Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union at the Zero Lower Bound

This paper constructs a two‐country core–periphery New Keynesian model of a currency union to address the interaction between the objectives of regionally directed fiscal policy constrained by a single currency and the aggregate use of fiscal policy in face of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on policy interest rates. We identify an optimal path of aggregate and relative fiscal policy responses to a negative region‐specific demand shock. Our results show that (i) in a monetary union, the optimal policy response to an asymmetric reduction in demand concentrated in the periphery always entails a relative shift of fiscal expenditure toward the worse‐affected regions, (ii) though no aggregate fiscal response is required outside the ZLB, and (iii) optimal union‐wide fiscal policy is expansionary at the ZLB. Therefore, optimal policy always entails an expansion in the periphery at the ZLB, but the optimal fiscal response in the core regions can be either expansionary or contractionary depending on the parameters of the model. However, (iv) fiscal expansion in the core is warranted if the periphery cannot implement an expansion due to constraints on public spending.     

Money and Output: Friedman and Schwartz Revisited

More than 50 years ago, Friedman and Schwartz examined historical data for the United States and found evidence of procyclical movements in the money stock, which led corresponding movements in output. We find similar correlations in more recent data; these appear most clearly when Divisia monetary aggregates are used in place of the Federal Reserve's official, simple‐sum measures. When we use information in Divisia money to estimate a structural vector autoregression, identified monetary policy shocks appear to have large and persistent effects on output and prices, with a lag that has lengthened considerably since the early 1980s.     

Monetary Policy Expectations at the Zero Lower Bound

We show that conventional dynamic term structure models (DTSMs) estimated on recent U.S. data severely violate the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates and deliver poor forecasts of future short rates. In contrast, shadow‐rate DTSMs account for the ZLB by construction, capture the resulting distributional asymmetry of future short rates, and achieve good forecast performance. These models provide more accurate estimates of the most likely path for future monetary policy—including the timing of policy liftoff from the ZLB and the pace of subsequent policy tightening. We also demonstrate the benefits of including macroeconomic factors in a shadow‐rate DTSM when yields are constrained near the ZLB.     

Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. For the average hedge fund, indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and managers’ personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives, manager wealth increases by at least $0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth. Younger and more scalable hedge funds have stronger flow‐performance relations, leading to stronger indirect incentives. These results have a number of implications for our understanding of incentives in the asset management industry.     

Do Managers of U.S. Defined Benefit Pension Plan Sponsors Use Regulatory Freedom Strategically?

We use historical particularities of pension funding law to investigate whether managers of U.S. corporate defined benefit pension plan sponsors strategically use regulatory freedom to lower the reported value of pension liabilities, and hence required cash contributions. For some years, pension plans were required to estimate two liabilities—one with mandated discount rates and mortality assumptions, and another where these could be chosen freely. Using a sample of 11,963 plans, we find that the regulated liability exceeds the unregulated measure by 10% and the difference further increases for underfunded pension plans. Underfunded plans tend to assume substantially higher discount rates and lower life expectancy. The effect persists both in the cross‐section of plans and over time and it serves to reduce cash contributions. We further show that plan sponsor managers use the freed‐up cash for corporate investment and that credit risk is unlikely to explain the finding.     

Why Does Return Predictability Concentrate in Bad Times?

We build an equilibrium model to explain why stock return predictability concentrates in bad times. The key feature is that investors use different forecasting models, and hence assess uncertainty differently. As economic conditions deteriorate, uncertainty rises and investors' opinions polarize. Disagreement thus spikes in bad times, causing returns to react to past news. This phenomenon creates a positive relation between disagreement and future returns. It also generates time‐series momentum, which strengthens in bad times, increases with disagreement, and crashes after sharp market rebounds. We provide empirical support for these new predictions.     

Sell‐Side Analyst Research and Stock Comovement

We document that a stock's price around a recommendation or forecast covaries with prices of other stocks the issuing analyst covers. The effect of shared analyst coverage on stock price comovement extends beyond analyst activity days. A stock's daily returns covary with the returns of other stocks with which it shares analyst coverage. These links between stock price comovement and shared analyst coverage are consistent with the coverage‐specific information we find in earnings forecasts; analysts who cover both stocks in a pair expect future earnings of the stocks to be more highly correlated than do analysts who cover only one stock from the pair. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analyst research produces coverage‐specific spillovers that raise price comovement among stocks that share analyst coverage. The strength of these spillovers is comparable to spillovers from broad industry and market information in analyst research.     

The Response of Equity Prices to Movements in Long‐Term Interest Rates Associated with Monetary Policy Statements: Before and After the Zero Lower Bound

Monetary policy actions since 2008 have influenced long‐term interest rates through forward guidance and quantitative easing. I propose a strategy to identify the comovement between interest rate and equity price movements induced by monetary policy when an observable representing policy changes is not available. A decline in long‐term interest rates induced by monetary policy statements has a larger positive effect on equity prices prior to 2009 than in the subsequent period. This change appears to reflect the impact of the zero lower bound on short‐term interest rates.     

Trade Openness and Exchange Rate Regimes

The paper evaluates the net welfare gains of inflation targeting over a fixed exchange rate as a function of a country's trade openness, using a multisectoral structural model calibrated to Chile. For most calibrations with separable preferences, net welfare gains are increasing in trade openness. The reason is that in more open economies terms of trade shocks, which favor inflation targeting, become quantitatively more important, while price markup shocks in the imperfectly competitive nontradables sector, which favor exchange rate targeting, become less important. The most important exception is heavily indebted countries, where net welfare gains are decreasing in trade openness.     

The Global Crisis and Equity Market Contagion

We analyze the transmission of the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis to 415 country‐industry equity portfolios. We use a factor model to predict crisis returns, defining unexplained increases in factor loadings and residual correlations as indicative of contagion. While we find evidence of contagion from the United States and the global financial sector, the effects are small. By contrast, there has been substantial contagion from domestic markets to individual domestic portfolios, with its severity inversely related to the quality of countries’ economic fundamentals. This confirms the “wake‐up call” hypothesis, with markets focusing more on country‐specific characteristics during the crisis.