Who Faces Higher Prices? An Empirical Analysis Based on Japanese Homescan Data

On the basis of household‐level scanner data (called homescan data) for Japan, we construct a household‐level price index and investigate the causes of price differences across households. We observe large price differentials across households, a result that is consistent with the previous research based on the data in the USA. However, the differences across age and income groups are small. In addition, we find that elderly people face higher prices than the younger ones, which is contrary to the results of the previous research. The most important determinant of the price level is the extent to which households rely on bargain sales; doubling purchases of goods at bargain sales decreases the price level by about 2%, while shopping frequency only has a limited effect on the price level.     

THE MARKET SELECTS THE WRONG FIRMS IN THE LONG RUN*

We consider the effects of free entry on the market structure and social welfare of an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Even if we allow for the existence of different types of firms initially, only one type (in almost all cases) can survive in the long run. Free entry leads an economy to a symmetric equilibrium, in which the excess entry theorem holds. Further, we consider the socially optimal policy for this economy. In cases of either (i) a concave demand (which implies strategic substitutability) or (ii) strategic complementarity (which implies a convex demand), the type of firms that should remain in the market to achieve social optimality does not necessarily coincide with the type of firms that will survive in the long run. The market may select not only the wrong number of firms but also the wrong type of firms in the long run.     

Competing to Outsource in the South

This paper analyzes foreign direct investment (FDI) competition in a three‐country framework: two Northern countries and one Southern country. We have in mind the competition of Airbus and Boeing in a developing country. The host‐country government endogenizes tariffs, while Airbus and Boeing choose domestic output and FDI. Wages and employment in the home countries are negotiated. We find that in the unique equilibrium, both Airbus and Boeing compete to undertake FDI in the developing country. This arises because the host country can play off the multinationals, which in turn stems from three factors: (a) oligopolistic rivalry; (b) quid pro quo FDI; (c) strategic outsourcing—FDI drives down the union wages at home if the host‐country wage is sufficiently low. However, if the host‐country wage is sufficiently high, the union wage increases under FDI. In such cases, FDI competition benefits the multinationals, the labor unions, as well as the host country.     

The Multi-Sector Business Cycle Model and Aggregate Shocks: An Empirical Analysis

This paper discusses the applicability of a multi-sector business cycle model to the Japanese economy. Through dynamic factor analysis, output fluctuations are broken down into aggregate and sectoral shocks. It is shown that independent sectoral shocks are more significant than common shocks, which is consistent with the model proposed by Long and Plosser (1983). In addition, the paper reveals that the importance of aggregate shocks increased during the so-called "Bubble" period in the late 1980s.     

A Two‐Country Game of Competition Policies

Recently a number of studies have recognized that trade policy can be substituted for by competition policy. This study demonstrates, however, that there is a fundamental difference in the working of terms‐of‐trade effects between competition policy and tariff policy and that if countries optimally set their respective competition policies, it is unlikely to result in a tariff‐war‐like state in which all countries adopt distortionary policies. Instead, in a Nash equilibrium, one country maintains perfect competition in its domestic service sector while the other country tolerates imperfect competition.     

Jumps in foreign exchange rates and stochastic unwinding of carry trades

Tails in the distribution of JPY/USD exchange rate returns are well approximated by an exponentially dampened power-law. Distribution parameter estimates indicate that yen appreciation jumps belong to a Levy process with unbounded variation, suggesting that same mechanism may be responsible for fluctuations in normal times as well as rare crashes. In contrast, yen depreciation jumps have a well defined second moment suggesting a Gaussian regime. In addition, extreme episodes of yen appreciation are larger and more persistent than episodes of yen depreciation. The asymmetry is magnified and power-law tails are more elongated during times of higher interest rate differential between U.S. and Japan and higher level of VIX indicating that carry trade may be the driver. We propose a model of strategic carry trader behavior that in equilibrium generates exponentially dampened power-law distribution of jumps in foreign exchange along with “up by the stairs down by the elevator” dynamics arising from the assymetries between negative and positive jumps.     

Stability and Turnpike Theorems in Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium

This study reviews the main results in the literature on the integration of competitive equilibrium theory and optimal growth theory, in particular those concerning the convergence of an equilibrium path to a stationary state (stability theorems).
JEL Classification Numbers: C6, D9.     

Do Convertible Bond Issuers Cater to Investor Demand?

We examine the impact of fluctuations in investor demand for convertible securities on convertible bond issue volumes, pricing, and design. We find evidence of a positive impact of investor demand proxies on convertible bond issue volumes. We also document significantly lower convertible bond underpricing in periods with higher investor demand. The results hold in a variety of specifications, and are robust to controlling for firm‐specific and macroeconomic financing cost proxies. However, we obtain only limited evidence that issuers adjust the design of their convertible bond offerings in response to investor demand.     

On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response

In this paper, we identify the conditions under which a strategy is weakly dominated if and only if it is not sequential best response. In addition, we explore the implication for extensive form rationalizability.     

Fertility,Intra‐Generational Redistribution,and Social Security Sustainability

Incorporating heterogeneity in preference to having children into an overlapping generations model of a small open economy, we examine the effects of changes in the size of pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) social security on fertility choices of individuals and population growth of the economy. It is shown that PAYG social security will raise population growth by increasing the number of individuals who have children and the number of children parents have if the system involves redistribution between retirees with different contributions, whereas, if it has no redistribution, PAYG social security does not affect the fertility decisions of individuals.