A core equivalence theorem with an arbitrary communication structure

We formalize the concept of a communication structure by identifying it with a partition of the set of agents. Thus, a coalition can form if and only if it belongs to the given partition. Within this framework we are able to show that for every integer J≧2, if we put the uniform distribution on the space of partitions that contain exactly (or, no more than) J coalitions, the probability that such a partition will contain a blocking coalition for any Pareto optimal allocation which is bounded away from being competitive, is arbitrarily close to 1, as the number of individuals increases.     

Neueste Benchmarking-Ergebnisse für die Controllership im deutsch-sprachigen Raum

Ohne Zusammenfassung Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Jürgen ist Leiter des Instituts für Management und Controlling (IMC), www.whu.edu/controlling, an der WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management, Burgplatz 2, 56179 Vallendar, WeberInhaber des Lehrstuhls für Controlling & Unternehmenssteuerung und schriftleitender Herausgeber der Zeitschrift für Controlling & Management (ZfCM), www.zfcm.de     

Making More from Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

When multiple items are sold through the use of simultaneous ascending-bid auctions, bidders can find it in their mutual interests to reduce their aggregate demand for the items while prices are still low relative to the bidders' valuations. The FCC's first broadband PCS auction provides examples of how such mutual reductions might be arranged even when the bidders are not allowed to communicate with one another outside of the auction arena.