Telecommunication in the US: From Regulation to Competition (Almost)

Alfred E. Kahn was an observer and practitioner of telecommunications regulation as technology changed the industry from a natural monopoly to a platform-based oligopoly among telephone, cable, satellite, and wireless carriers. Regulation and legislation were slow to recognize these changes, and large welfare losses occurred, some of which could have been avoided if regulators, legislators and economists had followed Fred’s economic advice: Prices must be informed by costs; the relevant costs are actual incremental costs; costs and prices are an outcome of a Schumpeterian competitive process, not the starting point; excluding firms from markets is fundamentally anticompetitive; a reliance on imperfect markets subject to antitrust law is preferable to necessarily imperfect regulation; and a regulatory transition to deregulation entails propensities to micromanage the process to generate preferred outcomes, visible competitors, and expedient price reductions.     

The relationships among leadership,goal orientation,and service quality in high-contact service industries: An empirical study

High-contact service industries are characterized by close interaction between service employees and customers, and diverse customer needs. Such characteristics pose a great challenge to the delivery of services of superior quality. In this research we conceptually explore and empirically examine several attitudinal and motivational factors of customer-contact employees, and the management style of managers as antecedents to service quality in high-contact service sectors. Based on dyadic data collected from 230 service firms in Hong Kong, we examine the relationships among transformational leadership, transactional leadership, affective organizational commitment, learning goal orientation, performance goal orientation, and service quality. We find that learning goal orientation is more effective than performance goal orientation in fostering service quality in the high-contact service context. We also observe that transformational leadership tends to be more effective than transactional leadership in influencing employee attitude in high-contact service firms. This research pioneers theory-driven examination of service quality in high-contact service firms using data collected from service employees and shop managers for hypothesis testing.     

Independent director death and CEO acquisitiveness: Build an empire or pursue a quiet life?

Research summary : This study examines the relationship between an independent director's death and CEO acquisitiveness. Using a sample of large U.S. public firms, we find that CEOs who have experienced an independent director's death undertake fewer acquisitions in the post‐director death period, in particular fewer large acquisitions. Our findings are consistent with the prediction of posttraumatic growth theory that mortality awareness can induce CEOs to reevaluate their life priorities and reduce the importance of extrinsic goals in their decision making. This study contributes to the strategic leadership literature by highlighting the influence of the death of CEOs ' social peers on CEOs ' strategic decisions . Managerial summary : Does the death of CEOs ' social peers influence CEOs ' strategic decisions? We find that CEOs who have experienced an independent director's death engage in fewer acquisitions in the post‐director death period, in particular fewer large acquisitions. One likely explanation for our findings is that the death of an independent director may heighten CEOs ' mortality awareness, lead the CEOs to pursue a quieter life, and weaken their propensities for undertaking decisions (i.e., acquisitions) that increase their compensation and social status . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions

R esearch summary : Agency theory suggests that external governance mechanisms (e.g., activist owners, the market for corporate control, securities analysts) can deter managers from acting opportunistically. Using cognitive evaluation theory, we argue that powerful expectations imposed by external governance can impinge on top managers' feelings of autonomy and crowd out their intrinsic motivation, potentially leading to financial fraud. Our findings indicate that external pressure from activist owners, the market for corporate control, and securities analysts increases managers' likelihood of financial fraud. Our study considers external governance from a top manager's perspective and questions one of agency theory's foundational tenets: that external pressure imposed on managers reduces the potential for moral hazard. M anagerial summary : Many of us are familiar with stories about top managers “cooking the books” in one way or another. As a result, companies and regulatory bodies often implement strict controls to try to prevent financial fraud. However, cognitive evaluation theory describes how those external controls could actually have the opposite of their intended effect because they rob managers of their intrinsic motivation for behaving appropriately. We find this to be the case. When top managers face more stringent external control mechanisms, in the form of activist shareholders, the threat of a takeover, or zealous securities analysts, they are actually more likely to engage in financial misbehavior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adaptive capacity to technological change: A microfoundational approach

