Evolution of the chronic care role of the registered nurse in primary care

High-quality, accessible, and efficient primary care is needed as the U.S. health care system undergoes significant change. Advancing the role of registered nurses in the primary care setting is important to the solution. A large academic health center implemented five initiatives to improve the care of chronically ill patients through the expanded role of RNs in the context of the health care team. Role evolution of nurses in the pilots required some continuing education and some additional nursing support to release the pilot nurses from their usual duties. These strategies allowed the nurses to apply interventions that enhanced the coordination of care and promoted patient self-management skills. Some short-term improvements in health status were realized and barriers to self-care were identified and resolved.     

Existence of a Condorcet Winner When Voters Have Other‐Regarding Preferences

In standard political economy models, voters are “self‐interested” that is, care only about “own” utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have “other‐regarding preferences” (ORP), that is, in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payoffs relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit “envy” and “altruism,” in addition to the standard concern for “own utility.” We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences.     

Debt Stabilizing Fiscal Rules

Unstable government debt dynamics can typically be stabilized around a certain target level of debt by adjustments in various fiscal instruments, like government spending, transfers, or taxes. This paper investigates properties of debt stabilizing rules which link the needed budgetary adjustments to the state of the economy. The paper establishes that the magnitude of the target level of long‐run debt is a key determinant of whether it is possible to find a rule of this type that can be implemented under all available fiscal instruments. Specifically, considering linear feedback rules, the paper demonstrates that there may well exist a critical target level of debt beyond which this is no longer possible. From an applied perspective, this finding is of particular relevance in the context of a monetary union with decentralized fiscal policies. Depending on the target level of debt, there might be a conflict between a common fiscal framework that tracks deficit developments as a function of the state of the economy and the unrestricted choice of fiscal policy instruments at the national level.     

The pros and cons of rewarding social responsibility at the top

Overemphasis on financial performance criteria to award incentives for CEOs has often been mentioned as one of the main culprits behind recent corporate scandals. In response, there is a growing chorus for inclusion of social performance criteria in the design of executive compensation schemes. To date, however, very little is known about the true benefits of this practice. This article critically discusses the potential advantages and pitfalls of this recommendation. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Profit‐sharing plans and affective commitment: Does the context matter?

This article analyzes the relationship between profit‐sharing plans (PSP) and affective commitment and how it is affected by the context of the PSP application. Overall, there is a positive relationship between profit sharing and commitment that is strongest in very small firms. The efficacy of a PSP in improving employees' affective commitment appears to be greatest in firms with low job‐related employee participation. Its application in workplaces where employees enjoy high levels of participation appears to have little impact and may even result in slight declines in affective commitment. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Free software on the market-side: the failure-story of free software services companies in France

ABSTRACT

This article investigates two research funding policies in a cooperative and a non-cooperative R&;D setting: subsidising private research (Spr) and subsidising public research (Spu). We show that R&;D cooperation with subsidies (either Spr or Spu) always performs better than R&;D cooperation with no subsidy. Furthermore, the Spr policy leads to better performance than the Spu approach does in terms of overall net surplus whether the firms cooperate or not in R&;D. Nevertheless, comparing the two research funding policies for the same level of public spending shows that the Spu policy with R&;D cooperation is in some cases more effective than the Spr policy, the latter becoming too costly for the government when spillovers are high.     

The Role of Income Effects in Early Retirement

We provide a long‐term perspective on the individual retirement behavior and on the future of retirement by emphasizing the role of (negative) income effects. We consider a political economic theoretical framework, with actuarially “fair” and “unfair” early retirement schemes, and derive a political equilibrium with positive social security contribution rates and early retirement. A reduction in the wages in youth, consistent with the recent labor market trends since the massive introduction of temporary jobs, induces workers to postpone retirement, and—in the “unfair” system—leads to lower contribution rates. A reduction in the growth rate of the economy has opposite effects on the retirement decisions, leading—in the “unfair” system—to more early retirement. Aging induces a negative income effect, but has also an opposite political effect on social security contributions and retirement decisions. For an actuarially “fair” social security system, we provide conditions for the political effect to dominate; in an “unfair” scheme, numerical simulations confirm a slight predominance of the political effect, as contribution rates increase. These results may shed some light on the future of early retirement in aging societies.     

Government Expenditure Financing in a Two‐Sector Cash‐In‐Advance Model of Endogenous Growth

We show that an expansion in the government size could be desirable from the viewpoint of the economy's long‐run growth, wherein factor intensity between the sectors, the mode of public spending financing, and the form of the cash‐in‐advance (CIA) constraint are crucial. We also show that when real balances are required only for consumption purchases, money financing is equivalent to consumption tax financing, but is not equivalent to income tax financing. If both consumption and gross investment are liquidity‐constrained, then the three financing methods are mutually not equivalent. The optimal financing scheme has the following features: (1) when the CIA constraint applies only to consumption purchases, any combination of the money growth rate and the consumption tax rate that satisfies the government budget constraint constitutes an optimal financing mix; (2) when the CIA constraint applies to both consumption and investment purchases, consumption tax financing only is optimal.     

CAN SECRET INTERVENTION BE COMPATIBLE WITH A NON‐PROFITMAKING CENTRAL BANK AND A FUNDAMENTAL‐CONSISTENT TARGET?

The coexistence of secret intervention operations and “the signaling channel” (Mussa. The Role of Official Intervention, 1981) seems confusing. Vitale ( Journal of International Economics, 49, 1999, 245–267) resolves this puzzle by employing an asymmetric information framework and an assumption of a fundamental‐inconsistent target for the exchange rate. Ferré and Manzano ( International Journal of Finance and Economics, 14, 2009, 378–393) follow Vitale's microstructure framework and argue that the central banks' profitability motivation offers a rationale for their secret intervention even under a target consistent with the fundamentals. However, that the authority uses its superior information to obtain speculative profits through secret intervention in the market is not a typical goal for central banks. To theoretically explain the opaqueness in non‐profitmaking central banks' exchange rate policies, we employ a model of a central bank's optimization by considering that no bank really knows the exact fundamental rate and they take into account the possible bad consequences of announcing the intervention. We also show that, in passing the bank's private information to market participants, a bank's announcement of the intervention size is equivalent to revealing its target rate. (JEL E58, F39)     

Tax Auditing as a Public Good Game: An Experimental Study on Punishment and Compliance

Prior experimental studies on tax evasion generally assume that the budget and the probability of audit are exogenously given, and ignore taxpayers' incentives to detect evasion and their compliance behaviour under such incentives. The experimental evidence of the present paper shows that, on average, subjects are willing to spend 20 to 30% of their tax revenue on auditing. Compliance is also greatly improved if subjects can determine the budget and, hence, the probability of audit. These findings suggest that taking taxpayers' incentives to detect evasion into consideration is important for the design of compliance‐improvement audit schemes.