首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   3985篇
  免费   159篇
  国内免费   2篇
财政金融   603篇
工业经济   147篇
计划管理   876篇
经济学   768篇
综合类   20篇
运输经济   20篇
旅游经济   34篇
贸易经济   1187篇
农业经济   59篇
经济概况   272篇
邮电经济   160篇
  2023年   34篇
  2022年   33篇
  2021年   47篇
  2020年   62篇
  2019年   82篇
  2018年   194篇
  2017年   205篇
  2016年   208篇
  2015年   140篇
  2014年   185篇
  2013年   426篇
  2012年   253篇
  2011年   182篇
  2010年   198篇
  2009年   151篇
  2008年   166篇
  2007年   113篇
  2006年   126篇
  2005年   143篇
  2004年   75篇
  2003年   78篇
  2002年   86篇
  2001年   82篇
  2000年   56篇
  1999年   41篇
  1998年   36篇
  1997年   29篇
  1996年   35篇
  1995年   30篇
  1993年   36篇
  1992年   22篇
  1990年   26篇
  1989年   20篇
  1988年   18篇
  1987年   23篇
  1986年   20篇
  1985年   34篇
  1984年   32篇
  1983年   22篇
  1982年   25篇
  1981年   22篇
  1978年   18篇
  1977年   20篇
  1976年   27篇
  1975年   23篇
  1974年   18篇
  1973年   20篇
  1972年   18篇
  1971年   26篇
  1970年   21篇
排序方式: 共有4146条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
151.
This article describes the results of a scientific discourse which aimed at exploring the reasons for differences in expert health risk assessment of radio frequency electromagnetic fields of mobile telephony.

It starts with describing the structure of the discourse. Then, the reasons for the conflicting risk assessments are discussed. Differences are due to the selection and evaluation of relevant scientific studies by applying different scientific quality standards, to the methods used for generating a research synthesis and an overall risk evaluation. Consensus could be achieved regarding the selection of and the quality requirements for the scientific studies used for risk assessment as well as their significance for risk evaluation. However, dissent remained about the synthesis of scientific evidence into an overall risk evaluation and about the relevance of the precautionary principle for risk evaluation and its implications for the risk assessment framework.

Based on the analysis of these problems, a transparent, consistent and rational procedure for risk assessment is suggested to facilitate a risk characterization which better meets the demands of policy making and the public for an appropriate risk evaluation.  相似文献   
152.
Are hedging transactions that diversify a manager’s compensation risk detrimental to incentives, or can they improve contracting efficiency? If hedging provides efficiency benefits, should the manager or the firm undertake it? In our model, both the firm and the manager can trade financial portfolios to diversify the manager’s compensation risk. Prior to the portfolio selection, the parties need to acquire information on how different financial portfolios fit their diversification purposes. We illustrate that financial portfolios correlated with firm‐specific risk improve contracting efficiency. For equal information costs, it is optimal for the firm to undertake the hedging on the manager’s behalf.  相似文献   
153.
154.
155.
156.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the persistent, typically negative, mispricing in the new stock index futures market in Turkey, which has amounted to 5–8%, several multiples of transaction costs. The observations suggest that it is the outcome of a combination of practical difficulties of shorting in the spot stock market, behavioral effects, and insufficient arbitrage. The magnitude of the mispricing and the absence of arbitrage make behavioral effects more visible and provide a unique opportunity to examine extant behavioral hypotheses. Results confirm effects such as disposition and/or conservatism with the mispricing negatively related to past returns, but unrelated to future returns. Finally, an orderly weakening of the negative relation to past returns and behavioral effects is observed, suggesting that such effects will diminish as the market matures. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:218–243, 2009  相似文献   
157.
158.
This paper analyzes a two-stage model of bilateral bargaining where one of the agents has the option to delegate. A first approach is to assume that the contract between the agent and his representative is perfectly observable and can be renegotiated. Commitment effects arise although renegotiation is possible. Then, perfect observability of the contract is weakened to observe it with certain probability. Commitment effects as pure-strategy equilibria exist if this probability is sufficiently close to 1, in contrast to Bagwell's [1995] findings that imperfect observability undermines commitment. Considering the realistic case of the actual agreement between two parties being private information, the commitment value as equilibrium outcome disappears since having closed a renegotiation-proof contract offers costless self-insurance against strategic misunderstandings. The author is grateful for helpful comments from Vasco Santos, participants at the International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 7–10, 1999, Montreal, Canada, an anonymous referee, and David M. Aadland.  相似文献   
159.
Platforms for SaaS-based enterprise applications are prospering and the number of on-demand ERP vendors is increasing. We combine both phenomena for the first time and illustrate how the integration of a sustainability benchmarking service into an on-demand ERP platform provides added value beyond pure cost savings. By applying a qualitative system dynamics approach we identify self-reinforcing mechanisms which allow a faster and more comprehensive market penetration compared to providing these services separately.  相似文献   
160.
We study the equilibrium accounting and transfer pricing policies in a multinational duopoly with price competition in the final product market. We find that the firms in a duopoly can benefit from strategically using the same transfer price for tax and managerial purposes instead of using separate transfer prices for both objectives. According to our results, the practice of one set of books should be the prevalent accounting method in markets with a small number of competitors and similar products.  相似文献   
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号