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101.
In this paper we discuss the fundamental inconsistency that results from employing the two traditional concepts of rationality as the basis of selecting social goals. We then consider the possibility that the selection of social goals must be based on explicitly ethical criteria. To do so a third concept of rationality namely, ontological rationality, should be adopted. Moreover, we argue that J. M. Keynes in A Tract Monetary Reform based his public policy recommendations on a modified version of ontological rationality, thereby introducing ontological rationality into economics as the basis for selecting social goals.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Fifty-Eighth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 7–10, 2004. The authors are grateful to session participants for their helpful suggestions, though the authors alone are responsible for the contents of the paper. 相似文献
102.
Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’ types. Such an estimate can
be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule
yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders’ types are affiliated or independent. We highlight the link between
the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results offer sharp insights into the strengths
and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of informational rents in such environments.
Harstad acknowledges hospitable accommodation by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Olin School of Business,
Washington University in St. Louis, during parts of this research. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Richard
McLean and Jeroen Swinkels. 相似文献
103.
We axiomatize a subjective version of the recursive expected utility model. This development extends the seminal results of Kreps and Porteus (Econometrica 46:185–200 (1978)) to a subjective framework and provides foundations that are easy to relate to axioms familiar from timeless models of decision making under uncertainty. Our analysis also clarifies what is needed in going from a represention that applies within a single filtration to an across filtration representation.Part of this research was conducted when Ozdenoren visited MEDS in Fall 2003. We thank Tapas Kundu, Costis Skiadas, Jean-Marc Tallon and Tan Wang for helpful discussions and also thank audiences at Koc University, Northwestern University, the CERMSEM conference “ Mathematical Models in Decision Theory” at Universite Paris I, and the FUR XI conference on foundations and applications of utility, risk and decision theory 相似文献
104.
105.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
106.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
107.
In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer
match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure
provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule)
may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether
FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular,
we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively,
and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams.
Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward
for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches
held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis.
First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001 相似文献
108.
Jenifer Piesse Igor Filatotchev Yung-Chih Lien 《International Review of Economics》2007,54(1):176-193
This paper examines the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in publicly traded Taiwanese
firms that are controlled by founding families. Results show that when shares are owned by institutional investors, particularly
foreign financial institutions, firms perform better. However, where families are the major shareholders, this is not the
case. In addition, boards that are independent of the financial interests of the founding family have a positive impact on
performance, whether measured by accounting ratios, operating performance or the stock market. (JEL: P52, G32) 相似文献
109.
We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally
complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented
as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry
properties of the structure 相似文献
110.
Nigar Hashimzade 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):907-912
Summary. In this paper I analyze the general equilibrium in a random Walrasian economy. Dependence among agents is introduced in the
form of dependency neighborhoods. Under the uncertainty, an agent may fail to survive due to a meager endowment in a particular
state (direct effect), as well as due to unfavorable equilibrium price system at which the value of the endowment falls short
of the minimum needed for survival (indirect terms-of-trade effect). To illustrate the main result I compute the stochastic
limit of equilibrium price and probability of survival of an agent in a large Cobb-Douglas economy.
Received June 7, 2001; revised version: January 7, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar and Thomas DiCiccio for helpful discussion and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions. 相似文献