Mapping network champion behavior in B2B electronic venturing

This study examines the concept of a new venture, B2B e-market in the light of participants who are involved in its innovation and diffusion processes. Our assessment results in the development of two key working propositions. The first proposition attempts to explain the relationship of the participants in the network and their contribution to innovation and diffusion processes over time. The second proposition attempts to explain how network champions (NC) contribute by bringing suppliers and buyers together in an electronic marketplace over time. In particular, this research adds to the industrial marketing literature by applying a case research method that is particularly useful for operationalizing theory development in business-to-business environments.     

Pay dispersion and workforce performance: moderating effects of incentives and interdependence

The compensation literature is replete with arguments, but lacking in empirical tests, regarding the effects of pay dispersion on organizational outcomes. Pay dispersion may increase effort and provide incentives for high workforce performance levels, but may also inhibit cooperation and goal orientation among employees. Drawing on several theoretical perspectives (individual motivation, institutional theory, organizational justice, and neoclassical economics), this study predicts that pay dispersion will be associated with higher levels of workforce performance when accompanied by formal individual incentive systems and independent work, while pay compression is desirable in the absence of individual incentive systems and when work is interdependent. Survey research studies in two industrial sectors (the motor carrier and concrete pipe industries) were conducted to address these issues. Interactive regression results were generally supportive of the predictions across several measures of workforce performance (accident rates, safety violations, and productivity). Implications of these studies for strategy implementation in terms of compensation theory and practice are addressed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stock market efficiency and random character of share price behaviour in India

This study is aimed at testing the appropriateness of the random walk model in the Indian Stock Market for a recent period 1979–87. Using data of prices for five shares indices from the Bombay Stock Exchange during this period, both the tests - serial correlation and runs analysis, have generally supported the independence assumption of the random walk model.     

Omitted variables,variability of estimated parameters and the appearance of autocorrelated disturbances

This paper shows that in a standard regression model with omitted variables, the OLS formula for the estimated variance matrix of the regression coefficients is more likely to underestimate the appropriate criterion of estimator reliability which is the Mean Square Errors matrix. Using examples of two and three regressor models, we show that overestimation, though possible, occurs in rather special cases. Throughout, our analysis is contrasted with that of Chaudhuri (1977) and clarifies some ambiguities of that paper. Finally, we disagree with Chaudhuri who distinguishes between the corresponding coefficients in the correct and the misspecified models. This distinction is inappropriate and leads to a misplaced criticism of some GLS variants when errors are serially correlated. A first-order Markov process is an inexact representation of serial correlation which is due to omitted regressors.     

Optimal pricing and advertising strategy for introducing a new business product with threat of competitive entry

The problem of optimal joint pricing and advertising decision making for a new product facing potential competitive entry has received inadequate attention. We propose a model that attempts to find the optimal price-advertising frontier in the face of potential competitive entry that maximizes total discounted profits for pre- and post-entry periods. We find that a firm would charge the price that equates price elasticity to marginal revenue product of advertising (as predicted by [Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954), Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836.]) only when the potential effects of pricing and advertising on its market share are not considered. Under optimal conditions, aware that market share is subject to erosion, the firm charges a somewhat lower price than the profit maximizing price, and sets an advertisement expense that is somewhat higher than the profit-maximizing advertising level as predicted by Cournot's monopolistic setting. We illustrate the applicability of our model using business product examples taken from several industries including operating systems, software, pharmaceutical, and telephone switching. Directions for future research with implications for B2B managers (for example, the possible effects of preannouncement to forestall competitive entry) are discussed.     

Follow the leader (or not): The influence of peer CEOs’ characteristics on interorganizational imitation

Research Summary: We argue that because charisma and narcissism represent widely held prototypes of effective and ineffective forms of leadership, respectively, the likelihood that a focal firm will imitate the practices of its peer firms is affected by these peer firms’ CEO characteristics. We theorize that peer firm CEO charisma enhances the focal firm’s imitation of peer firms’ behaviors, while peer firm CEO narcissism diminishes it. We further posit that the uncertainty of the context affects these imitation processes: industry dynamism and prior experience in a given strategic domain, respectively, strengthens and dampens focal firms’ susceptibility to these peer CEOs’ attributes. We test and find support for these ideas using a longitudinal sample of Fortune 500 firms in two distinct domains, corporate strategy and corporate social responsibility. Managerial Summary: When companies are uncertain about the costs and benefits of strategic actions this may lead them to imitate the actions of peer companies. But given the uncertainty, the challenge for executives is: which companies to emulate and which to ignore? In a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we find that the charisma or narcissism of a peer company’s CEO positively or negatively influences, respectively, the degree to which the peer company’s strategic actions are imitated. We reason that this is because these particular CEO attributes are widely believed to drive leadership effectiveness or ineffectiveness, respectively. We also find that the effects of these CEO characteristics on imitation are stronger in dynamic industry environments and weaker for companies that already have experience with the given strategy.     

Asymmetric causality between military expenditures and economic growth in top six defense spenders

This study applies asymmetric causality tests, proposed by Hatemi-J (Asymmetric panel causality tests with an application to the impact of fiscal policy on economic performance in Scandinavia, 2011; Empir Econ 43(1):447–456, 2012), to revisit military expenditures-growth nexus for the world top six defense spenders during the period of 1988–2013. Empirical results indicate that the military expenditure-led hypothesis is supported in China and Japan. However, the growth-led hypothesis is supported in four countries, i.e. France, Russia, Saudi Arabia and US. Except for Saudi Arabia, strong economic growth by no means implies automatic expansion of military expenditures. Defense planning in these countries is a matter of matching their limited resources to attain the suitable priorities. The more threats they perceive, the more spend for defense. This evidence provides useful insight into the behavior of other potential defense suppliers.     

Size of Financing Need and the Choice between Asset Sales and Security Issuances

We study the effect of the size of financing need on a firm's choice between selling assets and issuing securities to finance its investments. The balance sheet effect predicts that a firm prefers to sell assets when the financing need is relatively small as there is less information asymmetry regarding the value of a (small) subset of its assets. When the financing need is large, a firm prefers issuing securities to selling assets. We find evidence supporting the prediction. Our findings remain unchanged when we employ measures of financing need that are relatively independent of the actual amount of financing raised.