Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery

The fishery for Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Barents Sea is one of the most valuable fisheries in the North Atlantic. After the introduction of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, cod is a shared stock between Norway and Russia. Overfishing of quotas has been a concern for a number of years. The purpose of this article is to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery. This will be done in a game theoretic context, based on different assumptions regarding important variables such as cost of effort and initial stock size. The game theoretic analysis will be based on an empirical bioeconomic model developed and estimated by Hannesson (Mar Policy 31:698–705, 2007; J Bioecon forthcoming). The case of cooperative management is analysed for different cost parameters and starting values of the stock. An interesting result is that the optimal policy gives rise to pulse fishing. As this involves effort (and harvests) varying from year to year, potentially imposing substantial social costs on the industry in years when the fishery is closed, a policy of constant effort is also considered. Finally, non-cooperative management is analysed.     

Time substitution for environmental performance: The case of Swedish manufacturing

We extend recent advances in time substitution modeling to a directional distance function framework, in order to examine the environmental performance of firms in Sweden’s pulp and paper industry for the years 2002–2008. Our data allow us to estimate the optimal reallocation of environmental investments, expenditures and energy use to simultaneously maximize production output and minimize emissions in the years immediately before and after the implementation of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. We find some evidence of overall productivity decline when considering both emissions and output objectives, due primarily to technological decline, and that cumulative dynamic inefficiency outweighs static inefficiency. A comparison of optimal investment with observed investment indicates that firms could have improved their performance by reallocating environmental investments to early periods and production-oriented investment to later periods.     

Searching for the Fed’s reaction function

There is still some doubt about those economic variables that really matter for the Fed’s decisions. In comparison with other estimations, this study uses the approach of Bayesian model averaging (BMA). The estimations show that over the long-run inflation, unemployment rates and long-term interest rates are the crucial variables in explaining the Federal Funds Rate. In the other two estimation samples, also the fiscal deficit and monetary aggregates were of relevance. There is also evidence for interest rate smoothing. In addition, we account for parameter instability by combining BMA with time-varying coefficient (TVC) modelling. We find strong evidence for structural breaks. Finally, a model average is constructed via an TVC-BMA approach.     

Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction

We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without a communication option but obtains regularly with mandatory costless pre-play messages. We find that even small communication costs dramatically reduce message use when communication is optional, but efficient coordination can occur with similar frequency as under costless communication. These findings can be accounted for by formalizations of forward induction that take Nash equilibrium as a reference point (such as Kohlberg and Mertens in Econometrica 54: 1003–1037, 1986; Govindan and Wilson in Econometrica 77: 1–28, 2009), while formalizations that only appeal to (higher-order) knowledge of rationality remain silent in this environment.     

Aktuelle Probleme der österreichischen Finanzpolitik

Ohne ZusammenfassungUnter diesem Titel hielt der Verfasser auf der Tagung der Wirtschafts-wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für Oberösterreich in Bad Ischl am 18. 9. 1959 einen Vortrag, der in Arbeit und Wirtschaft, 13. Jg., Nr. 11, S. 297 ff., wörtlich wiedergegeben ist.Das dort nur skizzierte Thema soll nun in der vorliegenden finanzwissenschaftlichen Analyse sowohl nach der Breite als auch insbesondere nach der Tiefe hin vollkommener behandelt werden, und zwar auch unter Beibringung des notwendigen Ziffernmaterials. (Leider ist dieses dürftig genug, da die einschlägigen österreichischen Statistiken nicht annähernd den im vergleichbaren Ausland üblichen Stand erreichen.) Die Wichtigkeit eines solchen Unternehmens steht außer Zweifel; zeitlich fällt es mit dem Abgang des über acht Jahre amtierenden Finanzministers Dr. Reinhard Kamitz zur österreichischen Nationalbank als deren Präsident zusammen.Herrn Dr. Herbert Zogelmann soll an dieser Stelle für seine wertvolle Mitarbeit ausdrücklich gedankt werden.     

Einzelbesprechungen

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Einzelbesprechungen

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Some results on the weak core of a non-side-payment game with infinitely many players

The present note considers a balanced game without side payments with a continuum of players. A concept of weak core for such games is introduced. Then a non-emptiness theorem for the weak core is proved for a class of games.