Should trees have managerial standing? Toward stakeholder status for non-human nature

Most definitions of the concept of stakeholder include only human entities. This paper advances the argument that the non-human natural environment can be integrated into the stakeholder management concept. This argument includes the observations that the natural environment is finally becoming recognized as a vital component of the business environment, that the stakeholder concept is more than a human political/economic one, and that non-human nature currently is not adequately represented by other stakeholder groups. In addition, this paper asserts that any of several stakeholder management processes can readily include the natural environment as one or more stakeholders of organizations. Finally, the point is made that this integration would provide a more holistic, value-oriented, focused and strategic approach to stakeholder management, potentially benefitting both nature and organizations.Mark Starik is an Assistant Professor of Strategic Management and Public Policy at The George Washington University. His research and writing on environmental management topics include articles, chapters, and presentations on Global Strategic Environmental Management, Environmental Entrepreneurship, and Environmental Stakeholders of the U.S. Energy Sector. In addition, he is active in the advancement of environmental programs in both the Academy of Management and the George Washington University.     

Validating the international tourist role scale

This study was designed to validate the international tourist role scale and the three dimensions it revealed. The purpose of this attitudinal scale was to measure the tourist role typology. United States adult outbound tourists flying with 11 major airlines returned useful questionnaires. This study validated the role scale as a reliable one that properly identified three conceptual dimensions of international tourist typology and successfully provided measures of tourists’ novelty-seeking preferences on the three dimensions. The study demonstrated, however, that the scale would measure the novelty-seeking preferences of international tourists more effectively if it were supplemented by other measures.     

Persistence of Output Fluctuations Under Different Exchange Rate Regimes

In a recent paper, Giugale and Korobow (2000) present evidence that suggests that the time required by output to return to trend following a financial shock is faster under a flexible exchange rate regime than under a fixed exchange rate. In this paper, we use vector autoregression models to measure the persistence properties of output for a number of countries in the Asia–Pacific region. Our results suggest that output persistence is not uniquely related to a country's choice of exchange rate regime. The two countries in our sample with the least persistent output following a financial shock are Australia, where the exchange rate is fully flexible, and Hong Kong, where it is rigidly fixed via a currency board.     

Investment in private water development: Property rights and contractual opportunism during the California Gold Rush

This paper explores the development of water supplies by private ditch companies during the California Gold Rush. Using data taken from newspaper stories, mining camp by-laws, and state Supreme Court and district court cases, the paper documents the presence of institutional conditions that were unfavorable to support private water investments including property rights uncertainty, imperfect capital markets, and significant contractual enforcement costs that may have provided opportunities for contractual holdup by miners. Some evidence suggests that water development was likely discouraged to some extent. Nevertheless, the larger response was a major expansion in water supplies through an extensive ditch system, suggesting that there were factors that limited the ability of miners to capture rents, including various ditch company strategies to limit their exposure to opportunistic behavior and recognition by miners of their reliance on ditch companies.     

Smuggling and price disparity

This paper proposes a model of smuggling consistent with the coexistence of smuggling, legal trade and price disparity, defined as a domestic price which exceeds (is less than) the return from legal export (import). These phenomena have been found to characterize Indonesian smuggling. A framework is presented in which legal trade is used to cloak smuggling activity with the implication that the greater the volume of legal trade, the less the costs of smuggling. This model is then used to explain the observation noted above and to show that smuggling may be welfare increasing vis-à-vis the non-smuggling situation, and that even if the suppression of smuggling is costless, tax revenue maximization may require a positive level of smuggling. In addition, the model is applied to coffee and rubber exports from Indonesia.     

The clinton health reform

There are some difficult, even some agonizing tradeoffs, that we have to confront if we want to achieve the objectives of universal coverage and cost containment set forth in the Clinton plan. Will universal coverage lead to uniform results? If we mandate coverage, who is actually going to be paying for it and in what form? Do targeted subsidies based on nonincome classifications of individuals (i.e., employment status) create more distortion than equity? A concern to focus on is whether the Clinton plan will be controlling health care spending or an individual's ability to spend for their choice of health care.     

Science and politics: The 1981 and 1984 LIHEAP distribution formulas

The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) is a federal block grant program to help low-income households pay their heating and cooling bills. If the regular fiscal year LIHEAP appropriation is less than or equal to $1.975 billion, then a 1981 formula is applied to distribute funding across states, while if appropriations rise above the $1.975 billion threshold, a 1984 formula is applied in conjunction with two hold-harmless provisions. In 18 of the past 20 years, the 1981 formula has served as the default mechanism to distribute LIHEAP funding. The purpose of this paper is to call attention to the inadequacy of the 1981 formula and to explain why the objectives of LIHEAP are not met when this formula is used. We explain why the distribution of LIHEAP funds is not proportionate to the need for assistance and offer some suggestions for improvement. The 1981 formula is shown to be the outcome of a convoluted political process heavily biased in favor of cold-climate states, with cold-climate states receiving on-the-order of at least $150 million a year in allotment dollars beyond their “fair share” of heating requirements. The 1981 and 1984 distribution formulas are derived and a critical examination of each formula is presented. The 1984 formula is shown to be an ideal mechanism to distribute LIHEAP funds, based on a scientific and rational understanding of low-income energy needs, but legislative constraints prevent its application.     

Wealth inequality: Theory,measurement and decomposition

This paper reviews the basic principles of inequality measurement, underlining the advantages and shortcomings of alternative measures from a theoretical standpoint and in the context of the study of the distribution of wealth. Adopting the two most popular measures, the Gini index and the P‐shares, the paper documents wealth inequality in Canada using the 1999, 2005 and 2012 Survey of Financial Security (SFS). It carries out several decompositions with covariates, featuring DFL‐type reweighting methods and Gini and P‐shares RIF regressions. The latter parallel decompositions deepen our understanding of how changes in socio‐demographic characteristics, including the compensating role of family formation and human capital, impact wealth inequality.     

Regulated firms in pollution permit markets with banking

This paper examines a competitive intertemporal market for bankable emission permits, such as sulfur dioxide allowances. Without profit regulation, firms are willing to bank permits if permit prices rise over time with the rate of interest, but will not bank if prices rise more slowly.The market achieves aggregate emission targets at least total cost if there is no profit regulation, but may not do so if firms are subject to profit regulation. Firms must arbitrage differences both in abatement cost and in the regulatory treatment of permits to achieve least total cost.The impetus for this work came from research we initiated during the Summer of 1990 for the Energy Information Agency. We would like to thank Chuck Howe for his detailed comments and enthusiasm, and Jim Alm, Dave Bjornstad, Charles deBartolome, Mike Greenwood, Robert Hahn, Douglas Hale, Carolyn Lang, Jim Markusen, Edward Morey, Till Requate, and Tom Tietenberg. We are grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for stressing the importance of regulation in these markets and for their helpful and clarifying advice.