Testing spatial regression models under nonregular conditions

In time series context, estimation and testing issues with autoregressive and moving average (ARMA) models are well understood. Similar issues in the context of spatial ARMA models for the disturbance of the regression, however, remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we discuss the problems of testing no spatial dependence in the disturbances against the alternative of spatial ARMA process incorporating the possible presence of spatial dependence in the dependent variable. The problems of conducting such a test are twofold. First, under the null hypothesis, the nuisance parameter is not identified, resulting in a singular information matrix (IM), which is a nonregular case in statistical inference. To take account of singular IM, we follow Davies (Biometrika 64(2):247–254, 1977; Biometrika 74(1):33–43, 1987) and propose a test procedure based on the supremum of the Rao score test statistic. Second, the possible presence of spatial lag dependence will have adverse effect on the performance of the test. Using the general test procedure of Bera and Yoon (Econom Theory 9:649–658, 1993) under local misspecification, we avoid the explicit estimation of the spatial autoregressive parameter. Thus our suggested tests are entirely based on ordinary least squares estimation. Tests suggested here can be viewed as a generalization of Anselin et al. (Reg Sci Urban Econ 26:77–104, 1996). We conduct Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the finite sample properties of the proposed tests. Simulation results show that our tests have good finite sample properties both in terms of size and power, compared to other tests in the literature. We also illustrate the applications of our tests through several data sets.     

Komplexität erfolgreich steuern — 27. Österreichischer Controllertag in Wien

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The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition

This paper proposes a model of imperfect competition among privately owned firms that act in the best interest of their shareholders. The existence of a solution for the model is proved under weaker conditions than the ones generally used in the literature. In particular, the results did not require the existence of a continuous equilibrium price selection or concavity assumptions on the profit function.      

Technological knowledge as an essential facility

The economics of regulation has articulated the notions of essential facility and mandated interconnection. Their application to the governance of technological knowledge can be fruitful especially when implemented by the adoption of a compensatory liability rule and the parallel reduction in the exclusivity of patents. Because knowledge is at the same time an output and an input in the production of new knowledge, exclusivity, traditionally associated to patents, is the cause of actual knowledge rationing with major drawbacks in terms of both static and dynamic efficiency. This institutional innovation can improve the governance of technological knowledge and increase both its rates of dissemination and generation.

Organizational forms in the knowledge economy: a comparative institutional analysis

This paper provides a framework with which to analyze organizational forms in the knowledge economy. We focus on an important trade-off facing modern firms: firms can acquire the property of all the innovations developed by their employees and can greatly increase their profits, yet this type of private intellectual property rights regime can discourage the innovative effort of the very same workers. Allowing workers to carry their knowledge outside the firm eliminates this disincentive. Hence, strategic complementarities may exist between innovative partners and a disclosure driven intellectual property rights regime, and passive employees and a private intellectual property rights regime. An evolutionary game theoretic model demonstrates these strategic complementarities and shows when economies tend towards disclosure driven or private intellectual property rights regimes.     

New EU member states and the Euro: economic readiness,benefits and costs

All of the new EU member states (NMSs) have made a commitment to adopt the Euro. This essay considers the countries’ economic readiness to adopt the Euro as well as the economic benefits and costs of adoption. Paper applies a method suggested by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) and finds that the changes of real effective exchange rates between the Euro area and the new EU member states follow the pattern predicted by the optimum currency area theory. This finding allows the construction of the readiness for adoption index for every NMS. The tangible benefits (for NMSs) of adoption are also examined in this essay. Analyses suggest that the costs of currency exchange and hedging against the uncertainty in foreign exchange markets account for about 0.08–0.012% of the countries’ GDP. In addition, countries that adopt the Euro might expect lower inflation and interest rates. This essay also examines the possible costs of adoption. These are in the forms of the lost ability to use monetary policy tools and set the level of seigniorage. Analysis suggests that many countries had given up their independence over monetary policy even before the accession to the EU. In addition, bigger NMSs have not used seigniorage as the source of fiscal income. However, they used exchange rate flexibility to depreciate their currencies during the recent crisis.     

Modeling Cyclical Asymmetries in European Imports

This paper applies smooth transition models to capture the nonlinear behavior in the imports data of six major European economies and to assess whether such nonlinearities are related to business cycle asymmetries. Two classes of switch between regimes are considered: endogenously determined transition that assumes nonlinearities are generated by idiosyncratic components specific to foreign trade, and exogenous transition based on GDP growth as a more direct indicator of the cyclical state of the economy. The results support the proposition that the dynamics of imports are nonlinear. In Belgium, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, regimes change over the business cycle, while in Germany and Italy the switch between regimes is endogenous. National characteristics play a role in defining the position of extreme regimes, the smoothness of the transition, and local dynamics within each state.Previous versions of this article have been presented at the 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference (Lisbon, Portugal, March 10–14, 2004) and at the VII Encuentro de Economía Aplicada (Vigo, Spain, June 3–5, 2004). The authors thank the conference participants and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

The effect of nonreciprocal preferential trade agreements on benefactors’ exports

Over the last decades, developed countries have provided developing countries with preferential market access via trade policies in the form of nonreciprocal preferential trade agreements (NRPTAs). Despite the lack of reciprocity of this kind of agreements, certain criteria for designating eligible countries refer to the commercial interests of benefactor countries. This paper examines for the first time the effect of NRPTAs on benefactors’ exports to beneficiary countries. Using recent developments in the econometric analysis of the gravity equation, we find robust evidence that nonreciprocal agreements have had an economically significant effect on exports not only for beneficiary countries but also for benefactor countries.     

Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design

Our paper reconsiders the triadic design proposed by Cox (Games and Economic Behavior 46:260–281, 2004) to identify trust and reciprocity in investment games. Specifically, we extend the design in two directions. First, we collect information on investors’ choices by using both the direct-response (as does Cox) and strategy methods. Using the latter, we are able to condition reciprocity on initial inequality, which is endogenous when investigating reciprocity. We demonstrate that the triadic design provides evidence for reciprocity once that initial inequality is considered. Second, we elicit expectations and test their coherence with the triadic outcomes. By examining the relationship between trust actions and expected gains, we analyze whether investors’ expectations are consistent with their behavior. Finally, we test for the existence of an emotional bias, i.e., whether expectation mismatches induce trustees to change actual choices from the planned ones.