On Welfare under Cournot and Bertrand Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies

Häckner (2000, Journal of Economic Theory 93, 233–239) shows that in a differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms, prices may be higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, implying that the classical result of Singh and Vives (1984, Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 546–554) that Bertrand prices are always lower than Cournot prices is sensitive to the duopoly assumption. Häckner (2000, Journal of Economic Theory, 93, 233–239), however, leaves unanswered the important question of whether welfare may be lower under price competition. This note shows that in Häckner’s model both consumer surplus and total surplus are higher under price competition than under quantity competition, regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements.     

The effect of advertising on the distribution-free newsboy problem

Advertising is very important for the newsboy problem because the shelf-life of the newsboy product is short and advertising may increase sales to avoid overstocking. In this paper, models to study the effect of advertising are developed for the distribution-free newsboy problem where only the mean and variance of the demand are known. As in Khouja and Robbins (2003), it is assumed that the mean demand is an increasing and concave function of advertising expenditure. Three cases are considered: (1) demand has constant variance, (2) demand has constant coefficient of variation, and (3) demand has an increasing coefficient of variation. This paper provides closed-form solutions or steps to solve the problem. Numerical results of the model are also compared with those from other papers. The effects of model parameters on optimal expenditure on advertising, optimal order quantity, and the lower bound on expected profit are derived or discussed.     

Applying the Grey prediction model to the global integrated circuit industry

This study examines the precision of the Grey forecasting model applied to samples based on demand and sales in the global integrated circuit (IC) industry. In doing so, the main objective is to explore which forecast model is most appropriate for the IC industry by comparing the empirical results from the Grey model (GM), time series and exponential smoothing. Furthermore, three residual modification models are applied to enhance the forecasting results. Empirical results indicate that the GM is better suited to short-term predictions than to mid- and long-term predictions. Meanwhile, the Markov-chain residual modification model achieves reliable and precise results.     

Determinants of passenger transfer waiting time at multi-modal connecting stations

This paper formulates a model to represent the transfer waiting time for a connecting service at multi-modal stations, where waiting time considers the characteristics of both the connecting service and its feeder services. Numerical simulation results show that transfer waiting time is mainly affected by the capacities and headways of the connecting and feeder services. Simulations also show that compared with the effects of connecting service variables, the corresponding variables of the feeder service usually have greater influences on transfer waiting time. In general, simulation results suggest that multi-modal operations, transfer waiting time cannot be improved without operational coordination with the feeder service.     

The Basu Measure as an Indicator of Conditional Conservatism: Evidence from UK Earnings Components

Following the work of Basu in 1997, the excess of the sensitivity of accounting earnings to negative share return over its sensitivity to positive share return (the Basu coefficient) has been interpreted as an indicator of conditional accounting conservatism. Although this interpretation is supported by substantial evidence that the Basu coefficient is associated with likely demands for conservatism, concerns have arisen that it may reflect factors not directly related to conservatism, and that this may adversely affect its validity as an indicator of that phenomenon. We argue that evidence on the validity of the Basu coefficient as an indicator of conditional conservatism can be obtained by disaggregating earnings into components, classifying those components by whether or not they are likely to be affected by conditional conservatism, and examining whether the Basu coefficient arises primarily from components likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. We implement this procedure for UK firms reporting under FRS 3: Reporting Financial Performance from 1992 to 2004. Although a substantial proportion of the Basu coefficient emanates from cash flow from operating and investing activities (CFOI), which cannot directly reflect accounting conservatism, its incidence across other components of earnings is predominantly within those components likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. Also, although the bias documented by Patatoukas and Thomas in 2009 is present in all of our aggregate earnings measures, it is heavily concentrated in the CFOI component of earnings and largely absent from components classified as likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. With the important caveat that researchers should test the robustness of their results to the exclusion of the element of the Basu coefficient due to cash flows, our findings are consistent with the conditional conservatism interpretation of the coefficient.     

New axioms for top trading cycles

The school choice problem is of great importance both in theory and practice. This paper studies the (student-optimal) top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) in an axiomatic way. We introduce two new axioms: MBG (mutual best group)-quota-rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. While stability implies MBG-quota rationality, MBG-robust efficiency is weaker than robust efficiency, which is stronger than the combination of efficiency and group strategy proofness. The TTCM is characterized by MBG-quota rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. Our results construct a new basis to compare the TTCM with the other school choice mechanisms, in terms of both fairness and incentive-related axioms.