Sequential selling mechanisms

Summary In this paper we attempt to formalize the idea that a mechanism that involves multilateral communication between buyers and sellers may be dominated by one that involves simple bilateral communication. To do this we consider the well known problem in which a seller tries to sell a single unit of output to a group ofN buyers who have independently distributed private valuations. Our arguments hinge on two considerations. First, buyers communicate their willingness to negotiate with the seller sequentially, and second, buyers have the option of purchasing the good from some alternative supplier. It is shown that the seller cannot improve upon a procedure in which she offers the good to each buyer in turn at a fixed price. The seller reverts to multilateral communication if possible, only when no buyer is willing to pay the fixed price. In reasonable environments buyers will be too impatient to wait for the outcome of a multilateral negotiation and all communications will be bilateral.In many problems in mechanism design, informed traders have no alternative to participation in the mechanism that is offered by its designer. The best mechanism from the designer's point of view is then the one that is most efficient at extracting informational rents, that is, a simple auction. In a competitive environment it is likely to be costly for buyers to participate in an auction or any other multilateral selling scheme in which the seller must process information from many different buyers because alternative trading opportunities will be disappearing during the time that the seller is collecting this information. Buyers might be willing to participate in an auction, but only if they could be guaranteed that the competition that they face will not eliminate too much of their surplus.At the other extreme to the auction is a simple fixed price selling scheme 1. The seller simply waits until he meets a buyer whose valuation is high enough, given the opportunities that exist in the rest of the market, for him to be willing to pay this price. The seller extracts the minimum of the buyer's informational rents since the price that a buyer pays is independent of his valuation. Yet the seller might like this scheme if adding a second bidder to the process makes it very difficult for him to find a buyer with a valuation high enough to want to participate.In the presence of opportunity costs, the seller faces a trade-off between his ability to extract buyers informational rents and his ability to find buyers who are willing to participate in any competitive process. In practice this trade-off will impose structure on the method that is used to determine a price. In markets where there are auctions, limits are put on buyer participation. In tobacco auctions bids are submitted at a distinct point in time from buyers who are present at that time. In real estate auctions time limits are put on the amount of time the seller will wait before making a decision. These restrictions on participation are presumably endogenously selected by the seller (possibly in competition with other mechanism designers) with this trade-off in mind.On the other hand, markets in which objects appear to trade at a fixed price are rarely so simple. A baker with a fixed supply of fresh bagels is unlikely to collect bids from buyers and award the bagels to the high bidder at the end of the day. Buyers are unlikely to be willing to participate in such a scheme since they can buy fresh bagels from a competitor down the street. Yet despite the fact that bagels sell at a fixed price throughout the day, most bakers are more than willing to let it be known that they will discount price at the end of the day on any bagels that they have not yet sold. Selling used cars presents a similar problem. Each potential buyer for the used car is likely to have inspected a number of alternatives, and is likely to know the prices at which these alternative can be obtained. A seller who suggests that buyers submit a bid, then wait until the seller is sure that no higher offer will be submitted is asking buyers to forgo these alternative opportunities with no gain to themselves. To avoid the rigidity of the pure fixed price scheme most used cars are sold for a fixed price or best offer. These examples suggest that the best selling mechanism may involve a complex interplay between participation and surplus extraction considerations.The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple formalism within which the factors that determine the best contract can be evaluated. We consider the best known environment from the point of view of auction design in which there are a large number of buyers with independent private valuations for a unit of an indivisible commodity that is being sold by a single supplier who acts as the mechanism designer. We modify this standard problem in two critical ways. First, we assume that the seller meets the potential buyers sequentially rather than all at once. Secondly we assume that buyers have a valuable alternative that yields them a sure surplus. This creates a simple bidding cost that is effectively the expected loss in surplus (created by the disappearance of outside alternatives) that the buyer faces during the time that he spends negotiating with the seller.These simple assumptions allow us to calculate the impact of competition and communication costs using completely standard arguments from the mechanism design literature. We are able to show that with these assumptions the seller's expected surplus will be highest if the object is sold according to the following modified fixed price scheme: the seller contacts each of the potential buyers in turn and either offers to negotiate or announces that he no longer wishes to trade. If he offers to negotiate and the buyer agrees, the buyer immediately has the option of trading for sure with the seller at a fixed price set ex ante. If the buyer does not wish to pay this fixed price, he may submit an alternative bid. The seller will then continue to contact new buyers, returning to trade with the buyer only if no buyer wishes to pay the fixed price and no higher bid is submitted.It will be clear that in our environment, both the simple fixed price scheme and the simple auction are feasible. The simple auction prevails when the fixed price is set equal to the maximum possible valuation, while the simple fixed price scheme occurs when the fixed price is set so that buyers are willing to participate if and only if they are willing to pay the fixed price. Our results will show that a simple auction in never optimal for the seller. The seller can always strictly improve his payoff by moving to a scheme in which there is some strictly positive probability that trade will occur at the fixed price. On the other hand, there are reasonable circumstances in which the seller cannot achieve a higher payoff than the one she gets by selling at a fixed price. It is shown that for any positive participation cost, there is a large, but finite, number of potential buyers so that the seller cannot achieve a higher payoff than what she gets by selling at a fixed price. Two simple, but important continuity results are also illustrated. As the cost of participation in the mechanism increases (decreases), the probability with which the seller's unit of output is sold at a fixed price goes to one (zero) in the best modified fixed price mechanism for the seller.Our paper is not the first to generate such a modified fixed price scheme. Both McAfee and McMillan (1988) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) come up with similar schemes for the case in which the seller must bear a fixed cost for each new buyer that she contacts. There are two essential differences between our model and theirs. First, as the cost is interpreted as the opportunity cost of participation in the mechanism, it is reasonable to imagine that the seller advertises the mechanism ex ante. Another way of putting this is that the seller pays a fixed rather than a variable cost to communicate the mechanism to buyers. This makes it possible to assume that the mechanism is common knowledge to the seller and all the buyers at the beginning of the communication process. For this reason we can make our case using completely standard arguments. Secondly, the mechanism in the opportunity cost case plays a different allocative role than it does in the case when the seller bears a cost. The mechanism must decide whether buyers should communicate with the seller or pursue their alternative activities, as well as who should trade and at what price. It is this allocative role that makes bilateral communication superior to multilateral communication in a competitive environment. These differences allow us to show, for example, that a simple fixed price scheme is undominated for the seller when the number of buyers is finite. As shown by McAfee and McMillan, this is only possible when the number of potential buyers is infinite when the seller bears the cost of communication.Remarkably, the existence of opportunity costs to buyer participation is not, by itself, sufficient to explain why sellers might prefer bilateral communications mechanisms. Samuelson (1983) and McAfee and McMillan (1987) show that when buyers must pay a fixed cost to submit a bid, which is equivalent to giving up a valuable alternative, a seller cannot expect to earn more than she does in a second price auction (though Samuelson shows that the reserve price may depend on the number of potential buyers). One of the contributions of this paper is to show that the assumption that buyers make their participation decisions simultaneously is critical to this result. Simultaneous entry decisions means that whether or not any particular buyer is assigned to the alternative activity is independent of any other buyer's valuation. With sequential communication the seller is able to relax this constraint. It is precisely the enlargement of the class of feasible mechanism that breaks down the optimality of the simple auction.The second author acknowledges the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the CRDE at the Université de Montreal.     

