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The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.

Multiple Levels of Corporate Sustainability

According to Dr. Clare Graves, mankind has developed eight core value systems,1 as responses to prevailing circumstances. Given different contexts and value systems, a one-solution-fits-all concept of corporate sustainability is not reasonable. Therefore, this paper presents various definitions and forms of sustainability, each linked to specific (societal) circumstances and related value systems. A sustainability matrix– an essential element of the overall European Corporate Sustainability Framework – is described showing six types of organizations at different developmental stages, with different forms of corporate sustainability, each supported by specific institutional arrangements.     

Does Human Capital Protect Workers against Exogenous Shocks? Evidence from Panel Data on South Africa during the 2008‐2009 Crisis

The financial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 took a heavy toll on the South African economy. The economy contracted for the first time since 1998 and entered recession during the fourth quarter of 2008. The gross domestic product contraction was soon transmitted to the labour market. Between the second quarters of 2008 and 2009, employment fell by 3.8%. However, not all individuals were hit with the same intensity. Using panel data from a quarterly labour force survey unique in the African context, we find that human capital (i.e. education as years of schooling and workforce experience) provided a buffer against the shock. After controlling for observable characteristics, education and experience showed the potential to entirely offset the effect of the recession on the likelihood of employment. This has important policy implications, as it strengthens the case for strategic investments in human capital and helps identify the unskilled as having the greatest need for social safety net interventions during a recession.     

IMPORTED SKILL‐BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper discusses the occurrence of skill‐enhancing technology import, namely, the relationship between imports of embodied technology and widening skill‐based employment differentials in low‐ and middle‐income countries. Generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques are applied to an original panel dataset comprising 28 manufacturing sectors for 23 countries over a decade. Econometric results provide robust evidence of the determinants of widening employment differentials in low‐ and middle‐income countries. In particular, the proposed empirical evidence indicates capital–skill complementarity as a possible source of skill bias, while imported skill‐enhancing technology emerges as an additional driver of increasing demand for the skilled workers in these countries.     

Non-linear Gaussian sovereign CDS pricing models

Prior literature indicates that quadratic models and the Black–Karasinski model are very promising for CDS pricing. This paper extends these models and the Black [J. Finance 1995, 50, 1371–1376] model for pricing sovereign CDS’s. For all 10 sovereigns in the sample quadratic models best fit CDS spreads in-sample, and a four factor quadratic model can account for the joint effects on CDS spreads of default risk, default loss risk and liquidity risk with no restriction to factors correlation. Liquidity risk appears to affect sovereign CDS spreads. However, quadratic models tend to over-fit some CDS maturities at the expense of other maturities, while the BK model is particularly immune from this tendency. The Black model seems preferable because its out-of-sample performance in the time series dimension is the best.     

Jensen's alpha and the market‐timing puzzle

Theory predicts that market‐timing activities bias Jensen's alpha (JA). However, empirical studies have failed to find consistent evidence of this bias. We tackle this puzzle in a nested model analysis and show that the bias contains an exogenous market component that is unrelated to market‐timing skill. In a comprehensive empirical analysis of US mutual funds, we find that the timing‐induced bias in JA is mainly driven by this market component, which is uncorrelated with measured timing activities. Measures of total performance that allow for timing activities are virtually identical to JA, even if timing activities are present in the evaluated fund. Hence, we conclude that JA is a sufficient measure of total performance.     

How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection

This paper investigates the determinants of the compensation structure for brokers who advise customers regarding the suitability of financial products. Our model explains why brokers are commonly compensated indirectly through contingent commissions paid by product providers, even though this compensation structure could lead to biased advice. When customers are wary of the adviser's incentives, contingent commissions can be an effective incentive tool to induce the adviser to learn which specialized product is most suitable for the specific needs of customers. If, instead, customers naively believe they receive unbiased advice, high product prices and correspondingly high commissions become a tool of exploitation. Policy intervention that mandates disclosure of commissions can protect naive consumers and increase welfare. However, prohibiting or capping commissions could have the unintended consequence of stifling the adviser's incentive to acquire information. More vigorous competition benefits consumers and reduces exploitation, but firms have limited incentives to educate naive customers.     

Which Factors Affect Bond Underwriting Fees? The Role of Banking Relationships

The question of which factors are relevant in determining bond underwriting fees is empirically investigated by analysing 2,202 bond issues completed by European firms during the 1993 – 2003 period. Four major results emerge from the analysis. First, the introduction of the single currency in 1999 has generated an increase in competition among banks, and, as a result, a reduction in underwriting fees. Second, a strong relationship with the issuer's main bank reduces the level of underwriting fees. Third, new issuers are charged with lower underwriter fees relative to firms that have completed issues without building any strong relationship with a bank. Fourth, higher reputation banks charge lower underwriting fees. The implications of these findings are also discussed.     

Eine Analyse ultimaten Verhaltens als Erklärungsansatz des moral hazards

For the insurance industry the moral hazard poses an incalculable risk. Changes in the behaviour of the insuree can lead to higher claims settlements and thus to higher premiums for the insured collective. Asymmetrically allocated information gives the insured individual the possibility to profit from the idea of common protection in a way that impairs insurer and the collective on the whole. Based on the homo oeconomicus model, economic concepts, first and foremost the agency theory of new institutional economics have made attempts to provide solutions for this management problem. However, behavioural economic experiments have demonstrated that the homo oeconomicus model does not fully succeed in describing the realities. As a result, the solutions proposed in these economic concepts have to be rated inadequate.The moral hazard is inherent in the conflicting realm of cooperation and defection, behaviour patterns that have evolved during the history of development of human behaviour. Ultimate behaviour analyses of these patterns do offer the opportunity to understand why humans behave in specific ways based on man's evolutionary origins and sources. Consequently, ultimate behaviour analyses could provide a solid foundation for the development of a framework giving insurers the possibility to exert influence on the insuree's behaviour and thus to assist in successfully impacting the moral hazard.