisticated manner than laymen, whereas the less researched investment advisors seem to do even worse. Our survey approach complements available evidence due to its design: it compares professionals with (qualified) interested laymen, it covers six measures of sophisticated behavior, uses several control variables and strictly compares investment decisions in the private domain.     

On the rationale of bank lending in pre-crisis Thailand

Evidence from credit files is provided to examine bank lending determinants of Thai commercial banks. Their lending practice follows reasonable patterns as a standard set of variables, including indirect risk variables, explains much of the variance in interest rate spread. Reflecting institutional differences with mature markets, we find a higher importance of relationship banking and risk control via credit availability. Information about later default reveals prudent relationship lending. However, banks could have made better use of available information about borrowers’ riskiness. These findings do not support a general verdict of bad banking but indicate room to improve lending decisions.     

Accountability and risk governance: a scenario-informed reflection on European regulation of GMOs

Regulating risks in the face of scientific uncertainty poses a particular challenge to policy-makers. Such problems are amplified when decisions are taken in a multi-level framework of supranational governance. The genetically modified organism (GMO) regulation in the European Union constitutes an especially salient issue of risk governance in a multi-lateral arena, as the topic is politically highly visible and decision-making is slow and contested. Furthermore, as authority is dispersed among multiple actors, European risk governance is in need of adequate mechanisms ensuring that decision-makers justify and account for their behavior. While legitimacy aspects of GMO governance have widely been examined, accountability relations within the field of GMO risk governance have hitherto only weakly been explored. Hence, this paper analyzes the question of who can be held accountable under the complex system of supranational risk governance. This paper claims that mere adherence by actors to the regulatory procedures during the decision-making process does not necessarily imply that overall accountability can be secured, resulting in ‘organized irresponsibility’. Although certain piecemeal accountability may exist, establishing overall accountability is complicated, precisely as a result of the complex system of interwoven rules.     

The Role of Dividends, Debt and Board Structure in the Governance of Family Controlled Firms

Abstract:  We investigate whether family controlled firms use dividends, debt and board structure to exacerbate or mitigate agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders in a capital market environment with high investor protection and private benefits of control. Results indicate family controlled firms employ higher dividend payout ratios, higher debt levels and lower levels of board independence compared to non-family firms. This suggests family controlled firms use either dividends or debt as a substitute for independent directors. We also find that dividends and debt are more effective governance mechanisms in mitigating the families' expropriation of minority shareholders' wealth. Independent directors are, in contrast, more effective in controlling owner-manager conflict in non-family firms.