Literacy,technology and ‘technological literacy’

The shortcomings of the technological literacy metaphor are reviewed. The lack of an agreed meaning for this concept reflects a widespread perplexity about how the study of technology should be incorporated into general education. The paper considers how the study of literature and history might contribute to an understanding of technology and posits a framework which permits the study of the made world to be incorporated within a humanistic educational scheme. It is suggested that the historical study of technologies of literacy could play a significant role in curricular integration.Based on a Plenary Address to the second Domains of Literacy Conference:Literacies for a Productive Future Institute of Education London 1/9/94Michael Barnett has been, since 1992, Professor of Technology and Education at the Institute of Education in London University. Prior to that he was Reader in Physics at Imperial College London. His main scholarly activities are concerned with the history, philosophy and sociology of technology and their bearing on educational practice. He has established an MA programme in Technology and Education which reflects these concerns.     

Transfer sciences: management of distributed knowledge production

This paper is concerned to develop the notion of transfer science to take account of what is perceived to be the emergence of a new mode of knowledge production. The new mode which is characterised by the production of knowledge in the context of application, by transdisciplinarity, by homogeneity and organisational diversity, by enhanced social accountability and reflexivity, and by new forms of quality control. The thrust of the new mode of knowledge production is to call into question conventional notions of knowledge transfer and focuses instead on the organisational and managerial implications of the emergence of a socially distributed knowledge production system. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the emergence of the new mode of production. Needed in the new mode are science and technology policies which promote institutional permeability and policies which enable governments, acting through their civil service to act as brokers in the new knowledge production process. Such brokerage is necessary to enhance permeability between institutions within a particular country but also to increase co-operation and collaboration between institutions across countries.     

Portfolio Capital Flows: Hot or Cold?

A distinction is often made between short-term and long-termcapital flows: the former are deemed unstable hot money andthe latter are deemed stable cold money. Using time-series analysisof balance of payments data for five industrial and five developingcountries, we find that in most cases the labels "short-term"and "long-term" do not provide any information about the time-seriesproperties of the flow. In particular, long-term flows are oftenas volatile as short-term flows, and the time it takes for anunexpected shock to a flow to die out is similar across flows.long-term flows are also at least as unpredictable as short-termflows, and knowledge of the type of flow does not improve theability to forecast the aggregate capital account.     

