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81.
82.
Abstract. This paper contributes to the growing literature that analyses the Spanish publishing performance in Economics throughout
the 1990s. Several bibliometric indicators are used in order to provide Spanish rankings (of both institutions and individual
authors) based on Econlit journals. Further, lists of the ten most influential authors and articles over that period, in terms of citations, are reported.
We are grateful to many colleagues who made very useful remarks to preliminary versions of this paper, as well as to two anonymous
referees. We are particularly indebted to Xavier Sala-i-Martín, without whose invaluable help this work would not have been
possible. All errors or omissions are of our exclusive responsibility. 相似文献
83.
María Xosé Vázquez Rodríguez Carmelo J. León 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2004,28(2):233-249
Altruism is a type of non-use value which can have different definitions depending on the type of goods entering the utility function of the altruists and their expectations about the contributions of others. The purpose of this paper is to measure the trade-offs between different types of altruist values originating from social and environmental policies. Environmental policies are concerned with reducing health effects from a power plant while social policies involve both the attainment of public facilities for education and leisure and an increase in the income of the affected population. The empirical application utilizes a choice experiment technique which allows for valuation of multiple goods. Health effects are decomposed into the values of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes and the limitations imposed by illness. Altruist values are elicited from a population that is not affected by pollution. Results show that altruism is significant for policies directed to reducing health effects and improving the income level of the affected population, whereas there is egoism for a policy aimed at improving public facilities in the polluted suburb. The value of altruism is significantly influenced by the expectations of net benefits to be received by the affected population. 相似文献
84.
We analyze the impact of product diversification on performance. This topic has been discussed in the literature, and there
is no consensus so far as to the significance or the direction of the impact. Performance is measured using Tobin's q for
a sample of 103 large, non-financial Spanish firms (1992–1995). Diversification is measured by means of a categorical variable,
as suggested by Varadarajan. The principal results indicate that the firms with intermediate levels of product diversification
have the highest performance, while the firms with low and high levels of diversification show significantly lower performance,
which performance is not significantly different between them. 相似文献
85.
Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2007,36(2):237-254
In this paper, we have considered a duopolistic model of environmental product differentiation with two types of consumers
(green and brown) to analyze how environmental awareness affects the environment. “Green” consumers value the physical and
environmental attributes of the good they purchase while “brown” consumers only value the physical attributes. We find that
more environmental awareness may not be good news for the environment as the firm that produces the good without environmental
attributes may increase its sales. The result depends on the degree of product differentiation and the cost to achieve it.
Social welfare can also be inversely related to environmental awareness if the negative environmental effect dominates the
positive market effect.
相似文献
86.
Conchita Garcés Ayerbe Carmen Galve Górriz 《International Advances in Economic Research》2003,9(2):123-132
This study presents theoretical arguments and evidence that attempt to show the contribution of economic mechanisms typical
of a business for resolving problems of environmental protection. Firstly, a brief synopsis is given of the classic solutions
that environmental economics proposes for correcting environmental externalities. Next, the benefit of expanding these two
mechanisms is discussed so that they include those intermediate mechanisms for which it is not possible to clearly establish
if they are developed within the domain of the market or the business. The study's focus resides in the fact that the explicit
expansion of the range of solutions proposed from a macroeconomic point of view establishes a connecting point between environmental
economics and business economics, an area in which academic attention to environmental matters has been significantly less.
The present work forms part of research project SEC2002-00835, financed by MCYT-FEDER. 相似文献
87.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
88.
Anne-Sophie Crépin 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2003,26(4):625-646
Recent research in natural sciences shows that the dynamics in boreal forests are much more complex than what many models
traditionally used in forestry economics reflect. This essay analyzes some challenges of accounting for such complexity. It
shows that the optimal harvesting strategy for forest owners is history dependent and for some states of the forest, more
than one strategy may be optimal.This paper confirms earlier literature on shallow lakes and coral reefs and shows that this
kind of phenomena seem much more common than previously thought. They are valid for a wide range of ecosystems that cover
large surfaces and they do not depend on the choice of some specific function to model the non-linearity. There are also indications
that theses results could be obtained even for resources with concave growth if at least one species with non-linear growth
affects their dynamics. 相似文献
89.
In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause.JEL Classification:
C73, D62, Q28
Corresponding author : Santiago J. RubioThis paper is based on chapter four of Begoña Casinos Ph. Dissertation. Financial support from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under grant BEC2000-1432 and Fundación BBVAis gratefully acknowledged. We also appreciate the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, whose suggestions improved the paper. Regarding any remaining inadequacies, the usual caveat applies. 相似文献
90.
John?K.?StranlundEmail author Christopher?Costello Carlos?A.?Chávez 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2005,28(2):181-204
We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871. 相似文献