The Competitive Characteristics of U.S Manufacturers in the Machine Tool Industry

This paper examines the competitive characteristics of U.S. manufacturers in the machine tool (MT) industry. After several decades of decline, this industry has recently shown signs of a modest but sustained recovery. Empirical evidence from a national survey of 104 MT producers suggests that the revival of this sector has been driven by a combination of factors, including renewed export involvement, improved customer support, and better product design. Although most MT companies are small-to-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the survey data show that very small SMEs are poorly represented in the recovery thrust of the industry as a whole. Our principal conclusion is that the MT industry has been following an export-led path toward stabilization, but that certain types of small producers are unlikely to thrive for very long. The most serious problems facing small producers include shrinking local markets, import competition, shortages of skilled labor, and cyclical demand.     

ALIGNMENT EXPOSED: HOW CEOS ARE PAID, AND WHAT THEIR SHAREHOLDERS GET FOR IT

This article begins by arguing that, for many companies, there is a significant "disconnect" between how managers are paid and what is actually achieved for shareholders. This paper answers two questions of prime importance to investors: Is there a way to know beforehand whether managers' incentives are well aligned with those of its shareholders? And does such alignment actually make a difference in the returns one is likely to see?
In answering the first question, the author argues that cash bonuses and performance-based equity grants (i.e., grants based on managers' meeting accounting-based operating targets) are likely to provide stronger, more cost-effective incentives than grants of stock or options because the former are generally based on measures over which managers have significantly more control than the stock price. Using this insight, the author develops a method for evaluating compensation structures based on the variability of compensation, the number and type of compensation metrics purportedly driving that variability (including the award of performance shares or options), the stability of those metrics over time, and the apparent level of discretion in the use of those metrics to either fund or distribute bonuses (including equity). All these elements are disclosed to varying degrees in the proxy statements or annual reports of companies.
Using his compensation scores for 140 companies and their return history over the last eight years, the author concludes that "high alignment" companies outperform their "low alignment" peers by more than 5% per year in total shareholder returns. Furthermore, increases in alignment scores by individual companies over time tend to lead to higher total shareholder returns, and degradation of scores lead to lower returns. In short, observable improvements in compensation structure appear to pay off in the form of significant abnormal returns.     

CREATING VALUE WITH MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

This report addresses two key questions for today's top executives: Do acquisitions create value for acquirers? And under what circumstances have acquisitions created the most value for acquiring shareholders?
The authors' analysis of over 1,500 completed deals by non-financial companies in the United States over the past 12 years shows that, at announcement, acquirers' shareholders suffer small losses, on average, in the short term around the initial deal announcement. Over longer intervals, such as one or two years following the announcement of the transaction, acquirers tend to slightly outperform industry peers.
The average or median market response hides tremendous variability in how the market has reacted to individual deals, however. This article provides evidence that the "right" M&A transaction can create substantial value for acquirers. One-quarter of the transactions lead to market-adjusted gains in excess of 5% for the acquirer and oneeighth of the transactions lead to gains in excess of 10% in the short term. However, some deals have also destroyed substantial shareholder value.
Financing structure is a key driver of the stock market reaction. Stock-financed transactions, on average, have a negative stock market reaction, while cash-financed transactions have benefited acquirers in both the short term as well as the long term.
Acquisitions of private companies or assets and units of public companies have consistently generated higher returns for acquirers than purchases of public companies.
Moreover, EPS dilution is not a major driver of how the stock market reacts to a deal. Although "accretive" deals perform slightly better than "dilutive" ones in the short and long run, the difference is small and not statistically significant. Over the long run, acquiring shareholders have benefited the most from deals within the same industry and that avoid targets with relatively optimistic earnings growth projections.     

