Employment Practices and Semiconductor Manufacturing Performance

This article analyzes the factors contributing to superior manufacturing performance in the semiconductor industry. Through an analysis of firm-level data from the United States, Asia, and Europe, we explore the relationship between firm performance along quality and quantity dimensions and three components of the employment system: skill development, employee participation in problem solving, and employee collaboration. We find that manufacturing success is related to the introduction of new production technology and the involvement of all occupations in problem solving under the leadership of engineers, who play a key (and growing) role in this high-tech industry. We find that the operators and technicians play a smaller role in creating high-performing semiconductor factories than has been found in studies of more traditional factories, such as automobiles and steel.     

Wrongful firing in violation of public policy: Who gets fired and why

We extend the whistle-blowing literature to the context of wrongful firings that violate a public policy. Our results suggest that the incidence of wrongful firings varies, depending on the employee’s gender and tenure, and the industry in which the organization operates. Wrongful firings do not occur more frequently in certain occupations, since firms wrongfully discharge professional and managerial employees as often as employees in technical, clerical, and laborer occupations. We also show that gender, tenure, occupation, and industry, in combination, can distinguish between three types of wrongful firings in violation of public policy. Our results support the application of theory and empirical research on whistle-blowing to the wrongful firing context, aiding researchers interested in developing explanations of wrongful firings in violation of public policy. For managers, our study points to the need to develop more effective responses to employees exercising legal rights, refusing to participate in illegal or unethical activities, and performing a public duty or obligation, such as whistle-blowing.     

ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY AND BOARD MONITORING: EVIDENCE FROM CEO TURNOVERS

We examine whether economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects a board's chief executive officer (CEO) replacement decision. We find that high EPU reduces the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. Our results support the idea that performance assessment may be more difficult when uncertainty is high. We provide evidence that succession planning may be important to firms in reducing the effects of EPU, as firms with an identifiable heir apparent are not influenced by high EPU. Likewise, voluntary CEO turnovers are not affected by EPU. Overall, our results provide evidence that boards make personnel decisions in response to external macroeconomic pressures.     

An Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Peer and Managerial Ethical Behaviors and the Ethical Predispositions of Prospective Advertising Employees

An advertising firm's ethical culture (as defined by the firm's managerial and peer ethical behaviors) may affect the employees' comfort levels and ethical behaviors. In this research, scenarios were used to describe advertising firms with various ethical cultures. Respondents' perceived comfort levels in working for the firms described in the scenarios and the respondents' behavioral intentions when faced with various advertising situations were assessed. Results of the study indicate that peer ethical behavior exerts a strong influence on the comfort or discomfort level and the ethical behavioral intentions of potential advertising employees. Further, the strong influence exerted by peers seems to transcend the ethical behavior of the manager and carry over to the attitude toward the entire corporate advertising environment. This study provides insights for firms and researchers interested in assessing the impact of an advertising firm's ethical culture on potential employees.     

Are Earnings Forecasts Informed by Proxy Statement Compensation Disclosures?

We investigate the extent to which market participants use compensation payouts released in the DEF 14A proxy statement (DEF14A) to assess future firm performance by examining sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts. Consistent with prior work, we confirm that CEO compensation unexplained by current observable economic factors is positively associated with future firm performance. We find that both the likelihood that analysts revise their forecasts following release of the DEF14A and the magnitude and direction of analysts' forecast revisions are positively associated with unexplained CEO compensation. These associations are stronger after the SEC required additional compensation-related disclosures in late 2006 but lower if the firm has weak corporate governance or more precise other information. Analysts' reactions are not complete, however. Analysts' forecast errors measured months after the DEF14A release are associated with past unexplained compensation, especially in the pre-2006 period and for analysts who do not revise at the DEF14A release. Taken together, our results suggest that compensation payouts released in the DEF14A contain useful forward-looking information that is recognized by at least some sophisticated market participants and that the increased disclosure regulations assisted market participants in incorporating this information.     

When Does Pre‐IPO Financial Reporting Trigger Post‐IPO Legal Consequences?

Prior research suggests that the fear of litigation precludes most managers from manipulating earnings in the initial public offering (IPO) setting. Yet, managers' restraint is perhaps unwarranted: research has not yet linked instances of aggressive pre‐IPO reporting to increased litigation risk. This paper investigates when aggressive IPO reporting triggers legal consequences. Examining 2,037 IPOs, we find that even when ex post evidence indicates the presence of earnings inflation, litigation is more likely to occur when investors have relied on the suspect earnings during the pricing process. Why might investors rely on some firms' abnormal accruals when valuing the IPO and yet discount the abnormal accruals of other firms? Our analyses suggest that IPO investors incorporate abnormal accrual information into IPO prices in situations where accruals are more likely to reflect information and where other sources of information to help investors make pricing decisions are lacking or are less reliable. In these situations, we find that abnormal accruals do positively correlate with future performance, validating investors' use of this information when pricing these offerings. Yet, when ex post performance reveals that these pre‐IPO abnormal accruals were in fact inflated, we find that litigation emerges to allow harmed shareholders to recover losses incurred dating back to the pricing process—importantly, investors are only harmed if they used those abnormal accruals in pricing the IPO. Collectively, our evidence indicates that litigation in response to earnings inflation does indeed surface in the IPO setting—but only when investors need it to settle the score.     

Compensation in the Post‐FIN 48 Period: The Case of Contracting on Tax Performance and Uncertainty

Academic and anecdotal evidence indicates that incentive systems often provide short‐term payouts without regard for long‐term consequences. New detailed disclosures mandated by FIN No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, enable us to use a tax setting to investigate whether boards adjust performance‐based pay for uncertainty. We find managers’ bonus payouts are positively associated with tax performance; however, bonus payouts are lower when measures of ex ante tax uncertainty are higher. Our results are robust to tests of alternative explanations including financial reporting aggressiveness, overall firm risk, and other forms of compensation. Further, we document that the relation between bonus compensation and tax performance has changed in the post‐FIN No. 48 period. Specifically, we identify a significant association between bonus payout and GAAP ETR only in the pre‐FIN No. 48 period and a significant association between bonus payout and cash ETR only in the post‐FIN No. 48 period, suggesting that the relation between compensation and tax avoidance should be examined carefully with particular attention to the post‐FIN No. 48 period.     

THE PERFORMANCE OF BANK‐MANAGED MUTUAL FUNDS

The ability of banks to offer proprietary mutual funds has expanded over recent years, and the mutual fund industry has been a significant growth area for banks. I examine the growth and performance of bank proprietary bond mutual funds. The empirical results show no evidence that bank‐managed mutual funds underperform nonbank funds. I find some evidence that bank managers are more conservative than nonbank managers in terms of investment strategy and that banks appear more likely to target individual rather than institutional investors. Also, I find that abnormal fund performance does not appear to be a significant determinant of the net asset flows into and out of bank‐managed mutual funds. Rather, the results suggest bank investors rely mainly on past marketing information and the general reputation of the bank. JEL classification: G11, G21