Competitive and Information Effects of Cross-Border Stock Listings

We examine the effect of 269 cross‐border listings on rivals in the listing and domestic markets and find that U.S. rivals experience significant gains whereas domestic rivals do not. Both competitive and information effects are important in explaining the reaction of U.S. rivals. Regarding the competitive effects, the reaction of rivals is less favorable when listings originate in developed countries and more favorable when listing firms do not have prior operating presence in the United States. Regarding the information effects, the reaction is less favorable when listings are combined with equity offerings and more favorable when the listing is the first to occur within an industry.     

How are China''s state-owned enterprises doing in the 1990s? Evidence from three interior provinces

Since its inception in the early 1980s, the success of China's enterprise reforms remains hotly debated. This paper introduces a new element into the analysis of state-owned enterprise performance by drawing on the recent increase in inter-regional income disparities. It is argued that as a result of less favourable structural conditions and stronger fiscal dependence on the central government, reform implementation in the interior provinces has lagged behind the progress made along the coast. This hypothesis is investigated using enterprise survey data from three interior provinces which is compared to a similar survey carried out earlier in four coastal cities. The evidence generally supports the view of larger administrative restrictions in the interior and relatively poor economic performance.     

A note on interactions-driven business cycles

Within the standard Keynesian multiplier framework, extended by a micro-model of interactive formation of individual consumption propensities, we demonstrate that socioeconomic interactions can lead to cyclical fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. The underlying micro-model of direct interactions is a version of Alan Kirman’s generic opinion formation model, with an additional feedback effect from macroscopic variables on the transition probabilities. Our model engenders cyclical fluctuations of economic variables, despite the fact that neither the Keynesian multiplier model nor Kirman’s model does so on its own.     

Strategic freedom, constraint, and symmetry in one-period markets with cash and credit payment

Summary. In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these strategic market games well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets large.Received: 5 June 2003, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, G10, G20, L10, D40, D50. Correspondence to: Eric SmithEric Smith, Martin Shubik: We are grateful to Lloyd Shapley, Duncan Foley, and Doyne Farmer for discussions in the course of this work.     

Structure,Clearinghouses and Symmetry

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure