Price promotions and “freemium” app monetization

The “freemium” model for digital goods involves selling a base version of the product for free, and making premium product features available to users only on payment. The success of the model is predicated on the ability to profitably convert free users to paying ones. Price promotions (or “sales”) are often used in freemium to induce this conversion. However, the causal effect of exposing consumers to such inter-temporal price variation is unclear. While sales can generate beneficial short-run conversion, they may be harmful in the long-run if consumers inter-temporally substitute purchases to periods with low prices, or use them as signals of low product quality. These long-run concerns may be accentuated in freemium apps, where the base version is sold for free, so that sales form extreme price cuts on the overall product combination. We work with the seller of a free-to-play video game to randomize entering cohorts of users into treatment and control conditions in which promotions for in-game purchases are turned on or off. We observe complete user behavior for half a year, including purchases and consumption of in-game goods, which, in contrast to much of the extant literature, enables us to assess possible substitution over time in consumption directly. We find that conversion and revenue improve in the treatment group; and detect no evidence of harmful inter-temporal substitution or negative inferences about quality from exposure to price variation, suggesting that promotions are profitable. We conjecture that the zero price of the base product that makes its consumption virtually costless, combined with the complementarity between the base product and premium features can help explain this. To the extent that this holds across freemium contexts, the positive effects of promotions documented here may hold more generally.

     

Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices

We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanismson bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impactof shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders)on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholdercontrol is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firmis exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence ofshareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differencesin takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points.Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associatedwith strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bondcovenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interestsdiverge.