The response of competitors to announcements of bankruptcy: An empirical examination of contagion and competitive effects

We find, like [Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R.M., 1992. Contagion and competitive intra-industry effects of bankruptcy announcements: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 32(1), 45–60], that large firm bankruptcies generate a dominant contagion effect. A value-weighted portfolio of competitors' stocks experiences a significant loss of 0.56% in the three days centered around the Chapter 11 announcement. This represents an average loss of $3.32 for all the competitors combined for every dollar lost by the bankrupt firm. In addition, we find that small firm bankruptcies also generate a dominant contagion effect among smaller sized competitors; an equally-weighted portfolio of all competitors has a significant 0.12% drop. In a new approach to separate the contagion and competitive effects, we compare the stock price reactions of competitors who themselves subsequently file for bankruptcy in the next three years (candidates for contagion effect) with those who do not do so (candidates for competitive effect). As expected, candidates for contagion effect experience a significant, negative three-day stock price reaction of −4.68%. However, contrary to expectations, candidates for competitive effect also have a significant, negative return (−0.49%), suggesting that the competitive effect is weak at best since it is dominated by the contagion effect even in this sample. Other procedures to identify candidates for competitive effect generally yield similar findings. Finally, we analyze competitors' stock price reactions based on selected characteristics (e.g., industry concentration, and leverage), with similar results as before. One explanation for the failure to detect a competitive effect is that the impact may already have been incorporated in stock prices prior to the filing for Chapter 11. Consistent with this explanation, we find significant positive stock price reactions by competitor stocks for the hundred days prior to the bankruptcy announcement.     

Top Management Compensation and the Structure of the Board of Directors in Commercial Banks

We examine the relationship between top management compensationand the structure of the board of directors for a sample ofcommercial banks. We find that boards with more reputable outsidedirectors compensate managers more heavily with long-term incentives(stock and stock options) than with cash (salary and bonus).We also find a significant positive correlation between thefuture performance of our sample banks and the proportion oftheir managers’ compensation in the form of long-termincentives. Taken together, these results suggest that boardswith highly reputed outside directors are more effective inproviding managers with the appropriate incentives and thusensuring better future firm performance. Another indicationof the effectiveness of these boards is our finding that theycompensate managers more heavily with long-term incentives (insteadof cash) when these managers are more entrenched. We also findvery little evidence of mutually beneficial back-scratchingor collusion between outside directors and senior managers whensetting management compensation. But boards with long-servingoutside directors are less effective in creating appropriatemanagement incentives.     

The relationship between portfolio diversification and firm value: The evidence from corporate venture capital activity

Corporate venture capital (CVC) activity exposes firms to new technologies and markets. An important but as yet unexplored question is the relationship of the industry diversification profile of the portfolio of venture companies to corporate value creation. Insights from options and diversification perspectives support our hypothesis that diversification of a corporate investor's portfolio of venture companies is related to corporate wealth creation in a U‐shaped relationship. We also propose that a corporate investor's financial constraints moderate the relationship between the diversification profile of its CVC portfolio and value creation. When we tested our hypotheses using a sample of CVC investments across multiple industries, we found support for them, and these findings may inform the CVC activities of corporate investors. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Activity-Based Costing on Managerial Decisions at Insteel Industries—A Field Study

In this field-based study, we interview top- and middle-level managers at Insteel Industries and conduct statistical analysis of firm-level data in order to shed light on whether activity-based costing (ABC) provides new information to managers and whether activity-based management (ABM) significantly influences product and customer-related decisions. We find that after the ABC analysis, Insteel undertook a number of process improvements that resulted in significant cost savings. Additionally, Insteel displayed a higher propensity to discontinue or increase prices of products and discontinue customers that were found comparatively unprofitable in the ABC study. Thus we provide empirical evidence that ABC influences both strategic and operational managerial decisions.     

Is There a Link Between Money Illusion and Homeowners’ Expectations of Housing Prices?

