Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values

We consider a model of optimal law enforcement where sanctions can be reduced for self-reporting individuals. We distinguish between a first self-reporting stage before the case is investigated and a second one where the criminal is detected, but not yet convicted. Since we assume that violators have private information in both stages, fine reductions for self-reporting individuals lead ceteris paribus to a higher violation frequency. Nevertheless, we show that fine reductions should be granted in both stages. We characterize the connection between the two fine reductions in the optimal policy and relate our results to self-reporting schemes observed in reality.     

Dynamic managerial capabilities: Scale development and validation

Studies on dynamic managerial capabilities still have a rather theoretical nature, and there is great difficulty in finding a valid, reliable instrument to measure this construct. The present study contributes to solving this problem: It aims to develop and validate a scale to measure dynamic managerial capabilities. In this investigation, we develop a scale for three factors related to dynamic managerial capabilities: human capital, managerial cognition (already described in the literature), and relationship networks. The prominent finding in this research is the factor that is referred to here as relationship networks.     

Raising Capital in an Insurance Oligopoly Market

We consider an oligopoly market where firms offer insurance coverage against a risk characterised by aggregate uncertainty. Firms behave as if they were risk averse for a standard reason of costly external finance. The model consists in a two-stage game where firms choose their internal capital level at stage one and compete on price at stage two. We characterise the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and focus attention on the strategic impact of insurers capital choice. We discuss the model with regard to the insurance industry specificities and regulation.     

Elections with platform and valence competition

We study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences (e.g., engage in campaign spending). The marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization—the closer platforms are, the more valence affects the election outcome. Consequently, candidates without policy preferences choose divergent platforms to soften valence competition. Moreover, exogenous increases in incentives for valence accumulation lead to both increased valence and increased polarization—the latter because candidates seek to avoid the costs of extra valence. As a result, the increase in valence is smaller than it would have been with exogenous platforms. Finally, the model highlights the overlooked substantive importance of common modeling assumptions. Changing the source of uncertainty in our model from noise around the median voter's ideal point to a shock to one candidate's valence (as is common in the literature) leads to complete platform convergence for all parameter values.     

Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values

We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present an example of a double auction with interdependent values where all equilibria are trivial, that is, they have zero probability of trade. This is related to Akerlof's “market for lemmons” example and to the “winner's curse,” establishing a connection between them. However, we are able to provide sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibrium existence.     

How do country‐level governance characteristics impact the relationship between R&D and firm value?

This article addresses the question of how country‐level governance characteristics moderate the market valuation of research and development (R&D). Using a valuation model and panel data from companies in the European Union, United States, and Japan, we find that effective corporate governance allows the market to better assess a firm's R&D investments. This finding is the conjunction with the effect of the legal system, the financial system, and mechanisms of control. First, as effectiveness of investor protection increases, the market valuation of R&D projects also increases. Second, more developed financial systems do a better job assessing R&D. Third, effective control mechanisms reinforce the positive effect of R&D on a firm's market value. In sum, our findings shed light on how policymakers can increase the benefits from firms' R&D spending and thus foster economic growth and social welfare using these country‐level governance characteristics.     

WILL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE EURO AREA CONVERGE? A CRITICAL SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Abstract.  This survey of business cycle synchronization in the European monetary union focuses on two issues: have business cycles become more similar, and which factors drive business cycle synchronization. We conclude that business cycles in the euro area have gone through periods of both convergence and divergence. Still, there is quite some evidence that during the 1990s business cycle synchronization in the euro area has increased. Higher trade intensity is found to lead to more synchronization, but the point estimates vary widely. The evidence for other factors affecting business cycle synchronization is very mixed.     

A dual‐sequence framework for B2C relationship formation: Moderating effects of employee communication style in online group chat

Past research on B2C relationships has typically focused on unidimensional constructs of satisfaction, trust, and commitment, ignoring underlying psychological dimensions. Although some studies have examined cognitive and affective dimensions of these relational constructs, dual sequential effects in relationship formation have not been investigated. This study proposes and finds (in the context of online group chat) that parallel cognitive and affective sequences of relationship formation take place, thus expanding scholarly understanding of underlying psychological processes and offering marketing practitioners two different ways to build relationships with consumers. The proposed dual‐sequence relational framework further advances theory by shedding light on counterintuitive findings in past research. The study also supports the proposed moderating effects of employee communication style, such that sequential effects of cognitive (affective) relational constructs are stronger with a task‐oriented (socially oriented) employee, thus offering insights to practitioners in hiring and training employees to match specific organizational goals for building relationships with consumers. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Nash-equilibria in a heterogeneous oligopoly with fuzzy information

We consider a model of an oligopolistic market with heterogeneous firms and products where neither the cost nor the demand functions are common knowledge. Instead, each firm only has some vague ideas about the price strategies adopted by its competitors which is modelled by a fuzzy set. In analogy to the notion of an "equilibrium of actions and beliefs" we define and characterize a generalized Nash-equilibrium and show its existence under general conditions. Furthermore, the impact of the fuzzy information on the equilibrium outcome is analyzed by means of a comparative static analysis within a particular model framework.Received: 28 May 2002, Accepted: 25 December 2002, JEL Classification: D43, D80, L13We wish to thank Bernhard F. Arnold, the editor Murat Sertel , and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Of course, we are responsible for all remaining errors.