The impact of tax on foreign direct investment: Empirical evidence and the implications for tax integration schemes

We estimate the impact of taxation on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, using data on flows between seven countries for 1984 through 1989, and a sophisticated measure of the cost of capital. We find that the choice between domestic investment and total outward FDI is not significantly affected by taxation but that taxation does affect the location of outward FDI. These results are used to examine the impact of tax integration systems. Giving a tax credit to foreign shareholders may induce a large increase in inward FDI from exemption countries but not from partial-credit countries. For the United States, the total effect would be small.     

A discrete characterization of Slutsky symmetry

Summary A smooth demand function is generated by utility maximization if and only if its Slutsky matrix is symmetric and negative semidefinite. Slutsky symmetry is equivalent to absence of smooth revealed preference cycles, cf. Hurwicz and Richter (Econometrica 1979). To observe such a cycle would require a continuum of data. We characterize Slutsky symmetry by means of discrete antisymmetric revealed preference cycles consisting of either three or four observations.The first author's research was supported in part by NSF grant DMS-9401355, and the second author's by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 303, and by a SUNY Faculty Research award.     

Ethics in business education: Working toward a meaningful reciprocity

This paper outlines and argues against some criticisms of business ethics education. It maintains that these criticisms have been put forward due to a misunderstanding of the nature of business and/or ethics. Business ethics seeks a meaningful reciprocity among economic, social and moral concerns. This demands that business organizations autonomously develop ethical goals from within, which in turn demands a reciprocity between ethical theory and practical experience. Working toward such a reciprocity, the ultimate goal of business ethics education is a moral business point of view through which one can live with integrity and fulfillment.To everyone who proposes to have a good career, moral philosophy is indispensible. Cicero, De Officiis, 44BC W. Michael Hoffman is Chair and Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Director at the Center for Business Ethics, Bentley College, Waltham, MA. He has received the following Grants: Council for Philosophical Studies, NEH Fellow, NDEA Fellow, Matchette. His most important publications are: Kant's Theory of Freedom: A Metaphysical Inquiry (UPA, 1979); Proceedings of the National Conferences on Business Ethics, 5 volumes (1977–1984); Business Ethics (McGraw-Hill, 1984) and articles in Journal of Business Ethics, Idealistic Studies, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Journal of Thought, The Journal for Critical Analysis, and The Southern Journal of Philosophy.Paper presented at the 16th Conference on Value Inquiry, entitled: Ethics and the Market Place: An Exercise in Bridge-Building or On the Slopes of the Interface.     

Is capitalism still viable?

This essay is an attempt to clarify the meaning of capitalism and to argue that this form of economic pattern will survive in the U.S. in the twentieth century. Capitalism should not be viewed as an abstraction which implies a religion, an ideology, a form of government, or a moral philosophy, but rather the private ownership of capital. Marx was wrong when he predicted the speedy decay of the capitalistic system in the West and when he claimed that a competitive system will lead to servitude and poverty for the masses; on the contrary, the American economic system is a grand success. Part of this success resulted from natural resources; part from America's being one of the largest free-trade areas; and part from the economic system, so-called capitalism, by which we have governed ourselves. The outcome is a greater measure of freedom, prosperity, leisure, and industrial sophistication. These achievements are hardly paralleled by any of the advanced countries of the world. Russell Kirk is a Distinguished Scholar of The Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. He is the author of twenty-three books and of several hundred essays. His books include The Conservative Mind; The Roots of American Order; and, recently, Decadence and Renewal in the Higher Learning.This article was originally published in The Hillsdale Review. Copyright © 1982 by Hillsdale Review Inc.     

THE PLACE OF MANAGERS IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

The discussion of industrial democracy in Britain has exploded in the last few years, but the result has been to write an agenda which has still to be worked through, not to reveal a consensus which can be written into action at once.     

Explaining Real Commercial Rents Using an Error Correction Model with Panel Data

This paper presents rent models for retail and office property in the United Kingdom. Panel data are used covering eleven regions for 29 years, enabling us to overcome the limitations of a relatively short time series. We use an error correction model (ECM) framework to estimate long-run equilibrium relationships and short-term dynamic corrections. The combination of panel data and an ECM is an innovative approach that is still being developed in economics. We construct new supply series that combine infrequent stock data with more frequent construction data. Separate regional models are estimated for retail and office properties. The regions are then combined into a number of panels on the basis of the income and price elasticities in the long-run and short-run models. Unlike previous studies, we find no evidence of a board north–south divide between low growth and high growth regions. Like these studies we do find a London effect: in London, demand elasticities for space with respect to both price (rent) and income are much lower in magnitude. We conclude that, while the economic drivers may vary, there is no evidence of differences in the operation of the regional property markets outside London. Elasticities for retail and office are similar. Our final models are parsimonious with single measures of economic activity and of supply and always support the use of an ECM.