Money illusion is a behavioral bias in which a person thinks in terms of nominal rather than real values. This article reports homeowners’ responses to a survey designed to measure the extent of money illusion as well as homeowners’ expectations regarding home valuations. Our survey respondents suffer from money illusion, yet they have reasonable expectations of home prices. Our analysis did not identify any unique individual characteristic that correlates with homeowners’ choices and suggests that the relationship between money illusion and mispricing is subtle and multifaceted.     

Aligning incentives in supply chains

Most companies don't worry about the behavior of their supply chain partners. Instead, they expect the supply chain to work efficiently without interference, as if guided by Adam Smith's famed invisible hand. In their study of more than 50 supply networks, V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman found that companies often looked out for their own interests and ignored those of their network partners. Consequently, supply chains performed poorly. Those results aren't shocking when you consider that supply chains extend across several functions and many companies, each with its own priorities and goals. Yet all those functions and firms must pull in the same direction for a chain to deliver goods and services to consumers quickly and cost-effectively. According to the authors, a supply chain works well only if the risks, costs, and rewards of doing business are distributed fairly across the network. In fact, misaligned incentives are often the cause of excess inventory, stock-outs, incorrect forecasts, inadequate sales efforts, and even poor customer service. The fates of all supply chain partners are interlinked: If the firms work together to serve consumers, they will all win. However, they can do that only if incentives are aligned. Companies must acknowledge that the problem of incentive misalignment exists and then determine its root cause and align or redesign incentives. They can improve alignment by, for instance, adopting revenue-sharing contracts, using technology to track previously hidden information, or working with intermediaries to build trust among network partners. It's also important to periodically reassess incentives, because even top-performing networks find that changes in technology or business conditions alter the alignment of incentives.     

Top Management Compensation and the Structure of the Board of Directors in Commercial Banks

We examine the relationship between top management compensation and thestructure of the board of directors for a sample of commercial banks. Wefind that boards with more reputable outside directors compensate managersmore heavily with long-term incentives (stock and stock options) than withcash (salary and bonus). We also find a significant positive correlationbetween the future performance of our sample banks and the proportion oftheir managers' compensation in the form of long-term incentives. Taken together, these results suggest that boards with highly reputed outsidedirectors are more effective in providing managers with the appropriateincentives and thus ensuring better future firm performance. Anotherindication of the effectiveness of these boards is our finding that theycompensate managers more heavily with long-term incentives (instead ofcash) when these managers are more entrenched. We also find very little evidence of mutually beneficial back-scratching or collusion betweenoutside directors and senior managers when setting management compensation.But boards with long-serving outside directors are less effective increating appropriate management incentives.     

The dividend policies of all-equity firms: A direct test of the free cash flow theory

This paper finds support for Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that dividends and debt are substitute mechanisms for controlling the agency costs of free cash flow. We find that dividend payout ratios of a sample of all-equity firms are significantly higher than those of a control group of levered firms. Further, within the group of all-equity firms, firms with lower managerial holdings have higher payout ratios. These results hold after controlling for free cash flow and growth rates. Overall, our evidence suggests that dividends and managerial ownership are substitute mechanisms for reducing agency costs in all-equity firms.     

Do Country Specific Bankruptcy Codes Determine Long‐term Financial Performance? The Case of Metallgesellschaft AG and Columbia Gas System

In this paper, we examine the impact of financial distress, the bankruptcy code, and related procedures on the long-term performance of two companies engaged in similar businesses across two countries. Both the companies were driven into bankruptcy as a result of unanticipated changes in energy prices. Though the resolution of bankruptcy of the US firm took a longer time, the post-reorganization performance of the firm has been excellent. In contrast, the post-reorganization performance of the German firm, which emerged out of bankruptcy in 2 weeks, has been poor. These results are consistent with the view that one of the important determinants of post-bankruptcy performance of a firm is more likely to be the underlying economic fundamentals rather than the country specific bankruptcy code through which the firm reorganizes.