Research summary> : W e take a microfoundational approach to understanding the origin of heterogeneity in firms' capacity to adapt to technological change. We develop a computational model of individual‐level learning in an organizational setting characterized by interdependence and ambiguity. The model leads to organizational outcomes with the canonical properties of routines: constancy, efficacy, and organizational memory. At the same time, the process generating these outcomes also produces heterogeneity in firms' adaptive capacity to different types of technological change. An implication is that exploration policy in the formative period of routine development can influence a firm's capacity to adapt to change in maturity. This points to a host of strategic trade‐offs, not only between performance and adaptive capacity, but also between adaptive capacities to different forms of change . Managerial summary : W hy are firms differentially effective at adapting to technological change? We argue that firms differ in the adaptive capacity of the routines that underlie their capabilities. These differences arise well before change occurs, and result because firms build routines that are differentially responsive to signals of performance decline associated with technological change. Thus, early managerial efforts to build superior productive efficiency must be complemented by efforts to build superior adaptive capacity. Our theory suggests that managers can prepare for technological change by implementing policies, in the formative period of organizational development, that promote individuals' exploration of novel actions. However, there are trade‐offs because preparation aimed at building adaptive capacity to one type of technological change may limit adaptive capacity to other types of change . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ripple Effects of CEO Awards: Investigating the Acquisition Activities of Superstar CEOs' Competitors

Research summary : This study proposes that CEOs may undertake intensive acquisition activities to increase their social recognition and status after witnessing their competitors' winning CEO awards. Using a sample of U.S. S&P 1,500 firm CEOs, we find that CEOs engage in more intensive acquisition activities in the period after their competitors won CEO awards (i.e., postaward period), compared to the preaward period. Moreover, this effect is stronger when focal CEOs themselves had a high likelihood of winning CEO awards. Our findings also show that acquisitions by focal CEO firms in the postaward period realize lower announcement returns compared to acquisitions by the same CEOs in the preaward period. Managerial summary : Each year a few CEOs receive CEO awards from business media and CEOs who receive such awards become instant celebrities, that is, superstar CEOs. This study explores how superstar CEOs' competitors react to not winning CEO awards. We find that superstar CEOs' competitors undertake more intensive acquisition activities in the postaward period compared to the preaward period. This is particularly true for competitors who were close, yet did not win CEO awards. In addition, acquisitions by superstar CEOs' competitors are associated with lower announcement returns in the postaward compared to the preaward period. These findings collectively indicate that acquisitions may be used as a channel for superstar CEOs' competitors to elevate their own social status, but at a cost to shareholders. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When do structural holes in employees' networks improve their radical creativity? A moderated mediation model

Previous research has found a relationship between structural holes of knowledge networks, tie strength of knowledge networks, and creativity. Our study extends these findings by proposing that characteristics of R&D employees' team knowledge networks influence their acquired diversified knowledge from the team, which is critical to creativity. Our results based on 558 members of 92 R&D teams demonstrated that, in order to benefit from their broker position in acquiring diversified knowledge, R&D employees should maintain their tie strength toward the team members with whom they are connected.     

Improving the effectiveness of nondisclosure agreements by strengthening concept learning

Intellectual property infringements rank among the top economic crimes, even though there are mechanisms in place to prevent their occurrence. One such mechanism are nondisclosure agreements, which, however, have been reported to fail in practice. This article argues that this may be overcome by strengthening employees’ concept learning. In an experiment, we investigated whether extended nondisclosure agreements, which provide the employee with detailed explanations and examples, lead to better recognition of trade secrets as compared to a standard nondisclosure agreement or no agreement at all. It was found that the extended nondisclosure agreement indeed increased participants’ ability to judge what falls under the trade secret law, whereas the standard nondisclosure agreement showed no such effect. Furthermore, the effects of the factors ‘Involvement’, ‘Specificity’, ‘Publicity’, and ‘Purpose’ on the identification of trade secrets could be proven experimentally. Employees’ judgments of whether an information represents a trade secret seem to rely on general cognitive processes. From this follows that concept learning could be integrated into systematic approaches for protecting intellectual property.     

The dynamics of emerging economy MNEs: How the internationalization process model can guide future research

The rapid emergence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging economies calls for a re-assessment of established theories of the MNE. We assess the usefulness of the internationalization process model (IPM), also known as the Uppsala model, to explain the recent strategies of emerging economy MNEs. We argue that popular stages models derived from the IPM are not helpful, but the underlying process of experiential learning driving steps of increased commitment is an important element in explaining the evolution of these MNEs over time. Focusing on the role of acquisitions within internationalization processes, we illustrate our arguments with six case studies of Thai MNEs. On this basis, we discuss how the IPM can inform future research on emerging economy MNEs. Specifically, the IPM suggests focusing on the internal and external factors that may induce firms to accelerate their cycle of international learning and commitment, in particular the roles of networks, acquisitions, human resources, big step commitments, the home country institutional environment, and possible managerial biases.