创新链全覆盖的高质量科技创新人才体系建设研究——以四川省科技创新人才体系建设为例

全球科技创新竞争,归根结底是科技创新人才的竞争。党的十九大明确将人才强国战略确定为国家战略。四川省在落实人才强国战略、加快由要素驱动转型为创新驱动的过程中,不断提升科技创新人才队伍规模和质量,但相比沿海发达地区,仍存在人才数量不足、结构不合理、政策落地不到位等问题。文章提出通过加强科技创新人才队伍顶层设计、构建“技术经纪人”人才服务体系、优化科技创新人才机制体制、加大科技创新人才开放、合作和交流等措施,构建“全方位、多层次”“创新链全覆盖”的高质量科技创新人才体系。     

向塘西站调度辅助决策支持系统的研究

分析向塘西站作业量增长情况,以及运输组织方式存在的问题,为确保运输安全和提高作业效率,研制了编组站调度辅助决策支持系统。在介绍系统结构设计的基础上,论述了系统的主要功能。系统的应用达到了提高调度工作质量、减轻劳动强度和实时反映技术作业动态等效果,有效提高了车站生产效率。     

Blockholder Exit Threats and Financial Reporting Quality

Recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that blockholders (shareholders with ownership ≥ 5 percent) exert governance through the threat of exit. Blockholders have strong incentives to gather private information and sell their shares when managers are perceived to underperform. To prevent blockholders from selling their shares and the firm from suffering a stock price decline, managers align their actions with the interests of shareholders. As a result of the greater manager‐shareholder alignment, managers' actions are more likely to be in shareholders' best interest, and consequently there is less need for managers to manipulate earnings. Consistent with these predictions from economic theory, we find evidence that as exit threat increases, firms have higher financial reporting quality. Theory also predicts that the impact of blockholders' exit threat on financial reporting quality (FRQ) should increase as the manager's wealth is tied more closely to the stock price, and this is what we find. Our study contributes to the research on the impact of shareholders on FRQ and to an emerging literature on the impact of blockholders in financial markets. Blockholders play an important role in managers' reporting outcomes through their actions as informed investors.     

Do Education and Income Really Explain Inequalities in Health? Applying a Twin Design

We apply a twin design to examine the relationship between health and education and income. The estimated associations between health and education and income, controlling for unobserved endowments, at the twin‐pair level, are lower than estimates obtained via ordinary least‐squares (OLS) on the same sample. Thus, OLS‐based effects of education and income are biased, exaggerating the contribution of education and income to health inequality. The main part of health inequality is explained by within‐twin‐pair fixed effects, incorporating family background and genetic inheritance. It appears that education and income policies have less to offer for reducing health inequality than is usually assumed.     

ASYMMETRY OF CUSTOMER LOSS AND RECOVERY UNDER ENDOGENOUS PARTNERSHIPS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*

This article is inspired by real‐world phenomena that firms lose customers based on imprecise information and take a long time to recover. If consumers are playing an ordinary repeated game with fixed partners, there is no clear reason why recovery happens slowly. However, if consumers are playing an endogenously repeated game, a class of simple efficient equilibria exhibits the asymmetry of fast loss and slow recovery of customers after a bad signal. Exit is systematic, but formation of a new partnership is random. We also give empirical evidence of our equilibria at an individual‐firm level.     

FAIR RETIREMENT UNDER RISKY LIFETIME*

A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime and compare the laissez‐faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies, and (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption profiles as well as raising the retirement age. This result is robust to the introduction of unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities.     

Does Tax Competition Reduce Corruption?

A vast literature asserts that competition among jurisdictions can mitigate corruption. However, empirical studies do not fully support such a conventional view. This paper points out a drawback of the conventional view, that is, it ignores the role played by the owners of immobile factors. Within a standard tax competition model, we amend the conventional view by incorporating the lobbying of the immobile factor owners, and show that fiscal decentralization can aggravate corruption. We also demonstrate that social welfare can be higher under decentralization than under centralization in some cases, whereas the immobile factor owners' lobbying will prevent such a superiority of decentralization from being the outcome. Moreover, we provide an example to show that a better policy outcome and a higher level of corruption can co‐exist, which contrasts with the general belief.     

Is there Causal Relationship between Money Supply Growth and Inflation in China? Evidence from Quantity Theory of Money

This study examines the causal relationship between Chinese money supply growth and inflation, using the bootstrap Granger full‐sample causality test and sub‐sample rolling‐window estimation test to determine whether such a relationship in China supports the quantity theory of money. The result indicates that there is a unidirectional relationship from inflation to money supply growth. However, considering structural changes in two series, we find that short‐run relationships using full‐sample data are unstable, which suggests that full‐sample causality tests cannot be relied upon. Then, we use a time‐varying rolling‐window approach to revisit the dynamic causal relationship, and the results show that money supply growth has both positive and negative impacts on inflation in several sub‐periods, and in turn, inflation has the same effects on money supply growth for China. These findings are basically consistent with the modern quantity theory of money from the perspective of money supply and price level. When money supply growth does not outweigh output growth, inflation should not be curbed only by decreasing money supply. It notes that a stable money supply growth is critical to price level stability and economic development in China.     

Economic Integration,Monopoly Power and Productivity Growth without Scale Effects

This paper considers how monopoly power affects the relationship between economic integration and economic growth that is not biased by a scale effect. In a two‐country model of trade, productivity growth is generated by firm‐level investment in process innovation, and the location of economic activity is determined by relative market size, trade costs and imperfect knowledge diffusion. Equilibrium features the partial concentration of manufacturing and the full concentration of innovation in the larger country. Increased economic integration raises the concentration of manufacturing in the larger country, and when monopoly power is strong, leads to decreased product variety, accelerated productivity growth and greater national welfare. With weak monopoly power, however, it raises product variety and dampens productivity growth, but may benefit or hurt welfare.