Structural production layer decomposition: a new method to measure differences between MRIO databases for footprint assessments

Recent empirical assessments revealed that footprint indicators calculated with various multi-regional input–output (MRIO) databases deliver deviating results. In this paper, we propose a new method, called structural production layer decomposition (SPLD), which complements existing structural decomposition approaches. SPLD enables differentiating between effects stemming from specific parts in the technology matrix, e.g. trade blocks vs. domestic blocks, while still allowing to link the various effects to the total region footprint. Using the carbon footprint of the EU-28 in 2011 as an example, we analyse the differences between EXIOBASE, Eora, GTAP and WIOD. Identical environmental data are used across all MRIO databases. In all model comparisons, variations in domestic blocks have a more significant impact on the carbon footprint than variations in trade blocks. The results provide a wealth of information for MRIO developers and are relevant for policy makers designing climate policy measures targeted to specific stages along product supply chains.     

The influence of entrepreneurs’ social referents on start-up size

This paper uses social comparison theory to explore the effect that the average size of established businesses at the regional (provincial) level may have on start-up size. It is argued that established entrepreneurs at the regional level become referents of new entrepreneurs, influencing not only the decision to become entrepreneurs but also the characteristics of the new venture, such as its initial size. Specifically, the greater the average size of established businesses at the provincial level, the bigger the start-up size of new ventures. This paper further considers how this effect is moderated by two key individual level variables: knowing an entrepreneur personally (i.e., close social referent), and being the owner and manager of an existing business (i.e., past entrepreneurial and managerial experience). Predictions are tested using data that combine individual- and provincial-level information in Spain over the period 2008–2014. The results show the positive relationship of the average size of established businesses on new venture start-up size, and that this effect decreases when the entrepreneurs have previous entrepreneurial experience.     

A theory of sequential reciprocity

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept—sequential reciprocity equilibrium—for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.     

Corporate patents and knowledge sourcing from universities

This paper provides empirical evidence on the link between different external knowledge sourcing strategies from universities and firms’ innovation output measured by the number of patent applications. Three strategies for acquiring external knowledge are distinguished: buying, cooperating and contracting out. The empirical model is based on the instrumental variable version of the ordered probit model. Geographical distance to local universities is employed as an instrument for the different knowledge sourcing strategies. The empirical results show that buying knowledge from universities is significantly positively related to the number of patent applications, while cooperating with universities and contracting out does not have an impact. This also holds for buying knowledge from domestic universities.     

A constitutional paradigm is not enough—would sovereign citizens really agree to manipulative nudges?—A reply to Christian Schubert

In this short note I reply to a comment made by Christian Schubert, who argues that my criticism of libertarian paternalism cannot be upheld under a constitutional economics paradigm. I disagree: it is implausible to assume that sovereign individuals behind a veil of ignorance would actually agree on manipulative nudges from the public sector. Resorting to a constitutional economics paradigm does not diminish the force of the manipulation objection—libertarian paternalism remains morally objectionable. Moreover, where sovereign citizens would agree on permissible (morally legitimate) nudges behind a veil of ignorance, these would no longer constitute “paternalism” under its commonly agreed definition. More constructively, the only morally defensible paternalistic nudges would be those that improve welfare while respecting or, better yet, improving individual autonomy. These are not the typical nudges defended by libertarian paternalists.     

Strategic freedom, constraint, and symmetry in one-period markets with cash and credit payment

Summary. In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these strategic market games well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets large.Received: 5 June 2003, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, G10, G20, L10, D40, D50. Correspondence to: Eric SmithEric Smith, Martin Shubik: We are grateful to Lloyd Shapley, Duncan Foley, and Doyne Farmer for discussions in the course of this work.     

The Power of Networks: Integration and Financial Cooperative Performance

Abstract ** :  The purpose of this paper is to perform a cross‐country survey of the level of integration of systems of financial cooperatives (FC) and its effect on measures of performance. We develop a classification scheme based on a theoretical framework that builds on published work using transaction cost economics (TCE) to explain integration of large numbers of financial cooperatives into networks. We identify three critical levels of increasing integration we call respectively atomized systems, consensual networks and strategic networks. Further, we test some of the propositions that result from the theoretical framework on an international sample of financial cooperative systems. Based on this analysis we can conclude that: (i) Integration is less (more) important in developing (more developed) countries and for very small (large) financial cooperatives as a determinant of efficiency. However, integration tends to reduce volatility of efficiency and performance regardless of development. (ii) Integration appears to help control measure of managers' expense preferences that tend to affect performance of FC. (iii) Despite high costs of running hub‐like organizations in highly integrated system, these systems economize in bounded rationality and operate at lower costs than less integrated systems.     

A working paper from April 1985: Which demand elasticities do we know and which do we need to know for policy analysis?

This paper presents some results on the theory and estimation of intertemporal allocation mechanisms. The results rely heavily on the distinction between anticipated changes and unanticipated changes.     

Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives induced by insurance buyers’ net trades. When there are many agents to share the insurance buyers’ risks, Cournot equilibrium outcomes are close to being second-best. In contrast, if insurance buyers are price takers, equilibria fail to exist or are bounded away from being second-best.