High‐Frequency Trading around Large Institutional Orders

Liquidity suppliers lean against the wind. We analyze whether high‐frequency traders (HFTs) lean against large institutional orders that execute through a series of child orders. The alternative is HFTs trading with the wind, that is, in the same direction. We find that HFTs initially lean against these orders but eventually change direction and take positions in the same direction for the most informed institutional orders. Our empirical findings are consistent with investors trading strategically on their information. When deciding trade intensity, they seem to trade off higher speculative profits against higher risk of being detected and preyed on by HFTs.     

Market Games in Successive Oligopolies

This paper introduces a new approach to successive oligopolies. We draw on market games à la Shapley–Shubik to examine how successive oligopolies operate between downstream and upstream markets when the input price is determined by the action of all firms, downstream and upstream both. This approach differs from the classical one as it allows us to consider downstream firms that exercise market power both in both downstream and upstream markets. We perform a comparison of the market outcome with each scenarios as well as a welfare analysis.     

Service Satisfaction: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Satisfaction in Financial Services

Does the widely accepted espectancy-disconfirmation model apply to situations within a financial services context? Or could it be, due to specific characteristics of services, that a different model applies? This paper addresses these questions and tests the relationships between consumer expectations, performance, disconfirmation, .satisfaction and repeat purchase in a lisrel model. The results would suggest that the relevancy of disconfirmation is fairly apparent and that expectations have only an indirect influence on satisfaction where financial services are concerned. The performance level of financial services however has a strong positive direct effect on satisfaction.     

INSTITUTIONAL WAGE EFFECTS: REVISITING UNION AND BARGAINING COUNCIL WAGE PREMIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

The literature on the union wage gap in South Africa is extensive, spanning a range of data sets and methodologies. There is, however, little consensus on the appropriate method to correct for the endogeneity of union membership or the size of the union wage gap. Furthermore, there are very few studies on the bargaining council wage premium in South Africa because of lack of data on the coverage of employees under these agreements. Our study, using 2005 Labour Force Survey data, firstly reconsiders the union wage gap controlling for both firm‐level and job characteristics. When correcting for the endogeneity of union status through a two‐stage selection model and including firm size, type of employment, and non‐wage benefits, we find a much lower union wage premium for African workers in the formal sector than premiums reported in some previous studies. Secondly, our study estimates bargaining council wage premiums for the private and public sectors. We find that extension procedures are present in both private and public bargaining council systems but that unions negotiate for additional gains for their members at the plant level. Furthermore, there is some evidence that unions negotiate for awards for their members in the private sector irrespective of bargaining council coverage.     

Determinacy under Inflation Targeting Interest Rate Policy in a Sticky Price Model with Investment (and Labor Bargaining)

In a sticky price model with investment spending, recent research shows that inflation-forecast targeting interest rate policy makes determinacy of equilibrium essentially impossible. We examine a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy under interest rate policy that responds to a weighted average of an inflation forecast and current inflation. This condition demonstrates that the average-inflation targeting policy ensures determinacy as long as both the response to average inflation and the relative weight of current inflation are large enough. We also find that interest rate policy that responds solely to past inflation guarantees determinacy when its response satisfies the Taylor principle and is not large. These results still hold even when wages and hours worked are determined by Nash bargaining.     

Optimal Piecewise Linear Income Taxation

Given its significance in practice, piecewise linear taxation has received relatively little attention in the literature. This paper offers a simple and transparent analysis of its main characteristics. We fully characterize optimal tax parameters for the cases in which budget sets are convex and nonconvex respectively. A numerical analysis of a discrete version of the model shows the circumstances under which each of these cases will hold as a global optimum. We find that, given plausible parameter values and wage distributions, the globally optimal tax system is convex, and marginal rate progressivity increases with rising inequality.