Strategic Practice Drift: How Open Strategy Infiltrates the Strategy Process

This paper builds theory on the process of open-strategy infiltration through an ethnographic study investigating how open strategy entered a financial services firm's strategy process behind the backs of top managers. Based on our analysis, we show how open strategy infiltrates the strategy process through a ‘strategic practice drift’, i.e., a gradual and partly unnoticed shift towards open strategy that occurs through ‘accommodating’ and ‘legitimizing’ the performance of transparency and inclusion in the strategy process. We show how the ‘goal-based ambiguity’ and ‘procedural certainty’ of initiatives that latently imply the performance of transparency and inclusion in the strategy process enable open-strategy infiltration. Furthermore, we show how top managers' ‘goal-based rationalization’ and ‘procedural renegotiation’ of practising transparency and inclusion contribute to the eventual reproduction of open strategy in the strategy process. Our model generates an understanding of how and why open strategy can enter the strategy process behind the backs of top managers and adds nuance to extant understandings of the role of top managers in this process. In addition, our findings contribute to research on strategy as practice by theorizing ‘strategic practice drifts’ and extending our understanding of the role of ambiguity therein.     

Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex!

We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party’s gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from evolutionary psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.     

Central bank transparency and financial market expectations: The case of emerging markets

In this paper, we study how central bank transparency influences the formation of money market expectations in emerging markets. The sample covers 25 countries for the period from January 1998 to December 2009. We find, first, that transparency reduces the bias (the difference between the money market rate and the weighted expected target rate over the contract period) in money market expectations. The effect is larger for countries with no exchange rate peg and countries with low income. Second, an intermediate level of transparency is found to have the most favorable influence on money market expectations: neither complete secrecy nor complete transparency is optimal. Finally, all subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index lead to a smaller bias in expectations, with political transparency having the largest effect.     

Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players

We analyze the optimal choice of risk in a two-stage tournament game between two players that have different concave utility functions. At the first stage, both players simultaneously choose risk. At the second stage, both observe overall risk and simultaneously decide on effort or investment. The results show that those two effects which mainly determine risk taking – an effort effect and a likelihood effect – are strictly interrelated. This finding sharply contrasts with existing results on risk taking in tournament games with symmetric equilibrium efforts where such linkage can never arise. Conditions are derived under which this linkage leads to a reversed likelihood effect so that the favorite (underdog) can increase his winning probability by increasing (decreasing) risk which is impossible in a completely symmetric setting.     

Efficiency and productivity change in Ukrainian health care

The study analyses technical efficiency and efficiency change of 193 community hospitals and polyclinics across Ukraine, for the years 1997–2001. These facilities are a subset of the medical institutions in rural Ukraine; they are identical w.r.t. their function in the health system and share the same departmental structure. The data comprise the number of beds in the hospitals, the number of staff employed in the hospitals as well as the polyclinics connected to the hospitals, the number of inpatient and outpatient admissions as well as the number of surgical procedures, lab tests, X-rays performed and the number of deaths and deaths after surgery. Because of the known sensitivity of traditional nonparametric frontier estimators to outlier observations, we employ an order-m estimator, a robust technique, to assess the efficiency of these health care providers as well as changes of their productivity time. The efficiency scores are calculated with an output-oriented model; they are close to unity for hospitals whereas polyclinics seem somewhat less efficient. The Malmquist-indices averaged over all observations are close to unity indicating that productivity does not change over during our observation period. But, depending on the period and the region, substantial deviations from unity can be observed.

Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments

We derive several implications of incentive compatibility in general (i.e., not necessarily quasilinear) environments. Building on Kos and Messner (2013), we provide a (partial) characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.