A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Noncooperative Environments: Theory and Applications

We construct a market‐based mechanism that induces players in a noncooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problem of “The Tragedy of the Commons.”     

The Distribution of Household Health Expenditures in Australia*

Out‐of‐pocket health expenditures in Australia are high in international comparisons and have been growing at a faster rate than most other health costs in recent years. This raises concerns about the extent to which out‐of‐pocket costs have constrained access to health services for low income households. Using data from the ABS Household Expenditure Survey 2003–2004, we model the relationships between health expenditure shares and equivalised total expenditure for categories of out‐of‐pocket health expenditures and analyse the extent of protection given by concession cards. To allow for flexibility in the relationship we adopt Yatchew's semi‐parametric estimation technique. This is the first detailed distributional analysis of household health expenditures in Australia. We find mixed evidence for the protection health concession cards give against high out‐of‐pocket health expenditures. Despite higher levels of subsidy, households with concession cards do not have lower out‐of‐pocket expenditures than non‐cardholder households except for the highest expenditure quintile. Cards provide most protection for GP out‐of‐pocket expenditures.     

Sequencing,timing and filling rates of recruitment channels

This paper analyses the recruitment process by which employers adjust their search strategies. The focus is, in particular, on the sequence and timing of recruitment channels. Two search strategies are identified. One strategy is to advertise a vacancy, and to form a pool of candidates by activating subsequent recruitment channels such that candidates are added to the pool. An alternative strategy used by employers is to start searching via informal channels, consider applicants at arrival and continue their search along a new recruitment channel if no suitable candidates show up. Results suggest that when informal personal contacts are available to the employer, this ‘switching of channel’ strategy is preferred. Moreover, the results of this paper are consistent with the view that informal search methods are potentially more efficient than using an advertisement and forming a pool of applicants, in particular when vital positions in firms have to be filled.     

Amakudari: The Post‐Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan

This paper analyzes the amakudari practice in Japan. Amakudari refers to a process in which government agencies contact the private firms that they regulate, asking them to provide employment for their retiring elite bureaucrats. Upon employment at the private firms, bureaucrats may collude with their former colleagues in the ministries they worked for to secure lucrative government contracts, avoid regulatory inspections, or obtain preferential treatment for their new employers. This paper provides an explicit formalization of the implicit collusion between the regulator and the regulated.     

Status‐Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero‐Tolerance

This paper offers a new argument for why a more aggressive enforcement of minor offenses (zero‐tolerance) may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both minor offenses and more severe crime. We develop a model of criminal subcultures in which people gain social status among their peers for being “tough” by committing criminal acts. As zero‐tolerance keeps relatively “gutless” people from committing a minor offense, the signaling value of that action increases, which makes it attractive for some people who would otherwise commit more severe crime. If social status is sufficiently important in criminal subcultures, zero‐tolerance reduces crime across the board.