»Die Befragung in der Kommunikationswissenschaft: Innovationen,Operationalisierungen, Standardisierung«

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On the determinants of data breaches: A cointegration analysis

Decisions in Economics and Finance - Cyber risks and particularly data breaches constitute one of the new frontiers of risk modeling for insurers across the world. We use the cointegration...     

Fiscal Policy in Europe: How Effective Are Automatic Stabilisers?

It is largely recognised that fiscal policy will have largerresponsibilities for cyclicalstabilisation in EMU given the loss of the monetary instrument.At the same time, theEMU's budgetary framework emphasises the need to rely onautomatic fiscal stabilisers,rather than active policies in cushioning the business cycle.We show that automaticstabilisers are relatively powerful in the event of shocksto private consumption, but lessso in the case of shocks to private investment and exports.In the case of supply sideshocks, the automatic stabilisers are largely ineffective,but this may actually be a goodthing to the extent that supply-side disturbances call forstructural adjustment rather thancyclical stabilisation.     

Guilds and middle-class welfare, 1550–1800: provisions for burial, sickness, old age, and widowhood

Guilds provided for masters' and journeymen's burial, sickness, old age, and widowhood. Guild welfare was of importance to artisans, to the functioning of guilds, to the myriad of urban social relations, and to the political economy. However, it is an understated and neglected aspect of guild activities. This article looks at welfare provision by guilds, with the aim of addressing four questions. Firstly, for which risks did guild welfare arrangements exist in the Netherlands between 1550 and 1800, and what were the coverage, contributions, benefit levels, and conditions? Secondly, can guild welfare arrangements be regarded as insurance? Thirdly, to what extent and how did guilds overcome classic insurance problems such as adverse selection, moral hazards, and correlated risks? Finally, what was the position of guild provision in the Dutch political economy and vis‐à‐vis poor relief?     

Does Human Capital Protect Workers against Exogenous Shocks? Evidence from Panel Data on South Africa during the 2008‐2009 Crisis

The financial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 took a heavy toll on the South African economy. The economy contracted for the first time since 1998 and entered recession during the fourth quarter of 2008. The gross domestic product contraction was soon transmitted to the labour market. Between the second quarters of 2008 and 2009, employment fell by 3.8%. However, not all individuals were hit with the same intensity. Using panel data from a quarterly labour force survey unique in the African context, we find that human capital (i.e. education as years of schooling and workforce experience) provided a buffer against the shock. After controlling for observable characteristics, education and experience showed the potential to entirely offset the effect of the recession on the likelihood of employment. This has important policy implications, as it strengthens the case for strategic investments in human capital and helps identify the unskilled as having the greatest need for social safety net interventions during a recession.     

The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.