Eliminating Excessive Tariffs on Exports of Least Developed Countries

Although average OECD tariffs on imports from the least developedcountries are very low; tariffs above 15 percent (peaks) havea disproportional effect on their exports. Products subjectto tariff peaks tend to be heavily concentrated in agricultureand food products and labor-intensive sectors, such as appareland footwear. Although the least developed countries benefitfrom preferential access, preferences tend to be smallest fortariff peak products. A major exception is the European Union,so that the recent European initiative to grant full duty-freeand quota-free access for the least developed countries (theso-called Everything But Arms initiative) will result in onlya small increase in their exports of tariff peak items (lessthan 1 percent of total exports). However, as preferences areless significant in other major OECD countries, a more generalemulation of the European Union initiative would increase theleast developed countries' total exports of peak products byUS$2.5 billion (11 percent of total exports). Although almosthalf of this increase is at the expense of other developingcountry exports, this represents less than 0.05 percent of theirtotal exports. This trade diversion can be avoided by reducingtariff peaks to a uniform 5 percent applied on a nondiscriminatorybasis. However, such a reform would imply no gains for the leastdeveloped countries, suggesting that the globally welfare-superiorpolicy of nondiscriminatory elimination of tariff peaks shouldbe complemented by greater direct assistance to poor countries.     

Trade Preferences to Small Developing Countries and the Welfare Costs of Lost Multilateral Liberalization

The proliferation of preferential trade liberalization overthe last 20 years has raised the question of whether it slowsmultilateral trade liberalization. Recent theoretical and empiricalevidence indicates that this is the case even for unilateralpreferences that developed countries provide to small and poorcountries, but there is no estimate of the resulting welfarecosts. This stumbling block effect can be avoided by replacingthe unilateral preferences with a fixed import subsidy, whichgenerates a Pareto improvement. More importantly, this paperpresents the first estimates of the welfare cost of preferentialliberalization as a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization.Recent estimates of the stumbling block effect of preferenceswith data for 170 countries and more than 5,000 products areused to calculate the welfare effects of the European Union,Japan, and the United States switching from unilateral preferencesfor least developed countries to an import subsidy scheme. Ina model with no dynamic gains to trade, the switch producesan annual net welfare gain for the 170 countries that adds about10 percent to the estimated trade liberalization gains in theDoha Round. It also generates gains for each group: the EuropeanUnion, Japan, and the United States ($2,934 million), leastdeveloped countries ($520 million), and the rest of the world($900 million).     

On the performance of the tick test

In financial research, the sign of a trade (or identity of trade aggressor) is not always available in the transaction dataset and it can be estimated using a simple set of rules called the tick test. In this paper we investigate the accuracy of the tick test from an analytical perspective by providing a closed formula for the performance of the prediction algorithm. By analyzing the derived equation, we provide formal arguments for the use of the tick test by proving that it is bounded to perform better than chance (50/50) and that the set of rules from the tick test provides an unbiased estimator of the trade signs. On the empirical side of the research, we compare the values from the analytical formula against the empirical performance of the tick test for fifteen heavily traded stocks in the Brazilian equity market. The results show that the formula is quite realistic in assessing the accuracy of the prediction algorithm in a real data situation.     

Overinvestment and fraud

We analyze the interactions between two managerial tasks: investing and revealing information. We assume that a manager can invest influencing the firm’s quality, then he reports this quality to investors. Whenever truthful reporting is not an equilibrium, the manager has incentives to overinvest relative to shareholders. Therefore, the potential for market manipulation is the key in understanding investment policy; it is the desire to manipulate prices that leads to inefficient investment. Also, more manipulation occurs when the manager is in control, so prices are less informative. Finally, we show that the manager is better off with an exogenous reporting policy.     

Regional versus global production networks: where does Latin America stand?

This article quantifies the effects of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) on the trade of intermediate goods and also on the trade of final goods. It is the first article to investigate whether increasing imports of intermediate goods from different regions to Latin America have led to higher exports of final and intermediate goods. The article uses sectoral data for trade in goods between 11 LAIA members over the period 1991–2008. The main results indicate evidence of increasing regional production networks, which have strengthened in the 2000s. Moreover, the findings show evidence of the emergence of global production networks, especially with respect to intermediate imports from China.     

Robust central banking under wage bargaining: Is monetary policy transparency beneficial?

We study the role of transparency in an environment of robust monetary policy under wage bargaining. The standard view from the game-theoretical literature is that, with unionised labour markets, monetary policy transparency is unambiguously “bad” (it induces increases in wage and price inflation, unemployment and may lead to higher inflation uncertainty). The empirical literature is instead ambiguous about the macroeconomic effects of transparency. By recasting the earlier theory into a robust monetary policy environment, and focusing transparency on the uncertainty about the preference for price stability, we show that the macroeconomic effects of transparency are more favourable than normally found. The impact on nominal wages, inflation and real variables (real wages and unemployment) is not parameter-free but depends on the public's informedness about this coefficient. The impact on real variables is found to disappear in case unions do not internalise the effect of wage decisions on the economy (i.e. in the case of atomistic unions). Finally, we find that the effect of transparency on inflation uncertainty is more complex than in the standard approach. We show that transparency may have the beneficial effect of reducing inflation variability not only when monetary uncertainty is low (as previously reported), but also when monetary uncertainty exceeds an upper threshold.     

Informal work networks

Abstract We present a model of time allocation between formal and informal labour supply, where workers learn of informal job opportunities from their peers. In addition to formal income taxation and enforcement, individuals’ labour supply decisions depend on the number of their peers with informal jobs and the strength of social ties. Workers allocate more time to informal activities when tax enforcement is lax and job information transmission is good. More connected social networks (e.g., wheel, complete) feature lower average income but higher average utility than poorly connected social networks (e.g., star, empty). Average income may be non‐monotonic in tax enforcement.