Punishment in environmental protection

The fundamental character of a punishment is the subject of this paper. Based on the assumed function of a punishment (deterrent), a punishment has to be perceived and experienced to be an adverse result by the punished and the public. The first factor in particular means that the courts have to have flexibility to sentence a person to such a punishment that is experienced as such. The legal question becomes how this customization of a punishment is acceptable from an equality standpoint. In the field of environmental protection, the administrative process poses serious problems. There may be administrative proceedings that result in substantial economic losses for individuals and groups alike. Jürgen S. Poesche was born in Edmonton (Alberta, Canada), lived in Europe and North America and graduated from the Helsinki University of Technology, University of Helsinki, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration and Tampere University of Technology. Areas of interest include chemical and mechanical pulping, environmental protection (EIA, environmental ethics, environmental law), and capital investment decision-making. He has published in, e.g., Wochenblatt für Papierfabrikation, Finnish Journal of Business Economics, Ympäristojuridiikka (Environmental Law), and in the publication series of the Helsinki University of Technology and the Tampere University of Technology. Presently, he is working for a major Canadian forest products company.     

Old flames never die – the role of binding social ties for corporate entrepreneurship in family firms

This paper investigates the role of social ties and family embeddedness for corporate entrepreneurship in family firms. Family firms are mostly characterized by close and often inseparable ties between the dominant family coalition and the firm and offer specific resources within a context of both rational as well as non-rational factors that influence entrepreneurial strategies. We empirically test (n =?181) the relationship between binding social ties and innovation, strategic renewal, and corporate venturing. Our findings indicate a strong significance for networks and close and stable relationships both to inside the firm and the outside in decision making for corporate venturing and innovation. In contrast, the results for strategic renewal show no relevance of strong social ties. We link up with the debate on the role of owners as an important stakeholder group.

     

Human–capital investment and the wage gap

Summary. According to empirical studies, the wage differential by skills evolved non–monotonically in the past decades although the relative supply of skilled labor steadily increased. The present paper provides a theoretical explanation for this finding. In our setting, technological change intertemporally alters the human–capital investment incentives of heterogeneous individuals. As a consequence of changing incentives, the time path of the relative wage is U–shaped while there is a rise in the share of skilled workers. Received: November 28, 2000; revised version: January 30, 2001     

How to control a chaotic economy?

An economic system which exhibits chaotic behaviour has been stabilized on various periodic orbits by use of the Ott-Grebogi-Yorke method. This procedure has been recently applied to controlling chaotic phenomena in physical, chemical and biological systems. We adopt this method successfully for Feichtinger's generic model of two competing firms with asymmetrical investment strategies. We show that the application of this control method to the particular economic process considered brings a substantial advantage: one can easily switch from a chaotic trajectory to a regular periodic orbit and simultaneously improve the system's economic properties. Numerical simulations are presented in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the whole procedure.The work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and by the Polish National Council (KBN) Grant No 2 P302 038 04.     

Accounting for the wealth of Denmark: a case study of Smithian growth using the emergence of modern accounting in Danish dairying

Abstract

The idea of “Smithian growth” rests on a “natural” development out of agriculture through capital accumulation, and the division of labour. We confront these concepts with an “historical experiment” and the case of Danish agriculture in the nineteenth century. Specifically, we look at how accounting was used to promote specialization, ultimately in butter production, leading to the massive increases in productivity that Smith predicted. We also observe the emergence of Smithian “philosophers”. This ultimately led to the capital-intensive industrialization of Danish agriculture through butter factories, and general development. We argue that this establishes the historical relevance of Smith’s theories.