Noch tragbar? Versuch einer konsolidierten Erfassung der Eurorettungsrisiken

The overall risk to be borne by Germany in case of further bailouts financed through the EFSF and ESM remains an intriguing question. The German Constitutional Court??s preliminary ruling on 12 September 2012, capping Germany??s ESM risk exposure at ?190 billion, has not rendered further examination of the topic irrelevant. Indeed, Germany??s aggravated risk exposure bomb continues to tick, because EFSF funds have already been promised as guarantees for ailing states and they will continue to be used thusly. The article quantifies these risks, in addition to the Target II risk exposure, to confront the Constitutional Court with facts that it ?? consciously or unconsciously ?? ignored in its aforementioned ruling. If the Court had been more diligent or more open to financial expertise, the worst-case scenario of a near doubling of German public debt (from about ?2 trillion to ?3.7 trillion) makes it hard to understand how the Court could have considered such risk compatible with its own postulate of sustained fiscal democracy.     

Balancing Power Markets in Germany: Timing Matters

This paper analyzes timing issues on the German balancing power market. We focus the analysis on the length of the bidding period, i.e. the length of the time period a supplier has to provide balancing power capacities, and the question of how far before the beginning of a bidding period the auction should be carried out. We show that different load levels require different plants for the optimal provision of balancing power. In a longer bidding period, the power plants that have the lowest average cost in the bidding period are unlikely to be efficient in all hours of the bidding period. Hence, shortening bidding periods can increase efficiency. Furthermore, we show that an early commitment on a power plant’s mode of operation (when uncertainty about resulting spot prices is still relatively high) also reduces efficiency. This suggests that the auction should be held relatively close to the beginning of the bidding period. Furthermore, we discuss some advantages of a liquid real time market.     

Risk management,corporate governance,and bank performance in the financial crisis

The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ performance during the crisis.     

Forecasting the past: the case of US interest rate forecasts

This study evaluates 10-year US government bond yield forecasts and three-month US Treasury bill rate forecasts for the period between October 1989 and December 2004. In total, 136 forecast time series with approximately 13,800 forecast data were scrutinized, making this the most extensive analysis of interest rate forecasts to date. Not one of the forecast time series proved to be unbiased. In the majority of cases, information from the past was not efficiently integrated into the forecasts. The sign accuracy is significantly better than random walk forecasts in only a very few of the forecast time series. The modified Diebold–Mariano test for forecast encompassing reveals that the information content of most of the forecast time series is lower than that of the naïve forecasts, the simple ARIMA models, the implicit forward rates, or average interest rate expectations. The forecasting process is dominated by the present and past market situation.     

Yield curve responses to market sentiments and monetary policy

Central banks recently started to target longer term interest rates. The empirical failure of the rational expectations theory of the yield curve, however, limits its applicability to monetary policy analysis. The success of agent-based behavioral asset pricing models and behavioral macroeconomic models in replicating statistical regularities of empirical data series motivates to apply them to yield curve modeling. This paper analyses how the interaction of monetary policy and market sentiments shape the yield curve in a behavioral model with heterogeneous and bounded-rational agents. One result is that the behavioral model replicates empirical facts of term structure data. Moreover, it overcomes one major deficiency of rational expectations models of the yield curve in explaining the empirically observed uncertain responses of longer term yields to changes in the central bank rate. These are explained by the behavioral model’s ability to generate different responses of market sentiments to shocks at different times which lead to a variety of interest rate responses. Further results of this paper can be used as policy advice on how central banks can target the level, slope and curvature of the yield curve by targeting market sentiments about inflation and the business cycle.     

Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure

We investigate how the structure of the distribution channel affects tacit collusion between manufacturers. When selling through a common retailer, we find—in contrast to the conventional understanding of tacit collusion that firms act to maximize industry profits—that colluding manufacturers strategically induce double marginalization so that retail prices are above the monopoly level. This lowers industry profits but increases the profit share that manufacturers appropriate from the retailer. Comparing common distribution with independent (exclusive) distribution, we show that the latter facilitates collusion. Despite this result, common retailing leads to lower welfare because a common retailer monopolizes the downstream market. For the case of independent retailing, we also demonstrate that contract offers that are observable to the rival retailer are not necessarily beneficial for collusive purposes.     

How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective

In this study, we address the question of why some CEOs stay in office during a performance downturn while others don't. Taking a social status perspective, we argue that an individual's board network embeddedness—as reflected in the number of outside directorships—plays an important role in dismissal decisions. We predict that a high status of the CEO relative to the chairman of the board protects an underperforming CEO against dismissal, while the relative salience of board network outsiders can counter this effect. Using longitudinal data of large German corporations, we find support for our predictions. Ltd. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Patent pools,vertical integration,and downstream competition

Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and nonlinear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel trade‐off between horizontal and vertical price coordination. Specifically, pools are anticompetitive if the share of integrated firms is large, procompetitive otherwise. We then formulate information‐free policies to screen anticompetitive pools.     

The Illiquidity Discount of Life Insurance Investments

We incorporate an illiquid life insurance investment in the multi-period investment strategy of an investor with constant relative risk aversion and independent and identically distributed returns. In our setup, the liquid and the illiquid assets are risky and correlated and the illiquid investment cannot be rebalanced. We calculate the illiquidity discount as the difference in certainty equivalent rates of return between the optimal strategy with all assets being rebalanced in each period and the strategy with the illiquid investment. Calibrating our model to data of the German market we find a negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and the illiquidity discount when the investor does not rebalance at all. However, when the investor rebalances his liquid assets in each period to hedge against the illiquid investment the illiquidity discount becomes economically negligible.