One-step R-estimation in linear models with stable errors

Classical estimation techniques for linear models either are inconsistent, or perform rather poorly, under α$\alpha$-stable error densities; most of them are not even rate-optimal. In this paper, we propose an original one-step R-estimation method and investigate its asymptotic performances under stable densities. Contrary to traditional least squares, the proposed R-estimators remain root-n$n$ consistent (the optimal rate) under the whole family of stable distributions, irrespective of their asymmetry and tail index. While parametric stable-likelihood estimation, due to the absence of a closed form for stable densities, is quite cumbersome, our method allows us to construct estimators reaching the parametric efficiency bounds associated with any prescribed values (_α0,_b0)$({\alpha }_0,b_0)$ of the tail index α$\alpha$ and skewness parameter b$b$, while preserving root-n$n$ consistency under any (α,b)$(\alpha ,b)$ as well as under usual light-tailed densities. The method furthermore avoids all forms of multidimensional argmin computation. Simulations confirm its excellent finite-sample performances.     

Dilation bootstrap

We propose a methodology for combining several sources of model and data incompleteness and partial identification, which we call Composition Theorem. We apply this methodology to the construction of confidence regions with partially identified models of general form. The region is obtained by inverting a test of internal consistency of the econometric structure. We develop a dilation bootstrap methodology to deal with sampling uncertainty without reference to the hypothesized economic structure. It requires bootstrapping the quantile process for univariate data and a novel generalization of the latter to higher dimensions. Once the dilation is chosen to control the confidence level, the unknown true distribution of the observed data can be replaced by the known empirical distribution and confidence regions can then be obtained as in Galichon and Henry (2011) and Beresteanu et al. (2011).     

Exploring governance of the new European Banking Authority—A case for harmonization?

In the context of the proposed EU financial supervisory reforms, this paper focuses on the governance of the network of national supervisory banking agencies and the newly established Community supervisor (European Banking Authority, EBA). We assess to what extent lack of governance convergence nationally and with EBA could undermine the incentives for cooperation among supervisors. Convergence should particularly focus on (i) the issue of the presence of politicians on decision-making bodies; (ii) the need for clearly defining dismissal procedures of heads of supervision; (iii) autonomy from government in regulatory matters; (iv) supervisory autonomy in matters of licensing and withdrawing licenses; (iv) mechanisms for judicial accountability; (v) legal protection for supervisors handling in good faith. In the absence of full centralization of prudential supervision, early harmonization of national governance arrangements towards best practice would better align supervisors’ incentive structures and, hence, be beneficial for the effectiveness of European supervision.     

Managerial characteristics and performance of eurozone mutual funds

We investigate the relation between observable managerial characteristics (i.e., gender, age, tenure, professional qualifications, and advanced education) and performance in diversified equity mutual funds domiciled in the eurozone. We find that differences in the fund alphas are statistically significant only in groups based on age, tenure, and professional qualifications (i.e., chartered financial analyst [CFA]). We also find a significant positive relation for age and CFA certification with a fund's risk-adjusted performance and a significant negative relation for tenure. However, we find no significant effect for gender and advanced education (i.e., master of business administration [MBA]). The differences in risk taking are significantly related only with age and tenure; the former has a negative and the latter a positive relation with risk taking.     

Central Bank Actions and Words: The Intraday Effects of FOMC Policy Communications on Individual Equity Volatility and Returns

We compare intraday impacts of the release of Federal Reserve decision announcements and of Federal Open Market Committee minutes between 2004 and 2015 on 1,997 equity return and volatility series. We find that returns are unresponsive to either news release, but conditional volatility increases for both, manifesting immediately after each information release, and persisting for 30 minutes post‐announcement. These effects are larger for decisions than for minutes. On stratifying firms by trading intensity, we find most “high trading intensity” firms respond to these announcements, while “low trading intensity” firms are less affected. Our results show that traders respond, albeit differently, to both sets of information releases.     

Three discount methods for valuing projects and the required return on equity

In this paper we discuss the required return on equity for a simple project with a finite life. To determine a project’s cost of equity, it is quite common to use Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition II (1963). However, if the assumptions of MM do not hold, Proposition II will lead to wrong required returns and project values. This paper gives an example of how the cost of equity should be determined in order to obtain correct valuations. The methods we apply are the Adjusted Present Value method, the Cash Flow to Equity method and the WACC method.     

ALIGNMENT EXPOSED: HOW CEOS ARE PAID, AND WHAT THEIR SHAREHOLDERS GET FOR IT

This article begins by arguing that, for many companies, there is a significant "disconnect" between how managers are paid and what is actually achieved for shareholders. This paper answers two questions of prime importance to investors: Is there a way to know beforehand whether managers' incentives are well aligned with those of its shareholders? And does such alignment actually make a difference in the returns one is likely to see?
In answering the first question, the author argues that cash bonuses and performance-based equity grants (i.e., grants based on managers' meeting accounting-based operating targets) are likely to provide stronger, more cost-effective incentives than grants of stock or options because the former are generally based on measures over which managers have significantly more control than the stock price. Using this insight, the author develops a method for evaluating compensation structures based on the variability of compensation, the number and type of compensation metrics purportedly driving that variability (including the award of performance shares or options), the stability of those metrics over time, and the apparent level of discretion in the use of those metrics to either fund or distribute bonuses (including equity). All these elements are disclosed to varying degrees in the proxy statements or annual reports of companies.
Using his compensation scores for 140 companies and their return history over the last eight years, the author concludes that "high alignment" companies outperform their "low alignment" peers by more than 5% per year in total shareholder returns. Furthermore, increases in alignment scores by individual companies over time tend to lead to higher total shareholder returns, and degradation of scores lead to lower returns. In short, observable improvements in compensation structure appear to pay off in the form of significant abnormal returns.     

CREATING VALUE WITH MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

This report addresses two key questions for today's top executives: Do acquisitions create value for acquirers? And under what circumstances have acquisitions created the most value for acquiring shareholders?
The authors' analysis of over 1,500 completed deals by non-financial companies in the United States over the past 12 years shows that, at announcement, acquirers' shareholders suffer small losses, on average, in the short term around the initial deal announcement. Over longer intervals, such as one or two years following the announcement of the transaction, acquirers tend to slightly outperform industry peers.
The average or median market response hides tremendous variability in how the market has reacted to individual deals, however. This article provides evidence that the "right" M&A transaction can create substantial value for acquirers. One-quarter of the transactions lead to market-adjusted gains in excess of 5% for the acquirer and oneeighth of the transactions lead to gains in excess of 10% in the short term. However, some deals have also destroyed substantial shareholder value.
Financing structure is a key driver of the stock market reaction. Stock-financed transactions, on average, have a negative stock market reaction, while cash-financed transactions have benefited acquirers in both the short term as well as the long term.
Acquisitions of private companies or assets and units of public companies have consistently generated higher returns for acquirers than purchases of public companies.
Moreover, EPS dilution is not a major driver of how the stock market reacts to a deal. Although "accretive" deals perform slightly better than "dilutive" ones in the short and long run, the difference is small and not statistically significant. Over the long run, acquiring shareholders have benefited the most from deals within the same industry and that avoid targets with relatively optimistic earnings growth projections.