Indonesian Local Government Spending,Taxing and Saving: An Explanation of Pre‐ and Post‐decentralization Fiscal Outcomes*

As a result of Indonesia's decentralization program, local governments have gained significantly more responsibility for service delivery, considerably larger fiscal resources, and much greater authority over the use of those resources than before. The present paper develops a simple budget model to describe and explain the substantial differences in pre‐ and post‐decentralization local government fiscal behavior related to spending, taxing and saving. During the post‐decentralization period special attention is paid to the fiscal behavior of natural resource rich regions. Among other things, the evidence suggests that: post‐decentralization local government spending is partly responsive to increasing needs and partly the subject of elite capture; local government taxation has become more aggressive under decentralization and appears to be mostly driven by local bureaucratic expectations related to routine overhead budgets; and the increased savings of local governments during the post‐decentralization period is determined to a large degree by delayed central government transfer payments.     

When and how should infant industries be protected?

This paper develops and analyzes a welfare maximizing model of infant industry protection. The domestic infant industry is competitive and experiences dynamic learning effects that are external to firms. The competitive foreign industry is mature and produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for the domestic good. A government planner can protect the infant industry using domestic production subsidies, tariffs, or quotas in order to maximize domestic welfare over time. As protection is not always optimal (although the domestic industry experiences a learning externality), the paper shows how the decision to protect the industry should depend on the industry's learning potential, the shape of the learning curve, and the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.Assuming some reasonable restrictions on the flexibility over time of the policy instruments, the paper subsequently compares the effectiveness of the different instruments. Given such restrictions, the paper shows that quotas induce higher welfare levels than tariffs. In some cases, the dominance of the quota is so pronounced that it compensates for any amount of government revenue loss related to the administration of the quota (including the case of a voluntary export restraint, where no revenue is collected). In similar cases, the quota may even be preferred to a domestic production subsidy.     

Employment,schooling and productivity growth

Summary This paper presents an empirical analysis of labour demand and labour productivity growth in The Netherlands. Assuming an aggregate production function with as factors capital and 3 types of labour, distinguished by educational attainment, cost minimization leads to a set of 3 labour demand relations to be estimated on time series data. Using the estimates and the implied elasticities, aggregate labour productivity growth is decomposed into factor substitution, autonomous factors, labour time shortening, economies of scale, utilization rates and the increased educational level of the working population. The contributions of substitution, utilization rates and education appear to be substantial, notably in the seventies.

List of symbols

Variables a _i Efficiency index of skill leveli - C production - h _i working-time index for skill leveli - g _i steady-state growth rate of skill leveli - K capital stock - L _i employment volume of skill leveli - L _i ^* desired level of labour skill leveli - p output price - p ^* desired output price - s _i ^* long-run static labour shares in the production value - p _k rental price of capital - P index of total factor productivity - P _l index of labour productivity - u _i utilization rate of skill leveli - u _k utilization rate of capital - w _i wage rate for skill leveli - y production volume - y _yij Hicks partial elasticities of complementarity - _i steady-state cost share of skill leveli - _k Bk steady-state cost share of capital - _f lf highest level price index in cost function nesting - _g 4 intermediate level price index in cost function nesting - _h 4 lowest level price index in cost function nesting - _i steady-state relative wage share of skill leveli - _ij Allen partial elasticities of substitution Parameters d _i l adjustment speed of skill leveli - d _p price adjustment speed - M mark-up on marginal costs - scale elasticity of production - _i distribution parameter in cost function,i = 3, g - _i distribution parameter in cost function,i = k, h - _i distribution parameter in cost function,i =1, 2 - _i autonomous labour productivity growth for skill leveli - _i cost share of skill level in base year - _f production cost index in base year - _i hours elasticity in labour efficiency index - group elasticity of substitution betweenL ₃ and (K, (L ₁,L ₂)) - _g Og group elasticity of substitution betweenK and (L ₁,L ₂) - _h 6h group elasticity of substitution betweenL ₁ andL ₂ We would like to thank B. Downey, G.M.M. Gelauff, A. Nieuwenhuis, J.M.M. Ritzen, J.C. Siebrand and an unknown referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts.