Promise and peril in implementing pay‐for‐performance

Why would managers abandon pay‐for‐performance plans they initiated with great hopes? Why would employees celebrate this decision? This article explores why managers made their decisions in 12 of 13 pay‐for‐performance “experiments” at Hewlett‐Packard in the mid‐1990s. We find that managers thought the costs of these programs to be higher than the benefits. Alternative managerial practices such as effective leadership, clear objectives, coaching, or training were thought a better investment. Despite the undisputed instrumentality of pay‐for‐performance to motivate, little attention has been given to whether the benefits outweigh the costs or the “fit” of these programs with high‐commitment cultures like Hewlett‐Packard was at the time. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

A Multivariate Linear Regression Test for the Arbitrage Pricing Theory

A test for the arbitrage pricing theory which employs a multivariate linear regression model is developed. Given a sample of return premiums for a set of N assets which includes a subset of k linearly independent portfolios, the k factor APT hypothesis is accepted if the intercept term is zero in the multivariate regression of the $(N?k)$ returns on the k portfolios. The test may be carried out simply, by using univariate multiple regression software. The relation of this test to the concept of performance potential and Sharpe's measure of performance is also discussed. If the performance potential of the k portfolios is not significantly less than the performance potential of the complete set of N assets, then the k factor APT hypothesis is accepted.     

Expectations,substitution, and scrapping in a putty-clay model

The paper presents a framework for analyzing the effect of changing expectations about future prices on a firm's choice of technique, and on its anticipated scrapping of capital equipment. Assuming a putty-clay technology, particular attention is paid to the way in which the scrapping age depends on the degree of ex ante input substitution. Numerical illustrations — based on data for Norwegian manufacturing for the years 1964–1983, an ex ante technology represented by a Generalized Leontief cost function in materials, energy, labor, and capital, and an ARMA representation of the price expectation mechanism — are presented. The results indicate that the price changes in this period may have had a substantial impact on planned scrapping, and on the chosen production techniques.     

Directional heterogeneity of environmental disamenities: the impact of crematory operations on adjacent residential values

A hedonic study of residential house sales in Rawlins, Wyoming, was conducted to estimate the impact of an environmental shock from a new point source upon adjacent residential property values. We use a unique data base of house sale prices and associated house attributes, including structural and neighbourhood characteristics and geographic distances and directions from the source of the shock, atmospheric emissions from a new crematory. Our data spans 27 months of house sales: 7 months before, and 20 months after the startup of crematory operations. Results indicate that proximity, measured both in terms of direction and distance from the crematory, imparts a statistically significant negative impact on average house sale prices–an increase of 0.3 to 3.6% of average sale price for every one-tenth mile increase up to one-half mile in distance away from the crematory, but depending on direction from the crematory. This distance benefit increases somewhat with calendar time only for houses located west of the crematory.     

You're fired! What to do, how to cope, finding a new job

If you find yourself out of a job, do not despair. It has happened to the best and the brightest; you are not alone. If you have never lost a job consider yourself fortunate, but do not become complacent. It very well could happen to you sometime soon. Be prepared. Watch for the signs. And if it happens, remain the professional you have always been. There is always another, and probably better, job awaiting you.     

Incomes policy reconsidered

In this study a large data base of individual contract data is used to analyse the impact of wage controls on different groups in the Canadian unionized private sector. Of particular interest is the behavior of the controlled relative to the uncotrolled sector. Statistically significant reductions in wage inflation are discerned both sectors with the effect in the controlled sector being, approximately, twice large as that in the uncontrolled sector.     

Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes.     

Anonymous sequential games: Existence and characterization of equilibria

Summary In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and the underlying process governing aggregate uncertainty Markov, we provide Markov representations of the equilibria.Table of notation Agents' characteristics space ( ) - A Action space of each agent (aA) - Y Y = x A - Aggregate distribution on agents' characteristics - (X) Space of probability measures onX - C(X) Space of continuous functions onX - _X Family of Borel sets ofX - State space of aggregate uncertainty ( ) - x _t=1 aggregate uncertainty for the infinite game - = (₁,₂,...,_t,...) - ^{t t} (₁, ₂,..., _t) - L₁(^t,C ×A),v _t Normed space of measurable functions from ^t toC( x A) - 8o(^t,( x A)) Space of measurable functions from ^tto( x A) - X^t X^t= x _s=1 ^t X - _X ^t Borel field onX ^t - v Distribution on - v_t Marginal distribution of v on ^t - v(^t)((¦^t)) Conditional distribution on given ^t - v^t(^s)(v_t(¦^s)) Conditional distribution on ^t given ^s (wheres) - _t Periodt distributional strategy - Distributional strategy for all periods =(₁,₂,...,_t,...) - _t Transition process for agents' types - ( _t,^t,y)(P _t+1(, _t , ^t ,y)) Transition function associated with _t - u _t Utility function - V _t (, a, , ^t) Value function for each collection (, a, , ^t ) - W _t (, , ^t ) Value function given optimal action a - C() Consistency correspondence. Distributions consistent with and characteristics transition functions - B() Best response correspondence (which also satisfy consistency) - E Set of equilibrium distributional strategies - x _t=1 ( ^t , (x A)) - S Expanded state space for Markov construction - (, a, ) Value function for Markov construction - P( _t ^* , _t y)(P(, _t ^* , _t , _y )) Invariant characteristics transition function for Markov game We wish to acknowledge very helpful conversations with C. d'Aspremont, B. Lipman, A. McLennan and J-F. Mertens. The financial support of the SSHRCC and the ARC at Queen's University is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was begun while the first author visited CORE. The financial support of CORE and the excellent research environment is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.